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In recent years Puerto Ricans in New York City have become difficult to locate in the 
public realm. This is a paradox given that Puerto Ricans make up the largest Hispanic subgroup 
in the larger metropolitan region. This study examines how, when, and why Puerto Ricans 
became publicly invisible in New York City. 
Through content analysis of archival newspapers, interviews with local politicians’ 
offices and local residents, analysis of demographic data, and ethnographic fieldwork in 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods in the 2012-2013 academic year, I examine the impact 
of changes in local demography, media, politics, and culture on the public identity of Puerto 
Ricans in New York City. With respect to demography, the Puerto Rican has become 
increasingly dispersed throughout the region, as well as increasingly dispersed among other 
Latinos. The result is that Puerto Rican concentration has lessened in historically Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods, contributing to declining visibility. What has not changed, however, is the high 
poverty rate, the low labor force participation, the low median income, and the low levels of 
educational attainment that many local Puerto Ricans continue to face. 
In the media, local news reports about Puerto Ricans have dwindled, and in their place, 
news reports about Hispanics have flourished.  This phenomenon is present in both the English 
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language and Spanish language news. The New York Times and El Diario La Prensa have both 
shifted their lenses away from local Puerto Ricans, a shift that began in earnest in the 1970s. As 
one of the primary means of public visibility, local media has also contributed to Puerto Rican 
public invisibility. 
In the political realm, Puerto Ricans make up the majority of local Hispanic politicians, 
and tend to focus on issues that Puerto Ricans do not face. For example, many Puerto Rican 
politicians are quite passionate about policies related to Hispanic immigration, a process that 
Puerto Ricans are not subject to. In contrast, the issues that Puerto Ricans face, such as high 
poverty rates, low labor force participation, and comparatively low median incomes amongst 
local Hispanics, are rarely a public topic of political discussion. This trend largely began in the 
2000s. This combined with the increase in Hispanic local news coverage means that the gains 
made amongst Puerto Rican politicians in recent decades has been largely ignored. Both of these 
political developments have contributed to Puerto Rican invisibility. 
Lastly, Puerto Ricans have become far less visible in the cultural realm. Salsa music, as 
perhaps one of the most visible Puerto Rican cultural objects in the U.S., is one example of how 
Puerto Ricans have become culturally invisible. The musical genre was never institutionalized, 
music marketers have since moved on to promote more pop versions of “Latin” music, and 
prominent Puerto Rican artists have denied any kinds of ownership of the genre. 
In sum, demographic, media-based, political, and cultural changes have all contributed to 
the decline in Puerto Rican ethnic visibility. The consequence is that although Puerto Ricans 
continue to be racialized (as evidenced by their socioeconomic indicators), their racialization 
cannot be seen in the public realm. Instead, Hispanic characteristics are highlighted in public 
discourse.  The subsuming of Puerto Ricans into the quasi-racial Hispanic category means that 
vi	 
their ethnic specificity is muted. This story of invisibility is not a story of assimilation, it is a 
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Introduction 
The Puerto Rican population in New York City has become increasingly difficult to 
locate in the public realm in the past 10-15 years. Twenty years ago, one could take a trip to the 
Bronx, Brooklyn, or Spanish Harlem and take in the sights, sounds, and smells of the local 
Puerto Rican community and culture. In addition, as the public face of the population, prominent 
Puerto Rican politicians and artists were clearly identified as Puerto Ricans, as were the number 
of non-profit institutions that served the Puerto Rican community.  Furthermore, the Puerto 
Rican population constituted a public presence, and factor, in New York City’s daily operations. 
In fact, Puerto Ricans were long considered a problem population in need of aid. However, as 
Hispanic and Latino marketing, political maneuvers, and media tactics gained momentum, and 
demographic patterns in New York City shifted, Puerto Ricans have been publicly obscured. 
Puerto Ricans remain the largest Hispanic subgroup in the region, yet they are invisible. 
Some would argue that this trend toward invisibility signals an assimilation into 
American society, wherein “Puerto Rican” no longer holds the same meaning now that a third 
generation of Puerto Ricans has been born on the mainland. This third generation, according to 
assimilation theory, likely would have spatial, economic, and social characteristics similar to 
other Americans (Gordon, 1964). In this sense, by being indistinguishable from other 
Americans, they would be ethnically invisible. Yet recent evaluations of Puerto Ricans in the 
United States indicate that many within this third generation, particularly those not 
phenotypically white, have not achieved what other immigrant groups have managed to achieve 
through assimilation (Bergad, 2010).   Other immigrant groups, such as those of European 
2	 
descent, were rapidly assimilating into American society by the third generation (Alba, 1981). 
However, unlike those of European lineage, recent work describes the challenges Puerto Ricans 
face in attaining upward mobility, more so even than other Hispanic immigrant populations 
(Kasinitz, et al, 2009). 
This decrease in Puerto Rican visibility is associated with an increase in panethnic 
Hispanic and Latino profiles. In fact, many formerly Puerto Rican organizations have now 
broadened their scope to include this larger panethnic population. Despite this correlation, there 
has been little to no analysis of the relationship between these two trends, and of any impact of 
this relatively newfound focus on the conglomerate. Have Puerto Ricans, and also other Spanish 
speaking sub-groups assimilated into the “Hispanic” population? Or have Puerto Ricans become 
American? Or both? Because there is not any literature currently available to answer these 
questions, perhaps the most pertinent question is when, how, and why have Puerto Ricans 
become obscured from public view, while “Hispanics” have become difficult to avoid? 
The media is one institution that has an incredible capacity to shape and disseminate 
political ideas to the public. Some have gone so far as to call the media the fourth pillar (or 
estate) of democracy, due to its incredible capacity to influence public opinion (Schultz, 1998). 
The other pillars include the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judiciary system. 
In New York City, the largest English language newspaper is the New York Times, and the 
largest Spanish language newspaper is El Diario La Prensa. These two media organizations 
have played in integral role in shaping the beliefs and attitudes of English and Spanish speaking 
New York City for decades - the New York Times for the past 100 years, and El Diario La 
Prensa for the past 50 years. These two sites have played a paramount role in influencing New 
York City’s ideas about Puerto Ricans and their role in local politics and culture.  In the past, 
3	 
Puerto Ricans were deemed to be quite important to the local political landscape, however in 
recent years they have lost the media’s attention in many respects while other groups, such as the 
larger Hispanic/Latino population, or even other Hispanic subgroups, have captured their lens. 
Thus, everyday Puerto Ricans have become far less visible in the eyes of the public. 
 
The same can be said of studies on Puerto Ricans, wherein there has been a drastic 
decrease in the number of scholarly works that address Puerto Rican conditions.  And the few 
that have addressed Puerto Ricans at all, while important, tend to deal more with historical, 
theoretical or cultural issues than investigate the quantitatively measureable educational, 
economic, and social condition of the population today (Whalen and Vazquez-Hernandez, 2005; 
Davila, 2004; Flores, 2009). There are a few exceptions to this rule. One key work is Gabriel 
Haslip-Viera, Angelo Falcon, and Felix Matos Rodriguez’ Boricuas in Gotham: Puerto Ricans in 
the Making of New York City (2004) – but this work is now over 10 years old and stands fairly 
alone in the field. In the past, numerous works assessed various realms of Nuyorican life, the 
experience of Puerto Ricans in New York City. Take, for example the everyday experiences 
captured in Jesus Colon’s A Puerto Rican in New York (1961), Dan Wakefield’s Island in the 
City (1957), or Elena Padilla’s Up From Puerto Rico (1958) to the more sociological take found 
in Lawrence Chenault’s The Puerto Rican Migrant in New York City (1938). Puerto Ricans were 
also chosen for in-depth comparison to other groups, such as in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. 
Moynihan’s Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of 
New York City (1963). Since the same cannot be said of ethnic scholarship today, Puerto Rican 
visibility has declined in scholarship as well. 
It is true that there has been a net loss of Puerto Ricans from New York City proper, 
which could contribute to their declining visibility (Table 1; Table 8).  However, when looking 
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beyond the constraints of the literal municipal boundaries, the population loss is far less than 
reported. Yes, the five boroughs experienced a net loss of about 140,000 Puerto Ricans between 
1980 and 2010 - but this is misleading, as a subset of the Puerto Rican population has come to 
reside in surrounding metro-area suburbs over the years. When including the more suburban 
surrounding counties in the analysis, there has only been a net loss of about 25,000 Puerto Ricans 
from the area over this same period (Table 8). As well, when viewing each of the five boroughs 
separately, there is a different interpretation as well. The more common Puerto Rican residential 
destinations of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan have lost Puerto Rican residents and yet 
remain much unchanged with respect to variables such as Puerto Rican income and poverty 
rates, whereas the more suburban boroughs of Queens and Staten Island have become 
destinations for upwardly mobile Puerto Ricans.  The suburbanization of a subset of more 
affluent Puerto Ricans is indicative of the ongoing process of in-group stratification, which 
seems to have accelerated in recent years. Puerto Ricans residents in the suburban locales in the 
region tend to have much more equitable incomes and far lower poverty rates than their urban 
counterparts. These residents are also younger, as upwardly mobile parents seek to raise their 
children in these suburban counties (Table 6).  However, in the past four years since the 
collection of the 2010 Census, none of this information has been reported in the mainstream- 
media or widely disseminated policy papers.  Thus, even statistically, Puerto Ricans have 
become less visible. 
Instead, there are reports pointing to the proliferation of Dominicans and Mexicans in 
New York City.  Obscured by available reports are important comparisons between these 
Hispanic subgroups. There were estimates that the number of Dominicans in New York City 
would surpass the number of Puerto Ricans in the 2010 Census, however, Puerto Ricans continue 
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to remain the largest Hispanic subgroup outnumbering Dominicans by about 150,000 residents. 
Between Puerto Ricans, Mexicans, and Dominicans, Puerto Ricans maintained the highest 
percentage of residents whose income was below the poverty level in 2010. Thirty two point 
seven percent of the Puerto Rican population in New York City had incomes below the poverty 
level in that year compared to 29.7% of Dominicans, and 28.9% of Mexicans (Table 16). These 
higher levels of poverty should mean that Puerto Ricans are hyper-visible because they have 
been unable to assimilate into New York City’s economy, even less able than other Hispanic 
subgroups despite their longevity in the region and their size in the population. Thus, in-group 
stratification, and the subsequent suburbanization of the more upwardly mobile Puerto Rican 
subset, has contributed to a more concentrated experience of poverty in the core New York City 
boroughs of the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan- poverty that is looked over in the face of 
Puerto Rican flight from New York City proper and the influx of other Hispanic subgroups. 
 
 




At the conclusion of the Spanish American War in 1898 Puerto Rico became a territorial 
possession of the United States (Gonzalez-Cruz, 1998). There has been a Puerto Rican population 
in the United States ever since, i.e., from the start of 20th century. The most notable growth in the 
mainland-based Puerto Rican population occurred following World War II during what is known 
amongst scholars of Puerto Rican Studies as the Great Migration: a steady, largely one-way flow 
of Puerto Ricans from the island to the United States that began around 1940 (Korrol, 1983). 
The first Puerto Rican migrants left rural areas for urban centers on the island to only later 
migrate to the U.S. mainland. Unemployment on the island was high.  Industrialization also meant 
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increased mechanization and a decreased need for farm labor. Also there was an increase in 
population, which combined with an increase in longevity and health, meant more people were 
available to work. Like other migrants/immigrants, Puerto Ricans came to the mainland U.S. in 
search of work, although they did not have to content with citizenship concerns (Sanchez-Korrol, 
1983). On the mainland United States there were numerous job opportunities in light industry, 
jobs that did not require a high skill level. At the time of the Great Migration, Puerto Rican 
migrants were largely working class, both male and female, and between 1940 and 1960, the Puerto 
Rican population in New York City is estimated to have grown from about 60,000 to about 
600,000, increasing tenfold. 
Four factors make post-WWII Puerto Rican migrants markedly different from other 
migrant streams. First, the timing of their migration was unique in that it both occurred after the 
old European immigration (halted for the most part in 1924) and before the later immigration 
unleashed by the 1965 relaxation of U.S. immigration law restrictions. Also unique, this Great 
Migration of Puerto Ricans took place by air, not sea- a technology that shortened transport time. 
Third, all Puerto Ricans entering the U.S. were deemed migrants (and not immigrants) by way of 
the 1917 Jones Act, because they were U.S. citizens prior to migrating. Lastly, the migration of 
Puerto Ricans to the Northeast coincides with the migration of African Americans from the rural 
Southern United States to cities in the North (this migration has also been termed the “Great 
Migration”). These differences from other migrant groups, and the similarity with African 
Americans would contribute to Puerto Ricans’ experience in New York City neighborhoods and 
politics. 
As noted, in earlier decades, it was common to read or hear about ethnic politics in New 
York City (Irish, Italian, Puerto Rican, etc.) in the press and in scholarly works, when immigration 
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and migration were fresh enough to ensure in-group similarities surpassed or at least equated out- 
group alliances (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963). Today, however, for the population deemed 
Hispanic, panethnic politics is the most dominant theme in discourse (academic work and the 
media), particularly near elections (Hugo Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Motel, 2011). The press 
consistently reports that “Hispanic” voters are of prime importance, since these constituents are 
increasing in number at a much more rapid rate than white and black panethnic/racial groups, and 
thus will outnumber white voters in the near future. However, the Puerto Rican role in this 
equation is not clear. 
 
 




The relationship between politics and panethnicity has been addressed in previous 
scholarly works such as Yen Le Espiritu’s work Asian American Panethnicity: Bridging 
Institutions and Identities, wherein she studied the roles of both people of Asian descent and U.S. 
institutions in shaping Asian American panethnic identity in America (Espiritu, 1992). Various 
governmental institutions sought to consolidate the quickly growing “Asian” population in the era 
of post-1965 immigration, but immigrants from all over Asia, and their descendants also used 
panethnicity as a political tool to combat American racism and prejudice. Given their shared 
experience of growing up non-white in the United States, the children of immigrants from Asian 
nations tended to feel more similar to other second-generation people of Asian descent so 
panethnicity made sense to them. The Asian embrace of panethnicity does not mean that there 
was always harmony amongst people of different Asian backgrounds. In fact, Le Espiritu 
documents the differences and discord based upon nation of origin, sex, and class, among other 
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variables. It is important to note the role that education plays in this work as many of the 
participants in Asian panethnic movements tended to be college educated. 
Unlike many other Asian subgroups, Puerto Ricans have not experienced the same rate of 
success in post-secondary education and related economic assimilation (Davis, 2001; Min, 2008). 
The few Puerto Ricans that have obtained success in academia and politics have become the public 
face of the Puerto Rican community, however in many respects these success stories are 
disconnected from the experiences of the larger Puerto Rican community. There is also a dearth 
of literature examining the relationship between ethnicity and panethnicity in the field of culture 
in recent years. The late Juan Flores was the last to assess Puerto Rican culture in the mainland 
context – examining both linguistic and musical expressions of culture (Flores, 1992; Flores, 
2000). 
According to current research the term “Hispanic” was largely unheard of in the United 
States until the 1970s and was not used in Census measurement tools until 1980 (Mora, 2014). A 
group in the Nixon Administration is responsible for the term’s appearance in the Census, partially 
at the behest of Gloria Flores-Hughes, a Mexican American from Texas working for the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare at the time (Flores-Hughes, 2013). The term was 
meant to consolidate into one group all Spanish-speaking people in the United States, who were 
thought to share a similar position in the American labor economy. According to G. Cristina Mora, 
in the 1970s, the social activists worked to broaden the scope of policy beyond the ethnic group, 
which then influenced changes at the state level and in the media, to address the larger Spanish- 
speaking population in the United States (Mora, 2009). Although important in assessing the 
broader national phenomenon that “Hispanics” have become, in the New York City context, the 
panethnic term “Hispanic” (Hispano in Spanish) was already quite prevalent in the Spanish 
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language press come 1970, often used within the same sentence as an ethnic group, most often 
Puerto Ricans. The term was also already used in the name of a local city organization, the Puerto 
Rican Affairs division of the New York City Human Rights Commission, meant to combat 
discrimination against Puerto Ricans (Kihss, 1968). 
The use of the word Hispanic varied around the city. There are clear differences between 
the ways local Spanish and English language press used the word. Spanish language newspapers 
used it first, and the term does not crossover until the 1960s. Hispanicity in New York City is born 
in small ethnic newspapers in the early 1900s, and much later adopted by local government and 
media outlets in the 1960s. New York City nonprofits would be the last to take to Hispanicity, 
generally making the shift in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
The world of advertising has also played a significant role in minimizing ethnic 
distinctiveness, and promoting Hispanic panethnicity. Advertising executives actively sought to 
create a Hispanic community with the intention of creating a cohesive market (Davila, 2001). This 
way, rather than catering to ethnicities separately, all Hispanic subgroups can be appealed to at 
once. They found that creating this imagined community is a much cheaper and lucrative 
endeavor, and used it to draw upon ideals of family and other symbols. The promotion of this 
fictional community has had very real consequences, particularly in the realm of culture. In the 
music industry, artists and their music are no longer promoted ethnically, but panethnically. As 
Puerto Ricans have made significant contributions to American arts, this trend serves to 
disenfranchise and obfuscate Puerto Rican artistic endeavors. For example, reggaeton, a highly 
popular Spanish language genre in the U.S., was born in Puerto Rico, and yet is promoted as 
“Latin” music. Submerging ethnic contributions under the guise of Latinidad is not only a means 
of marginalizing artists, but also a means of obscuring the ethnic population. Like politicians, high 
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profile artists serve as the face of a given community, and if their ethnic identity is suppressed then 
the ethnic population becomes less visible as well. In the early stages of her career, Jennifer Lopez 
clearly identified herself as a Boricua from the “block”, however, by 2006 she was labeling herself 
as Latina in promotional interviews (Perez-Feria, 2006). As perhaps the most visible of all Puerto 
Ricans, she has effectively submerged her Puerto Rican identity in favor of Latinidad. 
You would think that politicians would have taken up the cause when newspapers and 
advertisers dropped Puerto Ricans. But they didn’t. Puerto Rican leaders seem to have found 
difficulty in addressing the particular needs of the Puerto Rican community or even providing an 
organizational face for the community. Perhaps these leaders have given up on ethnic politics to 
retain relevance in the broader non-profit community, to retain income and grants for their 
organizations, perhaps because this is considered a politically correct maneuver, or perhaps it is 
because the general Puerto Rican constituency has lost its political strength. Several Puerto Rican 
political figures came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s, such as Herman Badillo, the first 
island-born Puerto Rican congressman, Felipe Luciano, a founder and former chair of the Young 
Lords, and Geraldo Rivera, a lawyer that once worked on behalf of the Young Lords and later rose 
to fame for his talk show and journalistic endeavors. These three individuals serve as important 
examples of politicians failing to take advantage of the lack of attention to Puerto Ricans; all are 
now focusing on work outside of the specific Puerto Rican community. Herman Badillo recently 
published a book (2006) about what the Hispanic population is doing wrong in the realm of 
education, Felipe Luciano is a radio show host, motivational speaker, and attempted politician, and 
Geraldo Rivera now works for the politically conservative Fox News and recently published a 
book entitled HisPanic: Why Americans Fear Hispanics in the U.S. (2009). Like these figures, 
although a variety of Puerto Rican politicians remain in various offices at the local and state level, 
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their intent has changed. No longer do political figures seek to address the issues pertaining to 
Puerto Ricans, but rather they seek to address problems within and surrounding the Latino or 
Hispanic constituency, a population containing incredible, and increasing, diversity. 
Puerto Rican language has also disappeared from local non-profits, as many community- 
based organizations that once focused on Puerto Rican life are defunct or now have a panethnic 
focus. The Young Lords, a militant community based organization, once worked to mend the ails 
within the poverty-stricken Puerto Rican population in New York City, but was destroyed by 
Cointelpro. El Comite (The Committee), a leftist organization, once sought to attain independence 
for Puerto Rico from the United States, but they failed like many leftist organizations due to 
internal ideological divisions. Aspira (Aspire), a national organization that originally aimed to 
provide Puerto Rican youth with educational advancement and pride in their culture, now serves 
Latino youth instead of Puerto Ricans. The Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, after 24 years of 
serving East Coast Puerto Ricans, is now known as The National Institute for Latino Policy, and 
works on behalf of all Latinos in the United States. PRLDEF, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and 
Education Fund, once meant to serve the Puerto Rican community, is now known as LatinoJustice, 
and works on behalf of all Latinos, particularly immigrants (which Puerto Ricans are not) and the 
poor. Lastly, a locale once overflowing with Puerto Rican creativity, Puerto Ricans are now rarely 
present at the Nuyorican Poets Café, historically a site of Puerto Rican cultural and political 
expression. When the term “Puerto Rican” disappears from the names of formal organizations and 
the public identities of local leaders and politicians, the Puerto Rican constituents then disappear 
from public view. 
Puerto Rican and Latino/Hispanic interests are not identical. This new focus on the 
Hispanic  conglomerate  masks  political  division  between  ethnic  sub-groups  that  have  been 
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identified in previous literature. In Chicago, Ramos-Zayas pointed to the distinct and separate 
social spaces for Puerto Rican and Mexican ethnics, as well as perceived differences between the 
two groups (Ramos-Zayas, 2003). Mexicans were understood to be politically naïve, but hard 
workers, whereas Puerto Ricans were seen as lazy, but politically savvy. And in New York City, 
with the influx of new ethnic groups such as Mexicans among other factors, Davila pointed to the 
complicated and contentious ownership of El Barrio, the historic New York City home to Puerto 
Ricans (Davila, 2004). In contrast to panethnicity, appeals to ethnicity as a platform, is argued to 
be a more effective means of inciting political action (Cruz, 1998). Although not explicitly stated 
in her study, Ramos-Zayas’ work supports this idea, noting that Latinidad, or panethnic identity is 
merely used as a racial construct to place oneself within the American racial hierarchy, as opposed 
to being any real evidence of similarity between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans in Chicago (Ramos- 
Zayas, 2003). Thus, appeals to Hispanic panethnicity are less likely to be reflective of a cohesive 
political entity, but rather an attempt to mitigate racialization. 
The immense racial heterogeneity amongst Latinos challenges the cogency of Hispanic 
panethnicity. Studies suggest that even if ethnic subgroups are similarly identified as being 
Hispanic, and live in close proximity to one another, that there is racial stratification within 
(Iceland and Nelson, 2008; Iceland, 2009). Those Hispanics with more visible African heritage 
tend to be more segregated from whites than other Hispanics. This tendency most certainly applies 
to Puerto Ricans, many of whom clearly have African heritage. However, even within the Puerto 
Rican population there are racial differences that are associated with real consequences. 
According to Bergad, those Puerto Ricans who identified themselves as racially black had much 
lower median incomes than those Puerto Ricans who identified themselves as another race 
(Bergad, 2010).   While these examples of racial segregation and difference are not necessarily  a 
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positive trend, Cruz would view this as an opportunity for ethnic political organization in New 
York City, an opportunity that has not been utilized of late (Cruz, 1998). 
It should be noted that there are also limits to ethnic identity. For instancenot only does 
racial identification change in different contexts, but ethnic identification changes as well 
(Rodriguez, 2000). In the context of a racialized society such as the United States, wherein a racial 
hierarchy exists, the persistence of ethnicity and the factions inherently created by its existence, 
only serve to reinforce racism (Bashi Treitler, 2013). In other words, the accompanying divides 
between each perpetuated ethnic group, are in many ways, merely an avoidance of being located 
at the bottom of the existing racial totem pole. Perhaps panethnicity serves a similar function. In 
other words panethnicity is another way of racializing people, because it helps to erase your ethnic 







The story of Puerto Rican invisibility is not a simple one. The process through which 
Puerto Ricans publicly disappeared took place over several decades, and affected different fields 
at different periods. Starting in the local ethnic presses, Hispanicity developed and grew amongst 
Spanish speakers in New York City. Soon after, with the influx of Dominicans and other Hispanic 
subgroups, Hispanic New York City became less Puerto Rican. Later, aware of these 
developments, local Puerto Rican politicians sought to utilize the Hispanic platform, and solidified 
the term in their political discourse. Only when the U.S. Census became concerned with 
consolidating an increasingly diverse population did Hispanic terminology enter the English 
language.  The media, too, took aim at profiting from a conglomerate Hispanic populous, and a 
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fictional community became a mainstream political reality. Puerto Rican nonprofits and artists 
somehow managed to remain sheltered for a time from the push toward Hispanicity, only folding 
to pressure in the 1990s and 2000s, when Puerto Ricans became increasingly dispersed amongst 
other immigrant populations and marketers zeroed in on pop endeavors. These events have 
resulted in the public invisibility of Puerto Ricans in New York City, the largest Hispanic subgroup 
in the region. 
This dissertation attempts to tackle each of these issues in order to explain the broader 
phenomenon of Puerto Rican invisibility. It is organized into six chapters. Chapter one examines 
invisibility as a sociological construct as it applies to Puerto Ricans in New York City. Chapter 
two provides an analysis of demographic shifts taking place within the Puerto Rican population in 
the broader metropolitan region between 1970 and 2010. Chapter three examines Spanish and 
English language print media between 1970 and 2010, and its role in the declining visibility of 
local Puerto Ricans. Chapter four examines the political history of Puerto Ricans in New York 
City, to assess the relationship between Puerto Rican identity and the political climate. Chapter 
five assesses the role of local politicians in the construction of Hispanic identity, and the ways in 
which local representation patterns relate to demographic change. Chapter six purveys salsa music 
as a Puerto Rican cultural contribution, and examines the opportunities to practice and reproduce 
Puerto Rican culture. Lastly, the conclusion describes the perfect storm at the core of Puerto Rican 
invisibility, and offers a theory of invisibility applicable to other ethnic populations. 
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Chapter 1. Invisibility: When Ethnicity Disappears 
 
 
We can see ethnic groups because their cultural, national, or religious distinction from 
others makes them visible. Distinction looks like someone wearing a hijab, someone with an 
accent, or someone who makes rice differently from the rest. White people get to use agency in 
selecting their ethnicity, where others don’t get to choose - we see their difference on them. 
What I mean is whiteness is always the unnamed category, and is never “ethnic” unless someone 
white chooses to tell you they are. But I argue that there are others who are ethnic but also 
invisible. If on the face of it, they look indistinct from other nonwhites, they can be confused for 
others not in their ethnic group. For example, this is the underlying element behind panethnicity; 
it uses the fact that nondistinct nonwhiteness can be morphed into a murky kind of race. Hispanic 
is one of these categories. 
We see “Hispanics” when we would otherwise see Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, 
Colombians and others; but we pretend we don’t see Spaniards, Argentines there. Racial 
distinctions become important. Thus we cannot say that race is divorced from the idea of 
ethnicity, and indeed some ethnicities cannot even be seen if the panethnic category is racialized 
in particular ways. 
In academic scholarship and public policy, race tends to be ignored when deciding if 
some group is visible or invisible. For them, ethnic invisibility only results from success in 
assimilation. Assimilation is evident when people “lose” their ethnic traits and join what is 
considered “American” culture. Academic studies measure things like income, education, 
intermarriage, and residential integration, and look for differences between an ethnic group and 
the white American mainstream.  If there is no difference between groups, that is proof that 
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assimilation has occurred.  If assimilation had indeed taken place, it is logical that ethnicity 
would be less publicly visible, as it would cease to maintain its social and economic significance. 
But Puerto Ricans lack these markers of socioeconomic mobility, - that is, they are 
residentially segregated, not fully intermarried, undereducated relative to other groups, and are 
relatively income poor. Plus, Puerto Ricans remain the largest Hispanic subgroup in New York 
City. How is it then, that an unassimilated group of such a large size has become increasingly 
invisible to the public eye? This paradox, wherein a large ethnic group’s ethnicity may exist but 
cannot be seen is exactly what I am trying to explain here. What I believe may have happened is 
that Puerto Ricans were absorbed into the rising predominance of Hispanic panethnicity. This 
chapter focuses on invisibility. 
For the purpose of this study I define invisibility as the nearly wholesale disappearance of 
clearly defined Puerto Rican institutions, non-profits, news reports, musical lyrics, art, and 
politicians. Through the 1980s, Puerto Ricans and their institutions were highly visible in New 
York City. 
Puerto Rican ethnic disappearance may be the result of appeals to panethnic identification 
but this is an empirical question that research can answer. Puerto Ricans did not exchange 
ethnicity for mobility like the Germans did, they became invisible without the normal 
socioeconomic gains of assimilation.  The implications of this are immense, particularly for 
those Puerto Ricans who remain socioeconomically disadvantaged. How can policy address a 
people that it cannot see? 
Several studies have investigated whether Puerto Rican racial identity is related to the 
process of migration to the U.S., ethnicity, and panethnicity. In the case of migration, Puerto 
Ricans on the island predominantly identified as white, despite the obvious racial diversity 
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present (Duany, 2002). Upon migrating to the mainland, many changed their race from white to 
“other” (Rodriguez, 2000). This shift indicates an understanding of how Puerto Ricans are 
racialized in the U.S., particularly when confronted with a very different definition of “white” 
than the one they knew on their island home. Just as racial identity is shown to be fluid, as 
opposed to static, and context based, perhaps ethnic identity is also. 
Other work points to marketers, media, nonprofits, and government as creating panethnic 
identity (Davila, 2004; Mora, 2014).  This work demonstrates the impetus for the 
institutionalized presence of panethnicity in Spanish language marketing and U.S. government 
entities, however neither point to any particular developments in New York City – a particularly 
important site for Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Furthmore, this work is limited to particular realms, 
Spanish language marketing on the one hand, and English language nonprofits and national 
government institutions on the other. These analyses thus exclude any localized examinations, 
which are necessary in assessing the Nuyorican experience of ethnicity, panethnicity, and race. 
Current research does not clearly implicate ethnic invisibility as a specific adverse effect 
of panethnic identification. There are critiques pointed directly at the meaning of Hispanic 
panethnicity, but not as it pertains to ethnicity. For example, the common critique of Hispanidad 
is an inability to find commonalities between an indigenous Mayan immigrant from Guatemala 
who settles in Los Angeles and a 3rd generation Puerto Rican in New York City (Flores, 2000). 
While this critique is related to my own, the focus is not on the deleterious effect panethnicity 
may have on ethnic populations. One deleterious effect is that policy now speaks to Hispanicity 
instead of ethnicity – despite the incredible diversity contained within the panethnic population. 
However, the effect is not problematic for all ethnic people. This is because many large ethnic 
populations – either through sheer numbers or sustained connection to the immigrant experience 
18	 
- maintain a public ethnic identity. Despite the passing of time and generations, Cuban identity 
persists in Florida and New Jersey. And despite the movement of national borders, Mexican 
identity remains strong in the Southwest. However, the same cannot be said for Puerto Rican 
identity. The three largest Hispanic subgroups in New York City include Puerto Ricans, 
Dominicans, and Mexicans – in that order. Each group’s tenure in New York City is ranked in 
the same order. Thus, it would stand to reason that Puerto Ricans would maintain a dominant 
public presence in New York City, with a somewhat lesser presence on the part of Dominicans 
and Mexicans. However, the reverse is true – while Dominicans and Mexicans maintain public 
identities, Puerto Ricans are difficult to locate. 
 
 




Of particular importance to the matter of Puerto Rican invisibility, is demographic and 
commercial density.  While Puerto Ricans reside in all five New York City boroughs, the 
majority live in the Bronx and Brooklyn. In fact, Brooklyn was home to the cohesive Puerto 
Rican community in New York City in the early 1900s, before the development of a Puerto 
Rican commercial sector in Manhattan. Even then, there were clear divisions between the 
Brooklyn and Manhattan based Puerto Rican residents. The Brooklyn community was organized 
around the cigar industry, while the Manhattan community developed around manufacturing 
(Sanchez Korrol, 1983). Only later in the 1950s and 1960s, would Puerto Ricans move in large 
numbers to the Bronx.  Interestingly, the areas considered to be the most “Puerto Rican” in 
nature, are also those that had a significant ethnic commercial sector.  For example, East 
Tremont in the Bronx is home to a densely populated Puerto Rican community, as is East 
19	 
Harlem in Manhattan, and Williamsburg in Brooklyn. Additionally, each of these 
neighborhoods used to also be home to a number of Puerto Rican small businesses. Tremont 
Ave. was the commercial street in the Bronx, 116th Street in Manhattan, and Graham Ave. 
(Avenue of Puerto Rico) in Brooklyn. 
These ethnic commercial streets gave rise to what are known as ethnic enclaves. Ethnic 
enclaves are a spatially dense mix of ethnic residences and businesses, and they can serve to 
counteract invisibility. Condensed commercial sectors are often the visible site of ethnic identity 
to non-group members.  Private residences, while they may be decorated with ethnic markers, 
are inherently private. Thus, they are less visible to the public eye. In contrast, businesses are 
meant for public consumption, and thus meant to be visible. Brightly colored signs adorn the 
doorways and windows, inviting both new and old customers to enter.  Ethnic businesses are 
thus the public face of the ethnic community. What is particular to ethnic commercial sectors, 
however, is that they tend to be located in condensed ethnic neighborhoods. This mix of ethnic 
residences and businesses, is what Wilson and Portes defined as the ethnic enclave (Wilson and 
Portes, 1980). 
Unfortunately, the businesses in the Puerto Rican enclave have eroded. Unlike earlier 
decades, in which Puerto Rican small businesses were the heart of the Puerto Rican community – 
many of these establishments have either closed or changed to non-Puerto Rican hands. Bodegas 
– a small deli/grocery and an ubiquitous business model in New York City – were once largely 
operated by Puerto Ricans.  In Boricuas in Gotham, Angelo Falcon lamented the lack of attention 
paid to the nearly wholesale loss of the Puerto Rican bodega (2004). Some argue that it has been 
a natural succession, a sign that Puerto Ricans have attained upward mobility and made the 
logical move to the suburbs.  However, these arguments don’t account for the tenuous economic 
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conditions many bodega owners operate under. For example, bodega owners often extend credit 
to their low-income clientele – a practice brought from the homeland that is meant to facilitate 
customer loyalty (Wagenheim and Jimenez de Wagenheim, 2006). This practice, while it might 
foster loyalty, does not pay the bills. Additionally, small business owners in New York City are 
consistently faced with increasing rental and product costs (Hayasaki, 2008).  Thus, the 
particular economic constraints of operating in a low-income community, combined with 
increasing costs of operation have proven detrimental to bodega owners across New York City. 
More specifically, the loss of the Puerto Rican bodega has served to help erase the public face of 
the Puerto Rican community. 
 
 




In addition to the enclave hypothesis, Portes also developed a theory relating ethnic traits 
to socioeconomic status, arguing that there are economic benefits to maintaining the transmission 
of ethnic traits from first generation immigrants to their 2nd generation American-born children 
(or the 1.5 generation) (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Portes and Zhou, 1993).  Conversely, there is 
a danger to acculturating to American culture too quickly, as this is associated with downward 
assimilation on the part of the 2nd generation. In the case of downward assimilation, the children 
of immigrants, often non-white, reside in impoverished communities amongst native-born 
residents, and come to adopt the cultural traits of the American poor. In this sense, then, Portes 
and Rumbaut might argue that Puerto Ricans’ poor economic outcomes, as well as their ethnic 
invisibility, could be explained by too rapid acculturation. Some recent work appears to support 
the assertion that Puerto Ricans assimilated with African Americans into urban New York City 
21	 
culture, contributing to it in the process (Rivera, 2003). My own data seems to contradict both 
sets of arguments that Puerto Ricans have rapidly assimilated with African Americans into 
urban, and English speaking, New York City. Most Puerto Rican adults residing in New York 
City were born in the United States and maintain ethnic traits, such as the regular use of the 
Spanish language. 
Puerto Ricans of all ages continue to speak Spanish in their everyday New York City 
living. Through a series of impromptu interactions with local Puerto Ricans living in several 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods, I spoke with a total of 10 respondents. Of the ten 
informal interviews, eight were conducted entirely in Spanish. And contrary to the potential 
assumption that they must have been born on the island, 7 of the 10 respondents were born on 
the mainland. The two interviews that were conducted in English also included Spanish 
references, intermittently used in conversation through code switching. An example of such 
code switching would be, “there used to be a lot of Puerto Ricans around here, tu sabes (you 
know)” or “now you see all these yuppies on cell phones, ese tipo (these type of people)”. 
Because the respondents remained entirely anonymous, their ages are not known, but I estimate 
that the youngest respondent was mid-twenties, and the oldest was in his seventies- a fairly wide 
spread of ages. With respect to generation, the respondents included first, second, and 
transnational migrants. 
In segmented assimilation theory, Puerto Ricans would be assumed to have culturally 
assimilated to the American urban poor, an English speaking class of the forever under- 
privileged (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Wilson, 1987). That they would have shed their cultural 
markers, and that this discarding of ethnicity with the acceptance of the American culture of 
poverty would have led to this demise into the underclass. 
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There is evidence that Puerto Rican culture and Puerto Rican Spanish is very much alive 
and strong, but is somehow hidden from public view. One problematic assumption associated 
with the segmented assimilation argument, is that culture and its practice is somehow a static 
phenomenon. Meaning, if one does not practice a culture as a teenager, then one would not be 
expected to practice that culture as an adult. But with Puerto Ricans, as age increases, so too 
does their use of the Spanish language (Flores, 1992). As teens and young adults, it is 
particularly important to fit in with one’s peers and thus the youth are less likely to use Spanish. 
Such teenagers were likely exposed to Spanish at home, but predominantly spoke English 
throughout the day at school and amongst peers. As peer pressure decreases with age, and these 
young adults become parents, they desire to practice familial (“traditional”) culture and transmit 
it to their children. Thus to believe that a researcher can capture the status of a person’s culture, 
or identity, at any given moment is folly, as cultural expression is not static and can change over 
the life course. 
 
 




Socioeconomic status is linked to assimilation not just for the poor, but also for the 
middle and upper classes. While the number of Puerto Ricans in urban New York City is 
decreasing, the number of Puerto Ricans in suburban spaces is increasing.  As Puerto Ricans 
move away from the Puerto Rican enclave and into more affluent suburbs, one might think that 
they also lose their tight grip on their Puerto Rican identity. There might be a need to conform to 
their new surroundings that may contribute to the invisibility of the population. Older, more 
educated Puerto Ricans do tend to identify themselves as racially “white” more often than their 
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younger and less educated Puerto Rican counterparts (Rodriguez, 2000). Moreover, Puerto 
Ricans with higher incomes tend to identify themselves as racially white compared to Puerto 
Ricans with lower incomes (Bergad, 2010).  However, successful Puerto Ricans seem to 
maintain their ethnic identity (Rodriguez, 1991). Census data from 2000 shows that the majority 
of Puerto Ricans living in the more affluent counties in New York, such as Queens, Staten 
Island, Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk Counties, continue to speak Spanish. For example, in 
Queens, 75% of the Puerto Rican population (over 5 years old) spoke Spanish in 2000. 
Moreover, a sizeable subset of Spanish speakers (20.7%) do not speak English very well at all 
(U.S. Census Bureau 2000 Summary File 4). 
Even though Puerto Ricans seem to be maintaining elements of their ethnic identity in the 
suburban context, if they also tend to identify themselves as being racially whiter than Puerto 
Ricans in the urban and poorer context, then perhaps their whiteness is contributing to their 
declining visibility. If the more upwardly mobile Puerto Ricans happen to be white, then they 
would not be visibly distinct, or visibly Puerto Rican.  Furthermore, even if ethnic identification 
is retained, these Puerto Ricans would be pioneers in many respects, the bringers of Puerto 
Rican-ness to places like Staten Island and Bergen County. There would not be a commercial, 
and publicly visible, Puerto Rican base in these suburban communities, and so the practice of 
ethnicity would likely be limited to the home. Unlike East Harlem, the Bronx, and Brooklyn, 
there are not any Puerto Rican restaurants in places such as Tenafly, NJ where Puerto Ricans 
have a small sizeable concentration. 
Upwardly mobile Puerto Ricans are the ethnic pioneers in the more affluent locales 
surrounding New York City, while those left behind in core New York City are the heirs to the 
deteriorating ethnic enclave.  Rather than a unified face for the community, there are two 
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obscured faces left in the wake of an increasingly divided Puerto Rican population - one in the 
suburban counties and one in the urban. 
 
 




On the one public day for Puerto Rican-ness, the yearly Puerto Rican Day Parade, even 
this display is presented with a limited version of what it means to be Puerto Rican. In 2013, the 
Puerto Rican representatives presented in the television coverage lacked apparent African 
heritage, the food presented came from an upscale Puerto Rican restaurant in Tribeca, and those 
presenting Puerto Rican-ness to Americans were largely residents of the island, and from the 
Puerto Rican government at that (WABC-TV, New York, 2013). The display was definitely not 
representative of the Nuyorican population, and purposefully so. Even the music televised was 
not explicitly Puerto Rican, but rather focused on Venezuelan Wilmer Valderama’s performance 
with a reggaeton group, in which the televised broadcast seemed to make more of the scantily 
clad female dancers than the music itself. The one aspect of the parade that seemed pertinent to 
the mainland Puerto Rican experience was that Chita Rivera, a noted actress, dancer, and singer, 
was selected as Grand Marshall for the parade. Born in Washington, D.C., Ms. Rivera is the first 
Puerto Rican, or Hispanic female, to receive the Kennedy Center Honors award for her 
contributions to American culture. 
In addition to the Puerto Rican Day Parade, there were a bevy of smaller festivals in 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods. These festivals largely took place in the week leading 
up to the Puerto Rican Day Parade. In contrast to the Puerto Rico Day Parade’s public, largely 
refined display of Puerto Rican-ness, was the less public and much more urban display of the 
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Puerto Rican State Festival in Williamsburg, Brooklyn which I attended in 2013 the week before 
the larger Puerto Rican Day Parade. This festival, one block long, was attended by the local, 
poorer, older, and browner Puerto Rican residents of Williamsburg, and was heavily policed. 
Posted along this one block were at least 20 police officers, heavily concentrated on one corner, 
opposite the stage. I found it nearly impossible to speak with anyone given the volume of the 
speakers near the stage. I moved closer to the stage to observe the speeches and musical 
presentations. There were a flurry of heroin deals taking place so close that a man brushed my 
arm during one exchange. No matter the heavy police presence, there seemed to be no interest in 
controlling drugs in the area, and perhaps because the noise made verbal communication nearly 
impossible, there was no secrecy involved in these deals. That neither the sellers nor the 
consumers had any apparent nervousness or attempted to hide their transactions, led me to 
believe that opiate drug sales like these are an ongoing problem in the neighborhood. Had I not 
been there, I would have never known, given the lacking public attention paid to any Puerto 
Ricans outside of the larger Puerto Rican Day Parade. Puerto Ricans are truly invisible if such 
open drug deals are left to transact without obstruction. 
The display of Puerto Rican-ness in the smaller festivals varied by the neighborhood. For 
example, on the Lower East Side, the Loisaida (a Spanglish variant of the name of the Lower 
East Side of Manhattan island) Festival was largely attended by younger Puerto Rican families 
compared to the mostly elderly Puerto Rican presence at the Williamsburg festival.  The 
Loisaida festival was also larger than the P.R. State Festival, about 6 blocks long, compared to 
the one block in Williamsburg; it also had much less of a police presence, despite the larger size 
of the event. The Loisaida Festival seemed more family oriented in that there were pony rides, a 
bounce house, face painting, and the like.  Only towards the opposite end of the pony ride, did 
26	 
the older Puerto Rican population become more visible, concentrated around the stage where a 
salsa band was performing. They sat on chairs in their Sunday best, watching the younger adults 
dance below the stage. Also more visible near the stage, were a variety of politicians. Mayoral 
hopeful Adolfo Carrion, Jr. was walking around accompanied by a staff member who carried a 
sign with Carrion’s photo saying who Carrion was, and a photographer to capture photo-ops. 
They stopped several times for Carrion to take photos with a few of the more elderly Puerto 
Rican residents (i.e., those who are also more likely to vote). Also present was a staffer for New 
York State Senator Daniel Squadron, who was handing out a parent resource guide.  In addition 
to this explicitly political presence, were a number of tables containing representatives from local 
non-profits. Comparatively, at the Williamsburg festival, there was absolutely no political 
interest. Thus, the Lower East Side Puerto Rican community seems to be a slightly more 
politically valued Nuyorican subset. 
A still larger display of local Puerto Rican-ness, was the 116th Street Festival in East 
Harlem. I attended this festival in June of 2013. This festival took place not just along 116th 
Street, but along the cross-streets as well, and was even more heavily policed than the one block 
festival in Williamsburg. In the center of the main intersection of the festival was a large police 
tower, reminiscent of the panopticon, with darkened windows so that those inside could not be 
seen (Foucault, 1995). I had not been to this festival in several years, however, and I had not 
seen such a thing when I had attended previously. In addition to this police tower, were a huge 
number of police officers lining gates that directed and controlled foot traffic. 
There were a huge number of festival-goers, perhaps several thousand. There were so 
many people that walking around was a problem in most places. The attendees seemed to be 
mostly teenagers or young adults, the males dressed in urban attire, and the females dressed 
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scantily in shorts and suggestive shirts. There were also some families with young children, but 
they seemed to be in the minority, as were the elderly. Here, I did not observe any local political 
activity, but rather a large number of local non-profit tables and tables for vendors selling Puerto 
Rican-related products. Two of the non-profits dealt with crime prevention and the sexual health 
of youth – these themes are in stark contrast to the more family oriented information distributed 
at the Loisaida Festival. 
Thus, the display of Puerto Rican-ness not only varies between the public televised Fifth 
Avenue Puerto Rican Day Parade and the less public local festivals that take place every June, 
but the presentation of Puerto Rican-ness varies by neighborhood. Some neighborhoods are 
older, some are more crime ridden, some are more policed, some are more political. There 
seems to be an incredible diversity of Puerto Rican urban experiences by neighborhood, 
however, what seems to be a point of commonality is the continued inability of a substantial 
number of urban Puerto Ricans to attain upward mobility by way of education or the local 
economy and in general, a lack of public visibility. 
Other scholars have been privy to America’s declining interest in the Puerto Rican 
population (Sanchez, 2007). Jose Ramon Sanchez, a political scientist at Long Island University 
in Brooklyn, would say that United States and the American public is just not interested in doing 
the political “dance” with Puerto Ricans anymore (Sanchez, 2007). Over time, there have been 
ebbs and flows in the interest of mainland Puerto Ricans, but in general, public interest in Puerto 
Ricans seems to have subsided in recent decades. As Sanchez describes, “there is evidence to 
suggest, in fact, that the larger society had begun to lose interest in the economic value of Puerto 
Rican labor in the mid-1960’s” (Sanchez, 2007, p. 139).  This evidence consists of analysis of 
the number of scholarly works, the framing of public representations of Puerto Ricans, the 
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dwindling national coverage of Puerto Ricans, and the “loss of jobs, income, and union support” 
(Sanchez, 2007, p. 140). Thus, in Sanchez’s view, the general American public had little interest 
in Puerto Ricans decades before New Yorkers lost interest in mainland Boricuas. This general 
public blasé attitude toward Puerto Ricans does not mean that Puerto Ricans are no longer 
noteworthy, but just that the public has moved on. 
This is not a case of benign neglect. Puerto Ricans are clearly a population in need of 
assistance, as evidenced by the high percentage of Puerto Ricans who reside in some form of rent 
controlled or rent stabilized housing. The continued state of neglect may even exacerbate the 
social and economic problems in a very large local community- a community that has ceased to 
exist in public. The Puerto Rican community in greater New York City has become publicly 
invisible despite their persistent use of the Spanish language, continued interaction between the 
island and the mainland, increasing out-group and in-group stratification, and the incredible 
persistence of urban impoverishment. If defying the rules of assimilation over a period of 70 





Ethnic invisibility applies to groups who maintain ethnic characteristics but are racialized 
as “non-whites” and lumped together with other “non-whites”. Their specificities are publicly 
expunged and in their place, they are bestowed with a quasi-racial identity. Usually this identity 
is “Hispanic”, or “Asian”, or “African American”. All of these categories are not entirely racial, 
as they include both panethnic and racial meanings. Through this process, Puerto Ricans have 
been stripped of their public ethnic identity, despite the persistence of Puerto Rican ethnicity. 
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Part of the decline in Puerto Rican invisibility relates to the decline of the Puerto Rican 
enclave. Puerto Rican businesses have either been lost or passed on to others. While the 
businesses have been lost, much of the ethnic residents remain. However, as businesses are the 
public face of an ethnic community, the decline of Puerto Rican businesses means that the 
community cannot be seen. 
While some scholars might point to segmented assimilation theory as another explanation 
for Puerto Rican invisibility, this theory does not stand in the face of the data. Segmented 
assimilation theory points to the dangers of assimilating too rapidly. It is thought that rapid 
assimilation could contribute to assimilation into the underclass, instead of assimilation into the 
middle and upper classes. However, most Puerto Ricans continue to speak Spanish, despite most 
being born on the mainland, which does not indicate rapid cultural assimilation. 
The Puerto Rican Day Parade, while perhaps the most visible Puerto Rican event of the 
year, also serves to support Puerto Rican invisibility. The display of Puerto Rican-ness presented 
in the Parade is not Nuyorican, but rather Puerto Rico-based, and largely white and upper-middle 
class. Thus, the Puerto Rican Day Parade ignores the local Puerto Rican resident experience in 
favor of a sanitized and whitened Puerto Rican character. 
Smaller festivals offer a more authentic presentation of what it means to be Puerto Rican 
in New York City, but these festivals receive little to no publicity.  In this sense, these festivals 
are also indicative of Puerto Rican invisibility. Furthermore, the heavy police presence at many 
of the smaller festivals and events, points to how the Puerto Rican population, as a non-white 
group, continues to be racially profiled as such. Ironically, in Williamsburg, the police presence 
was just that, a presence, meaning that nothing was done to stop or prevent public criminal 
activity.  It was as if the police officers could not see the onslaught of drug deals – or they just 
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did not care to see. In this respect, not only are Puerto Ricans invisible to the public, they are 
invisible to the entities meant to serve and protect them. 
Puerto Rican invisibility is a paradox. Puerto Ricans are the largest and poorest Hispanic 
subgroup in New York City, and yet cannot be seen. Rather than having succumbed to the 
pressures of assimilation, they have defied these forces to maintain their ethnic traits. Puerto 
Ricans remain Puerto Rican in New York City, they just can’t be seen. 
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Chapter 2. Demography: Puerto Rican Stratification and Dispersion 
 
 
Puerto Ricans became invisible in New York City through a variety of means. The 
submersion of Puerto Ricans within the quasi-racial Hispanic category is one. And the decline of 
the Puerto Rican enclave is another. Yet another is the media’s choice to avoid Nuyoricans in 
Puerto Rico Day Parade coverage. The result of these processes, among others, is that Puerto 
Ricans have been stripped of their ethnic identity as a racialized group to become ethnically 
invisible in New York City. However, there are other forces at play that contribute to Puerto 
Rican invisibility throughout the larger New York City Metropolitan region: demographic shifts. 
The Latino population in greater New York City is rapidly changing. In earlier decades, 
Puerto Ricans were by far the largest Latino subgroup in the region, making up the vast majority 
of the Hispanic population. However, today, the Puerto Rican slice of the Latino pie chart is 
getting increasingly slender. As of 2010, Puerto Ricans maintained the largest number of Latino 
residents in the area, however, they were not by any means the majority. Newcomers such as 
Dominicans and Mexicans have helped to change the Latino fabric of the metropolitan New 
York City region. 
From 1970 on, the number of Latino residents throughout the region has grown by about 
half a million people per decade (Table 2). In contrast, the number of Puerto Rican residents 
throughout the region has remained relatively stable over the past four decades, hovering at 
around 1 million residents. Growth in the broader Latino population is largely attributed to the 
influx of Dominicans to the area. Between 1990 and 2010, the local Dominican population has 
doubled in size, approaching 800,000 residents (Table 7). Growth in the local Mexican 
population has also fueled the rising number of Latinos. Between 1980 and 2010, the number of 
Mexican residents in the area increased by over 400,000, approaching 500,000 total local 
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residents. In terms of percent change, growth in the Mexican population has been much more 
rapid, in that the number of residents has increased by over 1000% in the past three decades. 
The relative stability in the Puerto Rican population combined with the rapid growth in the 
Dominican and Mexican populations have served to decrease the proportion of Puerto Ricans in 
the area. Whereas Puerto Ricans made up about 70% of the local Latino population in 1970, by 
2010 they made up less than 30% of Hispanic residents in the region (Table 2). 
In addition to the decrease in the proportion of Puerto Rican residents overall, there has 
been a decrease in the proportion of Puerto Rico–born residents. In 1970, with the exception of 
Nassau County, most Puerto Ricans in every borough and county throughout the region were 
born in Puerto Rico (Table 6). It was thus more common for local Puerto Ricans to have been 
born in Puerto Rico, than not. Furthermore, the mainland Puerto Rican experience was largely 
focused in New York City. Thus, in 1970 most mainland Puerto Ricans lived in New York City 
proper, and they were mostly born in Puerto Rico. By 2010, much had changed. First, mainland 
Puerto Ricans are now much more dispersed throughout the country, so that the Puerto Rican 
migrant story is no longer predominantly a New York City story. Puerto Ricans are rapidly 
moving to places like New Jersey, Florida, Pennsylvania, and other counties in New York State, 
and thus shifting the population away from New York City proper. Second, most Puerto Ricans 
in the region are no longer born in Puerto Rico. The percent of Puerto Rico-born Puerto Rican 
residents has decreased to under 30% in most local boroughs and counties.  The exceptions to 
this are Hudson County (31.1%) and Passaic County (38.3%) in Northern New Jersey. The 
decline in the proportion of Puerto Rican residents born in Puerto Rico has cultural implications. 
If the island-born population is not replenished, then it is assumed that cultural traits, such as 
Spanish language use, would also recede.  Indeed, there is a stereotype amongst Latinos that 
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Puerto Ricans are the most Americanized, however, as of yet, there is little data to support this 
stereotype. In fact, according to the 5 year ACS estimates for 2010, most local Puerto Ricans 
spoke Spanish (Age by Language Spoken at Home, U.S. Census 2010). As Juan Flores noted, 
the use of Spanish is greater among residents over the age of 18, as teenagers exit the English 
dominant public school system (Flores, 1992). However, even amongst younger Puerto Ricans, 
the number of Spanish speakers is significant. 
There are three main demographic trends associated with Puerto Rican invisibility in the 
New York City metropolitan region: stratification within the local Puerto Rican population, 
Puerto Rican dispersion throughout the region, and Puerto Rican dispersion amongst other 
Latinos. The trend towards stratification means that there is subset of more affluent Puerto 
Ricans who have moved to more affluent and suburban counties such as Nassau County in Long 
Island, and thus have moved away from Puerto Rican enclaves. This same trend has contributed 
to Puerto Rican dispersion throughout the region, and thus a decreasing concentration in Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods. Lastly, Puerto Ricans are increasingly dispersed amongst others with 
whom they share a number of demographic characteristics, such as Dominicans. These three 







I studied demographic changes among Puerto Ricans, other Latino subgroups, and 
African Americans in the New York metro area in order to see if those data could answer 
questions I had about how it is that Puerto Ricans go from news and public policy headlines to 
what I am naming invisibility.  I used the U.S. Census American Factfinder Website 
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(http://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/index.xhtml), Prof. Andrew Beveridge’s Social 
 
Explorer website (http://www.socialexplorer.com/), and the Integrated Public Use Microdata 
 
Series (IPUMS; https://usa.ipums.org/usa/) to retrieve data on a number of variables from the 
 
1970-2010 Census collections for Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, African Americans, 
and overall county residents, both within New York City and in counties surrounding New 
York’s five boroughs. The variables analyzed include sex, median income, birthplace, income at 
or below the poverty threshold, labor force participation, percent with bachelor’s degree or 
higher, age, and the number of residents. Minimal statistical calculations were applied to create 
tables reporting percentages, percent change, and net loss/gain.  Some data are based upon 
Census estimates, some are sample data (5% or 1%), and some are recorded as static figures, 
depending on the variable. In addition to Census data analysis, I also conducted interviews with 








In 1970, the Puerto Rican experience was still predominantly an urban New York City 
story, and one that was imbued with poverty and struggle (Table 1; Table 4; Table 5). However, 
even then, the Puerto Rican population was not completely homogenous. There were a number 
of Puerto Ricans residing in places like Staten Island, Nassau County, and Bergen County, NJ, 
and they fared significantly better than those living in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Essex County, 
NJ - but the privileges of those living in more suburban settings were limited to the few. This 
pattern, however, has accelerated over time, and has become more exacerbated. 
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Between 1970 and 1980, Puerto Rican poverty rates increased in the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
and Manhattan – New York City’s urban counties – while they decreased in more suburban 
locations such as Staten Island, Nassau County, and Westchester County (Table 5). At the same 
time, median incomes for Puerto Ricans in the more suburban counties were rising at a much 
faster rate than those in the more urban counties. Whereas the median income for Puerto Ricans 
in the Bronx was about $9,000, the median income for Puerto Ricans in Nassau County was 
about $23,000 (Table 4). Additionally, when comparing the Puerto Rican median income to the 
median income for the county overall, Puerto Ricans in Nassau County fared better than Puerto 
Ricans in the Bronx. In Nassau County, Puerto Ricans made 80.7% of the total median income 
for the county, while in the Bronx, they made 70.5% of the median income for the county 
overall. This difference is made all the more apparent by the difference in median income 
between the two counties. Lastly, an increasing number of Puerto Ricans were moving to the 
more affluent and suburban counties, while the number of Puerto Ricans residing in urban spaces 
like Manhattan and Brooklyn began to decrease (Table 1). In this sense, the local Puerto Rican 
population was starting to shift away from the urban centers and towards the more suburban 
surrounding counties. 
The trend towards spatial stratification would persist and become more glaring in the 
decades to follow. The process of gentrification would only serve to exacerbate the 
socioeconomic divide between Puerto Ricans in urban spaces and Puerto Ricans in suburban 
spaces. As New York City’s economy shifted further away from manufacturing and towards 
service, many Puerto Ricans lost work, and because of their low educational attainment, did not 
fit into the white-collar professions now proliferating on the market. There is evidence that the 
public sector provided a niche for Puerto Ricans (Logan, Alba, and Stults, 2003), but this field 
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would not be sufficient to support the community. More importantly, Puerto Ricans did not 
populate the ubiquitous low-paid service positions. As to why they did not take these jobs, it is 
unclear. Some studies have pointed to anti-Puerto Rican sentiment on the part of Dominican 
business owners. Others might argue that Puerto Ricans would not accept such low-paid 
positions. In any event, Puerto Ricans no longer fit as well into jobs offered by the new local 
economy. To add insult to injury, gentrification would also push rents sky high. Thus, Puerto 
Ricans were getting squeezed out of both the labor market and the housing market. 
By 2010, the Puerto Rican median income was less than 50% of the overall median 
income for Manhattan (Table 4), the Puerto Rican poverty rate was over 40% in the Bronx 
(Table 5), and the gap between poorer urban Puerto Ricans and the more affluent suburban 
Puerto Ricans had grown substantially. While Puerto Rican median incomes in the Bronx and 
Manhattan were less than $30,000, those in Nassau County and Suffolk County were over 
$70,000 (Table 4). Additionally, since 1970, Puerto Rican poverty rates had largely increased in 
the urban centers, while they decreased in the more suburban regions (Table 5). These changes, 
combined with the increasing number of Puerto Rican suburban dwellers, led to a much more 
stratified Puerto Rican population. 
 
 




In addition to becoming more stratified, the Puerto Rican population also became more 
dispersed throughout the broader region. The number of Puerto Ricans living in the counties 
immediately surrounding New York City would rapidly increase between 1970 and 2010. The 
suburban New York counties of Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester would gain about 100,000 
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Puerto Rican residents, while Northern New Jersey counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Passaic, 
and Union would gain about 110,000 Puerto Rican residents.  These surrounding counties in 
New York and New Jersey, while they are certainly all more suburban than the Bronx, Brooklyn, 
and Manhattan in core New York City, are a mix of typical suburban counties and less suburban 
counties. For example, Union County, New Jersey would be considered a suburban county, 
however, the two counties right next door, Essex and Hudson, would be considered much more 
urban (Table 7). Thus, Puerto Ricans are not solely moving to more suburban locations, but also 
to fairly urban locales outside of the urban core of New York City. 
There appears to be a spectrum of urban-ness amongst the counties both within and 
surrounding New York City. The Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan are the urban core of New 
York City, while the two remaining New York City counties, Queens and Richmond, are far 
more suburban in nature. In urban New Jersey, Essex, Hudson, and Passaic counties seem to be 
located between the core New York City counties and the more suburban New York City 
counties. Essex, Hudson, and Passaic counties are less urban than say, the Bronx, but yet more 
urban than Staten Island (Richmond County). The surrounding counties in New York, Nassau, 
Suffolk, and Westchester, are explicitly suburban, as are Union and Bergen counties in New 
Jersey. 
This spectrum of urban-ness is associated with a spectrum of socioeconomic status. 
 
Those Puerto Ricans in the urban New York City core fare worse than those in the urban 
counties of New Jersey, and those in urban New Jersey fare far worse than those in the more 
suburban counties within and surrounding New York City. Previous research has examined the 
perils of being Puerto Rican in New York City, and the importance of place to their 
socioeconomic standing (Santiago and Galster, 1995).  However, the specific mechanism behind 
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this trend is unclear. It could be that those Puerto Ricans who choose to move to more suburban 
counties are also the most affluent. It could also be that those Puerto Ricans who have not left 
are unable to, due to socioeconomic constraints. In any event, a scale of urban Puerto Rican 
poverty to suburban Puerto Rican affluence is in place. 
 
 




In addition to increased stratification within the Puerto Rican population and increased 
dispersion of Puerto Ricans throughout the region, there is also increased dispersion of Puerto 
Ricans amongst other Latinos. In each and every borough in and surrounding New York City, 
Puerto Ricans make up a smaller percentage of the Latino population than in previous decades. 
For example, in 1970, Puerto Ricans made up over 86% of the Latino population in the Bronx, 
by 2010 they only made up 40% of all Hispanics in the borough (Table 2). This change is due to 
the influx of other Latinos to the region, such as Dominicans, Colombians, Ecuadorians, and 
Mexicans. Between 1940 and 1960, Puerto Ricans, in large part, dominated migration to the 
region, mostly because of the constrictions on immigration law in the U.S. at the time. Because 
Puerto Ricans are not subject to immigration laws, their movement to the region was 
unencumbered. African Americans, also unencumbered by immigration laws, moved in large 
numbers to the region at this time as well, and occupied a similar socioeconomic status to Puerto 
Rican migrants.  Another exception to immigration law is found in the Dominican example. 
Although Dominicans are subject to immigration law, the political upheaval on the island 
unnerved U.S. officials, and so by the early 1960s, the U.S. government began granting a large 
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number of visas to Dominicans, so as to stave off a revolution. By 1980, Dominicans received 
the highest number of U.S. visas (per capita) when compared to other countries. 
By 1965, restrictive immigration laws would be relaxed, and the influx of other Spanish- 
speaking migrants would further change the makeup of the local Hispanic population. In the 
1980s, with the increasing violence in Colombia and the economic turmoil in Ecuador, a number 
of migrants fled both countries in search of opportunities in New York City. This era would also 
bring the onset of Mexican migration to the region. By the 1990s, the number of Mexican 
migrants to the region was rapidly increasing, and their numbers would increase 10 fold over the 
next few decades. 
While Colombians and Ecuadorians would settle largely in Queens, Dominicans and 
Mexicans would settle within or adjacent to Puerto Rican enclaves. The Bronx, Manhattan, and 
Brooklyn would welcome hundreds of thousands of Dominican and Mexican migrants. East 
Harlem, perhaps the best-known Puerto Rican enclave is now home to a significant number of 
Mexicans. Williamsburg, Brooklyn, another significant Puerto Rican enclave is now home to a 
significant number of Dominicans.  This influx, combined with Puerto Rican flight, has resulted 
in a decreased concentration of Puerto Ricans within Puerto Rican enclaves. Today, the 
Community District that contains the highest concentration of Puerto Ricans is Hunts Point and 
Longwood in the Bronx (Bronx Community District 2) (Table 3).  32% of this community 
district remains Puerto Rican, however this is a steep drop from 1970, when Puerto Ricans made 
up over 56% of the local community. The loss of concentration in the South Bronx is not solely 
due to the dispersion amongst other Latinos, but also to the influx of other newcomers, such as 
the gentrifying class (Gordinier, 2016). In other neighborhoods, such as the Lower East Side and 
East Harlem, the decreasing concentration of Puerto Ricans is also related to increases in the 
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local Chinese population, in addition to the increases in the local Mexican, Dominican, and 
gentrifying populations.  The matter of demographic change is complex in New York City. 
Interestingly, there are three Community Districts wherein there has been an increase in 
Puerto Rican concentration (Table 3). The concentration of Puerto Ricans in Central Harlem 
(Manhattan Community Board 10) has grown from 2.6% in 1970 to over 7% in 2010. While this 
is a very small percentage, the growth itself is significant. The other two Community Districts 
that have experienced growth are Queens Community Board 5 and Staten Island Community 
Board 1.  The percentage of Puerto Ricans in the Queens Community District increased from 
6.4% to 11.8% between 1970 and 2010. This district contains the neighborhoods of Glendale, 
Maspeth, Middle Village, and Ridgewood. In the same period, in Staten Island the percentage of 
Puerto Ricans in Community District 1 increased from 4.4% to 12%. In Staten Island there are 
only 3 Community Districts, and so there are numerous neighborhoods included in each. In 
Community District 1, there are 26 neighborhoods. The growth in Queens and Staten Island is of 
particular interest, because of how well Puerto Ricans are doing there, in comparison to the other 
New York City boroughs. Not only are Puerto Ricans becoming increasingly suburban but their 
percentage of the local population, and thus the Puerto Rican character, of these spaces is 
increasing. 
Outside of the Bronx, the spaces that maintain the highest concentrations of Puerto 
Ricans, include the Community Districts containing East Harlem, the Lower East Side, 
Williamsburg, and Bushwick (Table 3). In all of these districts, the percentage of Puerto Ricans 
has fallen by at least 15% in the past few decades. Despite the losses, a significant number of 
Puerto Ricans remain (Table 1) – Puerto Ricans who are experiencing significant disadvantage in 
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the areas of median income, poverty, labor force participation, and education (Table 4; Table 5; 
Table 12; Table 13). 
 
 




In order to assess the lived experience of these figures, I spoke with a number of Puerto 
Ricans that reside in historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods. I also spent much time as a 
participant observer within these spaces. Over the course of about 9 months between 2012 and 
2013, I collected copious field notes, and interacted with numerous Spanish speakers, both 
Puerto Rican and not. The following sections provide a snapshot of the neighborhoods of East 
Tremont in the Bronx, East Harlem in Manhattan, the Lower East Side in Manhattan, 







As I am walking down East Tremont in the Bronx the day of the 2013 Puerto Rico Day 
Parade in Manhattan, it is impossible to miss seeing a man carrying an enormous Puerto Rican 
flag. The flag was obviously difficult to carry, but he soldiered on, making sure passersby could 
not miss it. This was his opportunity, the day of the parade, to loudly display his culture- his 
pride. In the next block there is a Puerto Rican restaurant, El Nuevo Bohio, a neighborhood 
landmark in business for 30 years, and I am hoping there is not a line. 
Once inside, I am immediately struck by the clear difference between the Puerto Rican 
patrons, and the non-Puerto Rican staff.  While I am not sure from where each staff member’s 
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origins hail, I can say with some certainty that it was not Puerto Rico.  The young woman 
waiting on my table, for example, was from Mexico. As I sat at my table, taking in the bustling 
atmosphere of young and old Puerto Ricans, from babies to the elderly, I manage to catch 
snippets of conversation. There is an older couple seated to my right (very close for that matter), 
who are apparent regulars, and quite dressed up, making jokes with a busboy. The woman wears 
a rather elaborate up-do on her dyed blonde hair, with a tightfitting red and blue dress. A white 
scarf is draped around her shoulders.  The man, with slicked back and thinning hair, has opted 
for a short-sleeved sweater, with a 1970’s vibe, and slacks. His pinky ring, however, is the main 
event - making itself known with each of his many hand gestures that accompany his speech. As 
well, I am mesmerized by the incredible variation in Puerto Rican clothing and accessories on 
display in such a small space. Tree frogs – the coqui, the ubiquitous symbol of Puerto Rico – are 
displayed in all sizes and styles adorn about a third of the clothing I see; the clothing is in the 
colors of the Puerto Rican flag, so red, white, and blue dominate, and an actual flag can be found 
on at least three fourths of the clothing items on view. The only language to be heard is Spanish, 
Puerto Rican Spanish at that. 
Obviously, this particular restaurant on this particular day would not be representative of 
the everyday transactions and interactions that would take place here, and yet they are important. 
An out-of-towner viewing the parade would likely stop to eat within some proximity to the 
parade, somewhere like East Harlem. But a resident of the Bronx, or a former resident of the 
Bronx, would likely make a point of eating Puerto Rican food on this day, and at a local Bronx 
restaurant nowhere near the parade site.  Because this particular restaurant is both well known 
and long-standing, and the day was explicitly meant to express Puerto Rican pride, I would argue 
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that this place on this day provided a rare opportunity to observe Puerto Rican density within the 
business’ walls. 
What struck me most about my dining experience was the combination of the array of 
ages, the monolingual atmosphere, and the clear ethnic divide between the employees and the 
patrons. While other Puerto Rican restaurants in the area likely draw a variety of ages to their 
restaurants, and employ non-Puerto Rican staff, in my fieldwork I had not yet observed a setting 
where Spanish was the only language to be heard. The patrons were on the lighter scale of the 
phenotypical spectrum, something I had not expected. Perhaps the ability of lighter skinned non- 
whites to be less hindered by their race or ethnicity was a function of class standing. Black 
Hispanics tend to be more segregated from whites than non-black Hispanics (Iceland, 2009) 
which is likely tied to economic opportunities as well. In any event, those Puerto Ricans that 
happened to venture out for a late lunch/early dinner in the Bronx on this particular day were of 
lighter complexions. 
Upon finishing my meal, as I start back towards the man with the giant Puerto Rican flag, 
a storefront catches my eye, known as a “one-stop”, a small store that sells traditional Spanish 
language music, instruments, and other cultural items - often these are Puerto Rican music and 
cultural items. Interestingly, I learn that the man with the flag owns the “one-stop”, and is happy 
to take a break to speak with me inside his store. He stops his flag-march and opens it. In recent 
years, he recounts, the failing economy has had a very negative impact on his business- he was in 
fear of closing the store for good at one time. He spends his winters in southeast Puerto Rico, 
where he owns a bar, and his summers in New York City, where he owns the “one-stop”.  He, 
like other members of his family, are musicians, and he has found an entrepreneurial niche in the 
Bronx, filling a demand for cultural products from Puerto Rico.  Business is definitely better in 
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the summer, he says, as Puerto Ricans come out for the parade and the related festivities. During 
this time, he sells a wide variety of products that display the Puerto Rican flag and other symbols 
that are in high demand in the summer. This incredible variety of goods, combined with the fact 
that the products come from Puerto Rico, had made his business unique in the neighborhood- and 
actually in New York City overall. 
The above qualitative data support the quantitative data analysis. The struggle of Puerto 
Rican businesses to thrive is likely related to the suffering Puerto Rican median income in the 
Bronx, as well as the high Puerto Rican poverty rate. Additionally, the influx of other Latino 
populations is apparent in the staff at the Puerto Rican restaurant. Furthermore, the interaction 
between race and class was quite apparent in this particular Puerto Rican restaurant, in that the 
majority of the clientele were light-skinned, whereas the people on the street outside were 
considerably more mixed. It is not that the restaurant was terribly expensive, but it appeared to 







“Angel” has lived in East Harlem his whole life, having been born and raised in the East 
River projects on East 105th Street and First Ave. His work sets the tone for our conversation, 
and he implores me, as a soon to be mother who is also Puerto Rican, to take note of the 
important information he can offer regarding the sexual health and activity of youth. For 10 
years he has volunteered for a local non-profit and he recently made it onto the payroll. At this 
point in his life, he is tired of the problems associated with a certain way of life - he says 20 
years ago he would have been partying with everyone else.  With this new sense of direction, he 
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has really taken to his work at the non-profit, which itself has been in the neighborhood for 21 
years, opening right around the time that he began to notice the changes taking place in his 
community. According to Angel, 20 years ago the neighborhood was quite different. Most 
residents were Puerto Rican then, and all of the bodegas were owned by Puerto Ricans. Now, he 
laments, all of the bodegas are owned by Arabs. He finds this a great loss for the community, 
pointing to the pride he feels when he sees a lawyer’s office with a “Lopez” over the door. Not 
that he blames those groups that have seemed to take on the commercial and educational 
opportunities available in the neighborhood. Rather than taking advantage of a local school that 
offers job training- as Jamaicans, Japanese, and West Indians have- he said it seems as though 
it’s getting back to where Puerto Ricans are killing Puerto Ricans, Blacks are killing Blacks. In 
his words, “instead of killing grandmothers and children in the neighborhood, they should just go 
to the army where they can kill professionally- not kill at home- the violence seems to be getting 
worse around here. And unfortunately, he doesn’t believe the local politicians care to do much 
about it. As he describes, “they don’t stand up for us- they’re not really in it”. Unlike the 
expressions of the local political entities that serve East Harlem, Angel’s interpretation of the 
neighborhood today, as a life-long resident and hopeful agent of social change, is that it is far 
more violent, and far less of a community. 
Another local resident, “Papo”, owns a small music store off of 116th Street. Born in Rio 
Piedras, an oceanside town in Puerto Rico, he went to school in Bayamon, a town on the 
Caribbean Sea, and he ran a ferry between the two towns before opening up his shop in New 
York City.  The shop’s location has been open for 6 years, but he ran it at its former location 
(one block down) for 23 years. In Papo’s eyes, the neighborhood began to change around 12-15 
years ago, when more Central Americans (specifically Guatemalans and Mexicans) started 
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moving to the area. Although most of his customers are still Puerto Rican, the neighborhood 
seems to be more Mexican to him - which as I view Mexican insignia on the storefronts of other 
small businesses, would not be an illogical guess.  The majority of the other small business 
owners do indeed hail from Mexico, as apparent by the flags and names of the establishments. 
Papo believes Mexicans to make up the largest population in the neighborhood. He also believes 
change to have come sooner and within a somewhat shorter time frame. As opposed to the 20-30 
years mentioned by all other respondents, for Papo, East Harlem started changing much more 
recently, and perhaps, commercially at first, which is certainly what a small business owner 
would notice.  In any event, his perception of the neighborhood is important, as he represents 
what has been a dying breed, of sorts: the Puerto Rican small business owner. 
The respondents in East Harlem mirror that of East Tremont, particularly in the area of 
small business. Local Puerto Ricans lament the loss of small Puerto Rican businesses, and 
identify newcomers as being more willing/able to take on such enterprises. What is different in 
the case of East Harlem, is that violence is determined to be a significant hindrance to Puerto 
Rican progress, as is noted by a mainland-born Puerto Rican man. Indeed, the Community 
Service Society noted that Puerto Rican male youth experience significant difficulties when 
compared to similar Dominicans, Mexicans, or other Latinos (Dolnick, 2010). This disadvantage 
could be linked to local violence. 
 
 




Residents on the Lower East Side shared a somewhat different view of their changing 
 
Puerto Rican neighborhood.  “Gladys”, the daughter of a Puerto Rican migrant, was born on the 
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Lower East Side and is a lifelong resident of New York City public housing. Her mother also 
continues to live in public housing a few blocks down from Gladys’ home. Gladys was 
volunteering on the day that we spoke, helping a friend who was working the annual Loisaida 
Festival. Although the festival is a day where Puerto Ricans become somewhat more visible in 
their community, the neighborhood has been hard hit negatively impacted by the changes 
associated with gentrification. As Gladys explained, although the crime was pretty bad 20 years 
ago- buildings were coming down, leaving open lots - no one could foretell the damage yet to 
come. People who became educated or had a little bit of money fled the neighborhood, leaving 
the rest behind. Then outsiders came and bought the buildings and lots and turned them into 
higher rent buildings, so that those who remained and were already less well off were living in 
the rentals with rising prices; they could not stay. Only those in public housing, like Gladys, 
could afford to stay. So, the long-term residents that remain are mostly Puerto Rican, and while 
there are Dominicans, Ecuadorians, and Chinese as well – these newer groups entered the 
neighborhood at the same time as the wealthier white North American gentrifiers. Gladys points 
to a sense of unity that she believes exists between the different Hispanic subgroups in the 
neighborhood - but she argues that it is less a matter of cross ethnic solidarity and more a matter 
of activism and unity in the face of the oppressive form of ongoing gentrification. In fact, the 
only way she, and others, manage to get by is by way of aid from the local churches, charities, 
and food pantries.  Because of the skyrocketing cost of food, no one can afford to eat in their 
own neighborhood – they are now forced to rely on the help of charitable organizations to fill the 
void. Her interpretation was quite different from that of any other respondents with whom I 
spoke. That she remained in housing was less of the problem; she saw it become increasingly 
difficult to nourish ones family – even while living in close proximity to a relatively gourmet 
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assortment of specialty bake shops, restaurants, grocery stores, and the like. Even when food is 
there, it is clearly not for their consumption. Although housing is important, obtaining food 
seems a slightly higher up requirement for everyday life.  No one can survive without food. 
“Brenda” is also a life-long resident of the Lower East Side. Her parents came from 
Puerto Rico in their teens and went to work in the lively manufacturing sector at the time. Her 
mother was set on learning English when she arrived, eventually moving out of the factory and 
into data-entry at a large hospital. She achieved her dream of a job with benefits, and was later 
able to retire to Puerto Rico. In fact, Brenda had recently returned from visiting her- where 
crime is a pretty bad problem.  Despite the crime there, her mother considers it to be home. 
Brenda on the other hand, feels more at home on the Lower East Side- in the co-op apartment 
inherited from her parents, with her name now on the lease. A dental assistant, she hopes to be 
able to go back to school to become a dental hygienist. Although her unit is rent stabilized, her 
landlord is trying to increase her rent 18% from the $850 she currently pays live on Grand Street. 
Brenda’s neighborhood is a mix of Dominicans and Puerto Ricans; in her eyes, there 
seem to be slightly more Dominicans in the neighborhood. Everyone seems to get along pretty 
well- sometimes there are problems- but everyone speaks with one another at places like church. 
There is definitely less crime in the area - before it was really rough - but the biggest change 
taking place is rapid increase in luxury housing costing $4,000 a month or more.  She is hoping 
to be able to fight the forces working to increase her rent so that she can continue to remain in 
the neighborhood. 
Brenda’s perspective is important in that she is the only respondent who lives in a rent 
stabilized apartment, a unique experience compared to public housing residents. A relatively 
stable population, residents of rent stabilized apartments are subject to private landlords who 
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may not comply with the policies related to their rent stabilized status. They are also more likely 
to live in a mixed-income situation than those who live in public housing. Unlike Gladys’ 
assessment of the neighborhood, local residential changes are compromising Brenda’s current 
address. Brenda also seemed less affected by the lack of affordable food in the area. Perhaps 
because Brenda’s mother learned English and provided a white collar, albeit likely low paid, 
lifestyle for her daughter, Brenda has a different take on the very same neighborhood.  Thus, 
even within the low income Puerto Rican population on the Lower East Side - there is great 
variation. 
“Mr. Martin” has lived in the same apartment on the Lower East Side for over 35 years. 
He works for a local non-profit that provides cultural and educational programming to the local 
community. In earlier days the organization struggled to keep the lights on, but now there is 
more Latino cultural programming available to the organization, so Mr. Martin gets to spend 
more time making the organization’s mission a reality. 
Mr. Martin is not Latino himself, but has lived amongst long-time Latino residents in his 
building. He says that over the years, the Latino presence has waned. As a member of 
Community Board 3, Mr. Martin is privy to Census data for his community, and in his 
assessment, believes the Lower East Side to be more Dominican than Puerto Rican. This 
perspective matches Brenda’s view of the neighborhood. When he first moved in, there were five 
Nicaraguan families and one Puerto Rican family, and now there is one Nicaraguan and the 
remaining Puerto Rican family. However, unlike the sentiment of being pushed out as was 
described by the two Puerto Rican respondents in the neighborhood, Mr. Martin described the 
relief he heard from his neighbors who managed to move out. As he described it, he heard 
variations of “thank God I moved to Portland”, or “thank God I moved to Westchester”, or 
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“thank God I went to the Army”.  In his building, there seemed to be a more voluntary desire to 
 
leave the neighborhood- although he acknowledges that pushing-out forces have impact as well. 
 
For those who haven’t left but remain subject to the push of gentrification, Mr. Martin 
speaks to the local resources now available in the neighborhood. For one, there is a new non- 
profit called “AYUDA” that works to help combat the pushing out of Latinos from the area, and 
which Mr. Martin describes as being “a bit late”. AYUDA was not yet around to help a long- 
time Mexican business stay in the neighborhood. Mr. Martin had been a patron at that Mexican 
restaurant for 28 years; the owners dedicated their attention to their business and never got 
around to learning English. Later, they lost their commercial space to more savvy Israeli 
businessmen. In Mr. Martin’s assessment, Latino entrepreneurs like these really need the 
protection that AYUDA is now providing. 
Mr. Martin also points to local government organizations as being quite responsive to the 
local community.  Unlike my own experience with Community Board 3, of which Mr. Martin is 
a member, in his description the board well represents the community it serves. He explains that 
there are Latinos, African Americans, gays, 20-somethings, and 80-somethings on the 
Community Board, and that the local public housing tenant associations residents really feel like 
stakeholders. Mr. Martin’s place of employment houses artistic programs such as a bilingual 
children’s theatre. He describes it as one step in the increased outreach to the local Latino 
community. In fact, the Regional Economic Development Council provided funding to train 
local Latino and Asian youth in the job opportunities available in the arts, as well as instruction 
on how to use local arts institutions and galleries. It appears that although there are many 
challenges to retaining the artistic history of the Lower East Side, Mr. Martin’s organization is 
doing its part for local Latino residents. 
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“AYUDA”, a nonprofit, serves the local Latino population. Its founder is a lifelong 
resident of the Lower East Side, and after having become quite successful in the real estate 
world, has now turned his lens toward preventing any further displacement of his community. A 
staff member, “Mr. Sanchez”, was kind enough to take the time to speak with me.  Mr. Sanchez 
is a relatively new New Yorker, having been raised and educated in Puerto Rico. His perception 
of the community was quite interesting, given his relatively recent arrival. Mr. Sanchez agrees 
that the two largest Latino populations in the area are Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, although at 
this point, he notes, Dominicans seem to have become more numerous of late.  In earlier 
decades, Puerto Ricans were the larger population, and as he describes it, they tended to come 
from Puerto Rico only to recreate little island communities upon their arrival, albeit in the urban 
context.  Now Mr. Sanchez sees Puerto Ricans moving to other locales with warmer climates 
like Florida and Georgia. Whereas Puerto Ricans used to make up 37% of the Latino population 
in the Lower East Side, they now only make up about 27%.  Although a good number continue 
to reside in the projects- about 40% of local Latinos live in public housing. 
According to Mr. Sanchez, the issue of lease inheritance is the most prevalent issue 
facing local Latinos. Normally, elder family members are named on apartment leases, and 
younger household residents might not be names. This becomes a legal issue for the younger 
members, for when the lease holder dies, the remaining residents would be subject either to a 
rent increase or eviction. Unfortunately this has happened often. Mr. Sanchez’s AYUDA 
organization is also working to combat this problem, by way of educating the community with 
respect to the legal requirements for lease inheritance. Landlords are well aware of this loophole 
in inheriting legal tenancy, and AYUDA is working to inform the community members as well. 
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Interestingly, another problem encountered by tenants, particularly in the projects and 
other low-income housing, is that of communication with local agencies. Translation is often 
needed, not just between Spanish and English, but also for translating the formal and 
bureaucratic English that is often found on forms required by the necessary agencies into formal 
Spanish. Issues such as poor transfer of legal tenancy and the lack of translation services have 
likely led to the net loss of about 15,000 Latinos from the area in the past 20 years. At the same 
time, the number of Caucasians and Asians are rising. The Asian population in particular has a 
very effective non-profit organization, Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), which works to 
secure affordable housing for the local Asian community. In fact, 50 to 70 percent of the 
affordable housing in the area is leased through AAFE. They do a great job of getting their 
clients through every step of the process, from the paperwork to how to communicate with 
government workers. At this point AAFE is a well known organization, and landlords may 
prefer their clients as their paperwork is likely to be in good order. 
AYUDA also works to support the small business sector for local Latinos. Mr. Sanchez 
believes the number of small businesses to be fairly equal between Dominicans and Puerto 
Ricans, although he says it is possible that there may be slightly more Dominican owned 
businesses.  These owners have businesses such as bodegas, restaurants, green groceries, and 
some retail shops. Owners struggle with issues similar to those of the residents, namely rising 
rents. Latino small businesses have difficulty competing with the gentrifying owners of trendy 
restaurants and bars that can pay exorbitant rents.  The sad reality is that there is no way to 
prevent the economic boom. The one benefit of decreased crime points to the luck of those 
building owners who bought back in the 1980s and 1990s. How could they have known what the 
neighborhood would become? 
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The result of these issues is an increasingly marginalized Latino resident and small 
business owner community. Such challenges may be contributing to solidarity in the 
community. As Mr. Sanchez has observed, the local Latino community seems to display 
camaraderie with one another in the context of the AYUDA meetings and services. 
Interestingly, Mr. Sanchez points to the level of Americanization that is unique to Puerto Ricans, 
although being from Puerto Rico, most Puerto Ricans who have lived long-term in the U.S. 
would likely seem to be Americanized in his eyes. 
Unlike East Tremont and East Harlem, the Lower East Side is much more economically 
mixed. There are long-time Puerto Rican residents who struggle to put food on the table, there 
are new Puerto Rican migrants who work for non-profits, there are long-term Anglo residents 
who work to provide Latino cultural education to the local community, and there are a large 
number of gentrifiers. The Lower East Side is perhaps the most gentrified of New York City 
communities. The schools in this particular City Council district were actually deemed to be too 
good; so good that parents from other districts were trying to get their children into Lower East 
Side schools (Rose Mendez’ office staff, 2013). In this particular neighborhood, violence does 
not seem to be an issue, nor does small business. Rather, the remaining residents are much more 







Sitting in a politician’s office in Williamsburg, I am surrounded on both sides by elderly 
Puerto Rican and Dominican women. I don’t need to ask: one of the women is wearing a coqui 
t-shirt that clearly displays her Puerto Rican-ness.  As we waited for our turn to speak with a 
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staff member, the women pass the time by talking about their wait-times, their issues, and some 
gossip- in Spanish, of course. At first, I stayed quiet so as not to bother them, but when the 
conversation turned to me, I felt compelled to let them know that I could understand them, and 
that their conversation was not private from me. 
In their conversations, the two predominant themes were government issued checks and 
public housing, and a dissatisfaction with their experience in the office. Each of the women 
described how long it took their late checks to arrive; whether the checks were social security 
checks or public assistance – I did not know and I did not feel comfortable asking for more 
details. Most of the women complained of issues with paperwork needed to maintain their 
ability to stay in public housing, and the subsequent notices they received - paperwork that they 
felt had already been completed and submitted. 
What struck me about the experience in that office was both the age and the sex of the 
people seeking guidance. This group of elderly Spanish-speaking women, mainly Puerto Rican, 
trying to resolve issues that I would have guessed involved their children somehow. Why were 
these women out in this office alone? Why weren’t their children helping them find resolution to 
these problems? 
That same day, I decide to follow up with a contact in another politician’s office, right 
around the corner. Upon entering the office there is a staff member who informs me that 
unfortunately my contact is not in. But the visit is not for naught, as I meet a Puerto Rican 
woman, born and raised in the area, who is happy to talk.  As I describe my trek from New 
Jersey, “Jhanice”, having recently moved to Throggs Neck in the Bronx, laments the fact that she 
must spend a lot of time getting to her parents’ place in Brooklyn. Although they could move in 
with her, she described how her parents never want to leave Los Sures, the name of their 
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neighborhood in South Williamsburg. They have been there forever and do not want to give up 
their public housing. When asked how the neighborhood had changed from her youth, she noted 
the much higher rents.  She also described changes to the North Side - how previously it had 
been really quiet- but now, it is all bars and noisy restaurants- “So many bars”.  Unfortunately 
this increased commercial activity, has not resulted in less crime, but as Jhanice described it, 
“different” crimes. In her telling, now the theft involves stolen iphones, apartments broken into, 
and some shootings among the younger set. 
The local non-profit sector also has a unique take on changes in the neighborhood.  I 
spoke with a local leader there, “Ernesto”, who was born in Puerto Rico and moved to 
Williamsburg when he was 9 years old. At the time he says there were hardly any Puerto Ricans, 
more Ukranians and other groups.  He always wondered what the term “tipping point” meant, 
but then he realized that it was when all the wealthy people started to move out when the poorer 
Puerto Ricans, and other populations started to move in. The newcomers now, however, are 
“disrespectful- not on the street or anything- but in that they don’t even try to get to know us. 
Some do, but most don’t.  These people are young, wealthy, without kids- and they are pushing 
us out. Now it is to the point where I can’t go out and buy lunch- it’s too expensive. These 
wealthy people are not just local either, but from all over the world- opening all of these 
restaurants.”  Although in the past there were more Puerto Ricans, now it seems to be pretty 
close between Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, who do not seem to have much tension between 
them.  Interesting in his assessment is the articulation of the disrespect he feels when 
encountering his new neighbors, and like the Lower East Side, and his inability to afford lunch in 
his own neighborhood. In his view, too, in the past there were more Puerto Ricans in the area 
than Dominicans. 
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Another local non-profit in Los Sures, has a museum in Williamsburg, which is host to 
neighborhood history. Within it works a Dominican woman who moved from Santo Domingo to 
Williamsburg 15 years ago.  “Yolanda” has a Puerto Rican boyfriend, who also happens to be 
her daughter’s father. According to her, her English is okay, but not great, which leads me to 
believe her Puerto Rican boyfriend must speak Spanish pretty well. Her take on neighborhood 
changes is interesting in that she is Dominican, and yet she is in very close contact with Puerto 
Ricans. According to Yolanda, the biggest change in the neighborhood has been the increase in 
rents. The newcomers are young with no children, and they can pay so much in rent. “Without 
public housing and rent control, no one could live in the area- apartments are bought for $2 
million- $4,000 a month.”  This change took place when white people started moving in during 
the late 1990s. Although crime used to be a problem, it had already subsided before they started 
moving in, she says. In earlier decades crime was really bad, and the buildings were in complete 
disrepair. The landlords would abandon them and burn them to collect insurance money as 
opposed to rent. But now, she reports, crime is much more improved in Williamsburg than in the 
Bronx and Washington Heights. A lot of Dominicans live in both the Bronx and Washington 
Heights as well. In Williamsburg, she explains, Dominicans are more likely to be from Cibao, 
whereas in Washington Heights they are more likely from Santo Domingo.  Where they are 
from, really depends on where someone’s family lives - if the family lives in Williamsburg then 
they go to Williamsburg, says Yolanda. This has translated into the local Dominican restaurants 
all being owned by Dominicans from the northern part of the island. 
With respect to the relationships within the Latino subgroups in the area, Yolanda points 
to the difference in the timing of entry to the neighborhood. In her view, Puerto Ricans came to 
the area much earlier than Dominicans, and so they have less of a connection to the island than 
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Dominicans do. Dominicans came in the 1980’s, while Mexicans came a bit later than that. At 
first, there was tension between Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, but at this point everyone seems 
to be in community with one another. Puerto Ricans used to have trouble with Italians before as 
well, but they fought for the community, for which other Latinos reap the benefits. The 
nonprofits Los Sures and El Puente have really helped with that- they were started by Puerto 
Ricans from the neighborhood. The local representatives seem to work for the community as 
well, such as Congresswoman Velazquez- they do what they say. 
From Yolanda’s perspective the majority of the Latinos in the area are Puerto Rican, and 
they are generally older than other Latino populations in the neighborhood. They want to leave, 
but they can’t because of they are trapped by the affordability of their rent controlled apartments. 
Yolanda tells her daughter to be grateful for Puerto Ricans, they paved the way for other Latinos 
in the neighborhood. It’s interesting that she perceives that Puerto Ricans are the largest 
population in the area, whereas the other respondents in the area point to an equal number of 
Dominicans and Puerto Ricans. As well, she is one of the only people to make reference of the 
connections between Dominican communities in different boroughs- most respondents limited 
their context to the neighborhood in which they lived. 
In Williamsburg, Puerto Ricans struggle with many of the same issues as on the Lower 
East Side. Rents are becoming increasingly unaffordable, and local residents are getting priced 
out. But what is mentioned in Williamsburg that is not mentioned on the Lower East Side, is the 
sense that the newcomers care little for long-term residents - or at least that is the impression 






While Williamsburg is one of the Brooklyn neighborhoods closes to Manhattan, Sunset 
Park is located closer to Staten Island. Sunset Park, too, is adjacent to water, however, the Upper 
Bay, not the East River. Sunset Park has a somewhat different experience from that of 
Williamsburg and the Lower East Side, in that gentrification is less of an issue.  “Jorge” was 
born in Sunset Park, but shortly after moved to Puerto Rico and then returned to the 
neighborhood at age 7. In his assessment, during the 1980s, the neighborhood was Puerto Rican. 
But about 10-12 years ago, people from all over- Mexico, Ecuador, and El Salvador- started to 
come. “Everything is changing, now Chinese people cook Puerto Rican food - and they speak 
Spanish!  There are still some Puerto Rican owned businesses on Fifth Avenue, but not many. 
The good thing about the change, is that the economy is better than in years past – Fifth Avenue 
is bustling at all times. Things actually cost less compared to before. Most Latinos in the Fifth 
Avenue section are not Puerto Rican, but from other places. It’s mostly Mexican from Seventh 
Avenue to the water, and then mostly Asian from Seventh Avenue up. Then there are Jews and 
some Italians. But Williamsburg and Bushwick are still mostly Puerto Rican. Things are way 
better today in terms of crime. The 1970’s were crazy- no one could even walk to the park 
because of the drugs and everything. Families could not walk on 5th Ave. Even now, 3rd Ave. is 
still bad- it’s dark there because of the train. The economy has definitely improved the crime in 
Sunset Park.” 
According to “Jorge”, Latinos in the Sunset Park community only get together at 
weddings, but mostly tend to stick to their own ethnic group. His wife, “Chita”, jumps in to 
indicate that she only stays with Puerto Ricans, and definitely does not associate with other 
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Latino groups. They each then lament that they feel like they are two of the only Puerto Ricans 
left in the neighborhood, and that all of their compatriots are leaving. What is striking, is that 
they point to the clear distinction between themselves and the other Latino subgroups in their 
neighborhood. They feel no sense of community with the other Latino residents in Sunset Park. 
And they feel as though they are in the minority – contrary to the assertion by a staff member at 
the local community board, who assured me that Puerto Ricans very much remain the largest 
Latino population. However, in comparison to the long history “Jorge” and “Chita” have in the 
neighborhood, this could very much seem as though the Puerto Rican world that they remember 
has nearly vanished. Sunset Park is distinct for its lack of high rise projects: high rises mean 
densely packed residents - and thus a lack of density of Puerto Ricans that other neighborhoods 
and boroughs maintain. Density is much less possible where housing is dispersed, so Puerto 
Ricans become interspersed amongst others, and disconnected from each other. 
The residents do, however, come together on the day of the Puerto Rican Day Parade. 
On this day in 2013, the Puerto Rican community comes together in what is called El Grito De 
Sunset Park. Several years ago an 8 year old Puerto Rican girl was shoved into a gate by a 
police officer, and on this one day of city-wide celebration of Puerto Rican culture the 
community came together to protest the oppressive police present in the neighborhood on the one 
day of city-wide celebration of Puerto Rican culture. On a corner of Fifth Avenue, several men 
are playing bomba music and chanting phrases in opposition of the large police presence 
monitoring the scene and have gathered a fairly large crowd. Several young people are 
documenting the activity of both parties, and passing out fliers in English and Spanish on how 
best to react to the police, so as not to suffer abuse.  The fliers say to treat the police like a wild 
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animal. The crowd got pretty rowdy, cursing the nearby officers, and the police began to call for 
backup- so I promptly left. 
Like in East Harlem, crime is again mentioned in Sunset Park. While local Puerto Ricans 
acknowledge that crime rates have improved, there is still lingering violence. However, what I 
observed was not gang violence, as was eluded to in East Harlem, but an increasingly tense 
relationship between police and local residents. Political activists were doing their best to stave 
off any violent encounters between the peaceful protesters and the police, however, a mounting 
tension could be felt on the scene. 
 
 




Through my observations, as well as a local report by the Department of City Planning, it 
became apparent that government housing plays a significant role in the Puerto Rican experience 
in New York City.  East Harlem, the best-known Puerto Rican enclave in the city, is also home 
to the largest number of public housing developments (24). A number of public housing 
developments are also located in the other historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods, such as 
Williamsburg, the Lower East Side, and East Tremont. Not only are there a large number of 
public housing developments within historically Puerto Rican communities, but a large 
percentage of the Puerto Rican population resides within them. In the 2008 New York City 
Housing and Vacancy Survey, it was reported that almost 80% of Puerto Ricans live in rent- 
controlled or rent-regulated units, and that 20% of the Puerto Rican population lives in public 
housing units- “the highest proportion among all major racial and ethnic groups and two and a 
half times the proportion of all households that lived in this rental category” (Lee, 2011). Thus 
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the role of public housing in the Puerto Rican community is tremendous. Indeed, of the 10 
respondents cited in this chapter, four are known to currently live in public housing (one whose 
mother lives in public housing as well). Three shared this fact quite quickly with me in 
conversation, and the fourth was not shy in her conversation with others, knowing that I could 
understand. A fifth shared that her parents continue to live in public housing, with no plans to 
leave. 
The preponderance of Puerto Ricans residing in public housing would contribute to the 
stability of the population. That is, it is unlikely that Puerto Ricans would give up their access to 
a relatively protected housing situation, in which rent is dictated by income, in favor of the 
unstable and unprotected private rental system. In this sense, it is a benefit that so many Puerto 
Ricans live in public housing, in that many do not have the incomes to support themselves in the 
private market.  However, it leaves this population in a state of limbo, between two worlds. 
With lackluster labor force participation, relatively few Puerto Ricans are working low-paid 
service jobs when compared to other Latino populations. And then on the other side, with 
lackluster educational attainment, relatively few Puerto Ricans have access to the white-collar 
service jobs or the creative jobs provided by gentrification. So, while they have housing, urban 
Nuyoricans are essentially in a state of socioeconomic purgatory. 
 
 




In addition to speaking with residents in Puerto Rican neighborhoods, I also managed to 
speak with a few Puerto Rican residents outside of the enclave. It was much more difficult to 
locate such Puerto Ricans, as the enclave provides an easy location for finding members of this 
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“Angie” is half Italian/Irish (father) and half Puerto Rican (mother), third generation 
Puerto Rican. Her mother was born and raised in Park Slope, Brooklyn, the daughter of Puerto 
Rican migrants to New York City.  Her father was also born and raised in Brooklyn, but moved 
to Queens with his family later in his youth. Angie works in the high-end spa industry in 
Manhattan, and is studying to gain the knowledge and experience to open her own spa, 
combining holistic health and beauty, having suffered through a chronic disease that affected her 
appearance for much of her youth. 
Angie’s Puerto Rican mother, “Evelyn”, is clearly dominant in English, but can get by in 
Spanish. As she explains to me, her mother and step-father are from Guanica, and her step- 
father is also half Nicaraguan. Evelyn is representative of the 30% of Hispanics in the United 
States who have married whites although she doesn’t fit the profile of the average Latino who 
intermarries since she did not go to college and was not upwardly mobile prior to marriage 
(Alba, pg. 204, 2009). Still, she does not have apparent African ancestry either, even though 
many Puerto Ricans do. Her marriage and her daughter are token representatives of the blurred 
color line in the United States, wherein her mixed daughter is now able to inhabit two ethno- 
racial worlds at the same time, although she seems to most often walk through her father’s. 
Evelyn and Angie occupy the space of those that have managed to culturally and 
economically assimilate- at least from appearances.  They live in a privately owned home in the 
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suburbs of Queens, they primarily speak English, and they have lost much of their previously 
held Puerto Rican connections to Brooklyn. Their experience gives credence to Portes’ and 
others’ assertions that upward mobility is possible given assimilation to the dominant norms and 
culture of the society (Portes and Zhou, 1993), in this case by way of intermarriage. But this 
exchange is not without detriment, as Evelyn laments the Brooklyn of her youth, and her lost 
connection to her Puerto Rican-ness. She feels alone in Queens, far away from Brooklyn both 
spatially and psychologically, and expresses sadness at her inability to display and maintain who 
she really is. The suburbs and the privately owned homes within them are inherently separating- 
no shared front doors, corridors, laundry rooms, lawns. Even if Puerto Ricans lived in the next 
block, she would probably never know. Even the house right behind hers, she said if she had to 
guess she would say they were Mexican or maybe Indian. 
In this particular case, intermarriage was the reason behind “Evelyn’s” departure from 
Park Slope.  While it is a move up economically, it is a loss culturally.  It is also a loss socially, 
in that neighbors in the suburbs are much more removed from one another than they are in urban 
neighborhoods. It is disheartening to hear, in that the move, while it looks great on paper (as 







Angie’s Puerto Rican cousin, “Blanca”, only 10 years younger than her mother, recently 
moved to Staten Island to raise her two daughters with her husband. She would have liked to 
buy a house in Brooklyn, but given the incredibly high prices, this was not an option. Thus, 
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although still an expensive endeavor, Staten Island became the second choice for this particular 
Puerto Rican Brooklynite. 
While “Blanca’s” move is not related to intermarriage, it is related to family. Having 
lived in Park Slope for decades, by the time she was able to purchase a home with her family, 
she had been priced out of the neighborhood. As Blanca’s children are still quite young, she is 
less concerned with the community she is leaving behind than her interest in providing the best 
possible residence for her children. As such, there is no hint of sadness in her story, but rather 
hope that the move will be an improvement for her family. I hope that this story of hope is more 





The quantitative and qualitative data illustrate the struggle that urban Puerto Ricans have 
faced for the past four decades. While there is evidence that some Puerto Ricans have 
experienced success, this does not detract from the problem of long-standing and persistent 
Puerto Rican poverty in urban New York City. The problem, however, cannot be seen. Rather 
than breaking out the data pertaining to ethnic subgroups, local government throughout the 
region assesses the status of the Hispanic conglomerate.  Coupled with Puerto Rican 
stratification and dispersion, this is a recipe for Puerto Rican invisibility. 
The Puerto Rican population in the larger metropolitan area is increasingly shifting 
toward the suburbs. Related to this trend is the increasing stratification amongst Puerto Ricans. 
While not an ideal type, there is generally a pattern of urban poverty and suburban affluence for 
Puerto Ricans in the region. One suburban-based Nuyorican I interviewed stated her economic 
advantages come at a steep price: namely the social disconnection from the Puerto Rican 
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enclave. Additionally, as a suburbanite, her seeming disconnect from her immediate neighbors is 
illustrative of the general social loss that can take place in suburban communities. The suburbs, 
by nature of the isolation of private property, foster invisibility. 
Not only are Puerto Ricans in suburbs dispersed amongst other middle class residents, but 
Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rican neighborhoods are also increasingly dispersed amongst 
Dominicans, Mexicans, and hipsters. The influx of Dominicans and Mexicans to the region is 
often concentrated within, if not adjacent to, Puerto Rican neighborhoods.  Puerto Ricans are 
thus dispersed amongst non-Puerto Ricans, and thus increasingly invisible, in their own enclaves. 
Stratification within the Puerto Rican community, the dispersion of Puerto Ricans 
throughout the New York City metropolitan region, and the dispersion of Puerto Ricans amongst 
other Latinos have contributed to Puerto Rican invisibility. However, the loss of Puerto Ricans 
from New York City proper was the only statistic of interest to local reporters in both 2000 and 
2010, despite the many available statistics that contradict this general pronouncement.  Rather, 
the singular headline seemed to give greater permission to New York City’s power players in 
media and politics to turn a blind eye to a community that has been in need for the past forty 
years. 
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Chapter 3. Media: The Blind Eye 
 
 
Along with demographic shifts, there have been several key shifts in how Puerto Ricans 
are portrayed in the media. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s Puerto Ricans were deemed a 
significant social problem in New York City, now Puerto Ricans are rarely the subject of local 
news reports. The decrease in media attention paid to Puerto Ricans relates to increasing 
diversity within the local Hispanic population, as well as the increasing dispersion of Puerto 
Ricans throughout the broader region. Despite these demographic shifts, Puerto Ricans remain 
the largest Hispanic subgroup in New York City yet receive significantly less media attention 
than smaller ethnic populations such as Mexicans. Another factor associated with disappearance 
of Puerto Ricans in local reporting is the increasing focus on the larger panethnic population: 
Hispanics. The trend towards Hispanicity began much earlier than is currently documented, 
getting started in earnest in the 1960s. However, there are differences in how the local English 
language and Spanish language press utilized Hispanicity, and treated the various ethnic 
populations. While the Spanish language press was the first to adopt Hispanic terminology in a 








Media has long been considered to be the fourth estate of democracy, due to its role in 
shaping public opinion (Carlyle, 1841). This ability to impact both lawmakers and their 
constituents is unmatched by any other field, given the ability of the media to disseminate 
information- albeit not untouched by bias.  The largest periodical in New York City, the New 
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York Times has helped shape the opinions of English-speaking New Yorkers, and other 
Americans, for at least 100 years.  And El Diario La Prensa, the largest Spanish language press 
in the city, has done the same for Spanish-speaking New York for at least 50 years. Thus, in 
order to investigate the ideas shaped and disseminated through the media regarding ethnicity and 
panethnicity, these two media stalwarts are the most appropriate for analyzing the question of 
Puerto Rican visibility and invisibility in New York City. 
Unfortunately, database access to El Diario La Prensa articles is not available for 1970, 
but rather starts for the year 1993. The only access to the news source for 1970 is by way of 
microfilm, a much more labor-intensive endeavor. For this reason, I will compare the number of 
articles and captions with references to Puerto Ricans to other populations, including 
Dominicans, Cubans, Mexicans, and panethnic populations, within the January 1970 issues of El 
Diario La Prensa to the New York Times for the same groups and time-frame, excluding the 
sports section. This process is not entirely comparable to using the New York Times database for 
data extraction, as photos and captions are not caught within its search engine, however, the task 
is nonetheless useful for the purpose of comparison as the majority of the each of the newspapers 
is comprised of articles. Within the January 1970 El Diario La Presna issues, I considered a 
caption that was not within an article to be separate- particularly given the fact that captions were 
emboldened in 1970 and 1980, and thus more prominent and visible. Further, an article that 
contained the term Puerto Rican and Hispanic was counted twice, once as an article containing 
the term Puerto Rican, and once as an article containing the term Hispanic- just as is done in the 
database. Some instances required improvisation, as there were at times separate headlines that 
were not explicitly within the same article, but not explicitly separate articles- in these cases, I 
separated the headlines and counted them individually.  Again, the use of judgment was required 
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in some cases, and while there may be some difference in opinion for how to count these articles, 
and thus the resulting figures, it is unlikely that the interpretation would change given the later 








On January 4th, of 1970, a singular headline adorned the front page of El Diario La 
Prensa, the prominent news source for Spanish speaking New York. The headline read: The rate 
for subway passage rises to 30 cents (translation from Spanish). The story title was emboldened, 
and in large text. There were several subsequent reports listed, including the presence of armed 
forces in Ecuador, a story about Mary Jo Kopechne being abandoned in Ted Kennedy’s car, a 
fire killing a family, a bomb injuring a man in West Virginia, and a murdered 18 year old- but 
these stories were clearly secondary to the rising cost of public transportation in the city. 
On the same day the front page of the New York Times did not show a singular headline, 
but rather many different headlines. The subway fare story made the front page, but was less 
prominent than it was in the Spanish language newspaper, relegated to the upper left corner of 
the page. Other stories appeared to be more prominent, such as a report on the legacy of 
problems left by the previous decade, and an Israeli raid on Lebanon that resulted in 21 
prisoners. To some extent, it makes sense that a larger newspaper with a broader reach would 
have a more varied take on “the news”, however, it seems that this story would be quite 
important to the New York Times. 
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The two news sources differed with respect to coverage of the subway fare story as well. 
 
To the New York Times, the story was more a bipartisan political tale, while to El Diario La 
Prensa, this occasion was clearly personal to Spanish speakers in New York City. New York 
City in 1970 was not the bright and shiny city of the post-war boom, but a tattered shadow of its 
former self. The gains made by the Puerto Rican pioneers to the region in the 1940s and 1950s 
were completely stunted, if not lost, and what remained was a community riddled with poverty, 
crime, and unemployment. So, the incredible 50% increase in subway fare not only shocked the 
psyche of Nuyoricans, but their meager wallets as well. The lucky that were employed now had 
to dish over 50% more to get to their jobs. Thus, the rising subway fare was unequivocally the 
most important story of the day for Spanish speaking, majority Puerto Rican, New York. 
At the time, part of the problem was the politically ambiguous position of Puerto Ricans 
in New York City. Puerto Ricans were located on one of the lowest rungs on the city’s 
socioeconomic ladder, and yet there was no clear political plan in place, on either side, for how 
to incorporate this increasingly large community, and there was no clear vision of who Puerto 
Ricans would become to New York City. Would they become a darker version of the third 
generations of Italians and Irish, and move out of the ethnic enclave? Or was this social and 
economic stagnation going to persist? Much like the New York Times coverage of the subway 
fare, is it assumed that Puerto Ricans were impacted by this change, and yet there is no mention 
of them in the article, further illustrating their unclear position in New York City’s political 
hierarchy. 
In the remainder of this chapter I address the changes over time in the reporting of Puerto 
Ricans in first the New York Times and then El Diario La Prensa. The reader should note that 
from 1970 to 2010, both the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa progressively diminished 
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their coverage of Puerto Ricans, they accomplished this in different ways. The effect, however, 
is the same: Puerto Ricans disappeared from local news reporting. 
 
 








While the front page on the first day of the year did little to address the issue of ethnicity 
or panethnicity in 1970 New York City, a search on the topic in the New York Times database 
provided the missing link. If the number of articles is to be considered popularity, then Puerto 
Ricans were most popular in 1970. Within the calendar year of 1970, there were 1,065 articles 
referencing Puerto Ricans in the New York Times - excluding advertisements, stock quotes, and 
the weather. If these topics are included, 1,213 articles referencing the term “Puerto Rican” 
appear. Unexpectedly, as there is existing research that points to 1980 as the birth of the 
widespread usage terms such as Hispanic and Latino- these terms are used in various instances in 
the New York Times in 1970. This is a full decade before the term Hispanic would become 
commonplace in the United States by way of the Census, and two decades before the Puerto 
Rican population in New York City would reach its peak. That being said, with the same 
restrictions applied, the term “Hispanic” appears only 45 times, and the term “Latina/o” a mere 
30 times. These panethnic terms are largely limited to articles pertaining to television and the 
arts. Eighteen, or 45% of the 45 articles that include the term Hispanic pertain to entertainment. 
One article discusses the new “Hispanic Band Series” that will take place throughout New York 
City parks, but features a heavily Puerto Rican lineup of bands.  At least 60% of the artists listed, 
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such as Willie Colon, Eddie Palmieri, and Ray Barretto, are Puerto Rican, much like Spanish 
speaking New York at the time. So, while Hispanic was not yet in frequent use, there were 
already ways in which Puerto Ricans were being submerged within English speaking New York, 
and even within the New York salsa music scene. 
Although these panethnic terms were mostly relegated to the arts, already the term 
“Hispanic” was being used with regard to a civil rights organization in New York City- a civil 
rights organization that was meant to cater in part to Puerto Ricans. The City Commission on 
Human Rights had a Puerto Rican-Hispanic Affairs Division at the time, and the Puerto Rican 
director abruptly quit because his attempts to correct the meager and low-level hiring of Puerto 
Ricans (Feb 10, 1970). Ironically, the article describes an accusation that this Puerto Rican city 
agency was doing little to help Puerto Ricans in New York, and in fact was biased against them- 
this despite the fact that the organization was meant to work for their civil rights. 
Although the size of the Puerto Rican population would not peak in New York City until 
1990, 1970 was the peak in terms of the number of references to Puerto Ricans in the New York 
Times. Between 1960 and 1969, the number of references had more than doubled from 470 to 
1,050 mentions. And 1970 would slightly top that figure, at 1,065 references. Several events 
coincide with this popularity in 1969 and 1970, including the push for open enrollment in 1969 
and its implementation in 1970, the formation of the New York City chapter of the Young Lords 
in 1969, the widespread teacher strikes in New York City public schools, the increasing national 
and local focus on the problem of urban poverty, the broader civil rights efforts throughout the 
country, and the city, state, and federal elections taking place in 1970. 
With the start of the 1970s, however, came the peak as well as the decline in popularity 
for the ethnic group in the English newspaper.  Between 1970 and 1979 the number of references 
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to Puerto Ricans dropped 40%, from 1,065 to 639 at the end of the decade. At the same time, the 
number of references to the “Hispanic” population was skyrocketing. In the most popular year, 
1970, the month of October had the highest number of references to Puerto Ricans (100 
mentions, excluding advertisements, the weather, and stocks). Eighty-five of these references 
pertained to New York City and New York State, 8 to New Jersey, 6 to the island of Puerto Rico, 
and 1 to Massachusetts.  Within the articles pertaining to New York City, 29% of the references 
to Puerto Ricans are regarding voting, 14% regarding the arts/entertainment, 13% regarding civil 
rights, 12% regarding education, and 8% regarding police/prisons. The remaining articles deal 
with a number of topics, including sports, violence, unemployment, the ghetto/poverty, public 
health, urban renewal, and an obituary (in that order). 
Within the voting related articles, nearly 70% of the references to Puerto Ricans are 
within voting district profiles, 20% are within candidate profiles, and the remainder can be found 
within state voting trends and voter registration information. As Puerto Ricans continued to flow 
to New York City, they became concentrated in districts that were previously heavily Italian 
(such as East Harlem, Brooklyn, and the Bronx), and in similar spatial locations to African 
Americans- literally side by side, if not dispersed amongst one another (Rivera, 2004). The flow 
of Puerto Ricans to the region coincided with the flow of African Americans from the South, and 
so these two communities ended up both in similar neighborhoods, as well as similar dire 
economic circumstances (Freeman, 2008). The two groups primarily filled the low-skilled 
manufacturing jobs available for people of color in the 1940s-1960s, which provided the means 
for these first generation New Yorkers to make some gains. However, with the flight of many 
factories from the city in the late 1960s, the economic base dropped out for both Puerto Ricans 
and African Americans.  As jobs were suddenly unavailable, many had no choice but to receive 
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government aid by way of welfare benefits and the newly available public housing in New York 
City. Public housing contributed to the spatial density of African Americans and Puerto Ricans 
given the tower style of many of the buildings- built as Robert Moses imperfect homage to Le 
Corbusier (Kasinitz, 1995). Little did Moses know that his Slum Clearance project would result 
in Slum Persistence in some respects (Plunz, 1990). These circumstances led to interest within 
the English speaking community in this potentially powerful voting bloc, and resulted in a 
number of articles outlining just how powerful the number of voters might be, and for whom 
they would be voting. 
Unlike other more popular arguments, which have proposed that there was some 
characteristic intrinsic to the Puerto Rican community that led to their dire socioeconomic status, 
Stephen Steinberg aptly points to the timing of entry to New York City as one of the defining 
moments for what would become the dominant Nuyorican experience (Steinberg, 2001). In 
contrast to the popularized versions of Oscar Lewis’ La Vida: A Puerto Rican Family in the 
Culture of Poverty- San Juan and New York (1966), and to Moynihan and Glazer’s Beyond the 
Melting Pot (1963), in which the onus of responsibility is placed upon the disadvantaged home, 
Steinberg points out the flaws in each of these arguments, which ultimately lack a connection to 
the current existence of structural barriers to black, Puerto Rican, and Chicano success.  For 
these groups, there was a mismatch between the group characteristics and the status of the place 
where the group tended to cluster, which led to the widespread condition of poverty amongst 
group members. However, this timing is not often taken into account; rather a series of 
explanations, social, economic, racial, etc., are offered as reasons for the failure of Puerto 
Ricans, now referred to as “Hispanics”, to assimilate into American society (Massey and 
Bitterman, 1985; Badillo, 2006). 
74	 
Ironically, although the community was numerically stronger in 1970, it was less dense 
than it had been in 1960, precisely because of the influx of other groups in the post-1965 era of 
immigration, in which national quotas for foreigner entry were dropped. So, since 1965, the 
ethnic enclave was increasingly becoming a multiethnic enclave. As well, the economic benefits 
that would have been possible from the existence of the ethnic enclave were becoming obsolete 
as small Puerto Rican businesses could not be supported in such dire economic circumstances- 
businesses that would be necessary to provide any kind of benefit (Navarro, 2000; Korrol, Centro 
PR Part Five; Thabit, 2000; Wagenheim and Jimenez de Wagenheim, 2006). Portes has argued 
that an ethnically segregated commercial district might provide an added benefit compared to an 
ethnically diverse commercial base, by way of ethnic camaraderie.  Essentially, Portes argues 
that ethnic discrimination would not be present in this context, facilitating a better outcome for 
the employee by way of apprenticeship or more equitable wages. However in the case of 1970 
Spanish Harlem, if Puerto Ricans could not make a living wage, they could not provide 
patronage to Puerto Rican businesses, and so the commercial base of the enclave deteriorated- 
obliterating any economic benefit to be had from this form of segregation.  As well, unlike 
Miami, the commercial base in New York City’s Puerto Rican enclaves did not include factories 
and other larger businesses, but rather small businesses such as bodegas and bakeries- businesses 
that would not support a large number of employees.  What remained was not the varied 
economic experience of Nuyoricans in decades past, but the increasingly singular experience of 
poverty (Frazier and Tettey-Fio, 2006; Baker, 2002). 
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The Evolution of “Hispanic” Reporting 
 
 
The term “Hispanic” was utilized by the New York Times’ journalists as early as 1910. 
Although the term has undergone several changes in meaning as time went on. In the early 20th 
century, the term referred to Spanish people hailing from Spain.  By the 1940s and 1950s, the 
term seemed to encompass a broader meaning, more often being used synonymously with “South 
American” or “Latin American”, but not necessarily Puerto Ricans (content analysis). There was 
a bit of growth in the 1960s, when the term “Hispanic” came to include Puerto Ricans, Latin 
Americans, and Spaniards-three seemingly separate groups- or their children, but use of the term 
was still negligible. It was not until the 1970’s that it became more commonplace in the news 
source, and when it came to refer mainly to people of “Spanish” descent residing in the United 
States, and included any Spanish speaking ethnic group. 
Between 1970 and 1979, use of the term “Hispanic” grew by almost 2,000%. In 1970 
there were 45 articles with references to the term, and by 1979, there were 871.  In fact, the rate 
of growth in this decade outpaces that of the 1980s- although the peak use of the term would not 
come until the 1990s. In 1978, the number of references to the “Hispanic” population overtakes 
the number of references to “Puerto Ricans”, despite the fact that it was still a relatively safe bet 
to say that a “Hispanic” person in New York City was a Puerto Rican, as Puerto Ricans made up 
somewhere between 61% and 68% of the broader “Hispanic” population (Rivera-Batiz, 2004). 
This is indeed a drop compared to 1960 when Puerto Ricans comprised 80% of Spanish speaking 
New York, but the steep decrease in interest in this population is no less shocking.  As can be 
seen in the below chart, by 1978 there were 491 references to “Hispanic” and 470 references to 
Puerto Ricans, and mentions of the latter would continue to decline. 
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Figure 1. Mentions of Puerto Ricans, NYT 1970s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
Mentions of other ethnic groups, however, were on the rise.  In fact, articles containing 
the term “Mexican” far surpassed those containing “Puerto Rican” throughout the decade. While 
there were 1,065 references to Puerto Ricans in 1970, there were 1,488 references to Mexicans. 
If the New York Times is to be considered a national news source, then it would make sense to 
have more references to Mexicans than Puerto Ricans, as Mexicans were a much larger 
population throughout the Southwest. But, if one considers New York region to be the primary 
focus of the media outlet, then this occurrence would not be logical at all, as the size of the 
Mexican population in the Northeast was minute in comparison. In any respect, by 1979, there 
were 1,512 references to the term “Mexican” and 639 mentions of the term “Puerto Rican”. 
Also not concentrated in New York City, Cubans were another popular ethnic group in 
the New York Times issues. In 1970, there were 482 articles including the term “Cuban”, and the 





about Cubans would nearly double to 957, and would far surpass the number of articles about the 
local majority, Puerto Ricans. There has been continued interest in Cuba and Cubans in the 
decades since the Cuban Revolution, and wonder at the stability of the communist island despite 
the economic embargo. Additionally, Cubans immigrants to the U.S. are considered to be one of 
the Hispanic success stories, managing to create a strong economic and educational base for 
future generations in spite of their harrowing status as refugees who fled a communist regime. In 
actuality, the first wave of Cuban refugees came from the privileged class, and while they may 
not have brought all of their money with them, they did bring their upper class business acumen, 
and their cultural capital. They also tended to be racially white, or at least whiter than Mexicans 
and Puerto Ricans, the other two major immigrant/migrant newcomers at the time, which 
removed at least one barrier to their economic assimilation (Blauner, pg. 23, 1973). Lastly, 
because of their refugee status and their political stance they received economic benefits 
unmatched by any other immigrant group. It is estimated that Cuban refugees have received 
nearly 1 billion dollars in support from the U.S. government (Grosfoguel, 2003). Aside from this 
support, there is a less explicit manner in which Cubans have benefitted from other government 
services. According to a study conducted in New York and New Jersey, when a Puerto Rican 
caller to the Small Business Administration asked for information about small business loans, 
they were given misleading information (Grosfoguel, pg. 170, 2003).  But when Cubans called 
the same line, they received correct information. Because of these refugees’ denouncement of 
communism and their seeming rags to riches success, the American political regime has come to 
hold them in high esteem. This, in combination with the mysterious success of communism in 
Cuba, could contribute to the proliferation of articles about this population in the New York 
Times.  What is interesting, however, is that despite the fact that over ten years had passed since 
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the Cuban Revolution, in 1970 the number of articles about Cubans continued to remain on such 
a steep incline, and they vastly outnumbered articles about Puerto Ricans by the end of the 
decade. 
By 1970, another Spanish speaking population was on the rise in New York City. 
 
Following the American occupation of the Dominican Republic in the early 1960s (the military 
intervened before 1965), Dominicans began to immigrate to New York City in increasingly 
larger numbers (Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). The U.S. government orchestrated large-scale 
migration from the island at this time in an effort to remove the political tension caused by the 
corrupt and deadly Trujillo regime. Led by the academic class, the people of the Dominican 
Republic were seeking democracy, and American officials feared another Cuban revolution. For 
this reason, Dominicans were granted a higher than average number of visas, so as to travel to 
the mainland. The resulting migration rate was tremendous, so that by the 1980s “the Dominican 
per capita figure was more than double that of Mexico” (Grasmuck and Pesar, p. 21, 1991). 
Between 1961 and 1970, the size of the Dominican population in the U.S. grew tenfold to 
105,191 people, and was largely concentrated in the New York City region. Although not a 
wealthy population, the first to migrate were highly educated, making the experience unique 
when compared to other Spanish speaking immigrants/migrants. 
This increase in Dominican immigration to New York City is reflected in the number of 
references to this population- although it is a bit more difficult to measure through the database 
than it is for “Puerto Rican” or “Mexican”. In English, the term “Puerto Rican” refers to a 
person, but “Puerto Rico” refers to the island- the two terms can be separated in English. But, to 
search for “Dominican” in English, will likely return hits for “Dominican Republic” as well. 
There are a few ways to test for this, but it is not for certain that the results can be measured in 
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line with Puerto Ricans and Mexicans due to this discrepancy. Nonetheless, in 1970 there were 
383 references to the term “Dominican”, and by 1979 there were 469 mentions of this 
population- a 22% increase. The results comparing the various terms can be seen more clearly 
below. 
Figure 2. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT 1970s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
As can be seen above, while there is a clear drop in the references to Puerto Ricans, other 
populations such as Mexicans and Dominicans experience some dips over the course of the 
decade, but make recoveries. As well, the references to Cubans and Hispanics are unequivocally 
on the rise. 
If the number of newspaper articles is indicative of public presence, then 1970 was the 
beginning of the trend towards Puerto Rican public invisibility. This trend is ironic for a number 
of reasons, including the fact that Puerto Ricans made up nearly 70% of the local Hispanic 





time, panethnic identity, in the form of Hispanicity, began to flourish. The downtick in Puerto 
Rican references appears to be synchronized with the uptick in Hispanic references. However, 
other ethnic groups do not suffer the same obfuscation – in fact, as the number of references to 
Hispanics increases, so to do the references to Cubans. The figurative cloak of invisibility is 
reserved for Puerto Ricans. 
 
 
The Hispanic Times of New York: Puerto Ricans Become Hispanics in the New York Times 
 




By 1980, the term “Hispanic” made it to the Census short-form, and thus was included as 
a category for all New Yorkers to choose from- not just those included in the long-form sample. 
Along with this governmental categorization came the continued expansion of the term into the 
lives of everyday Americans, and New Yorkers.  With the inclusion of this term, mainland 
Puerto Ricans’ chosen race was also changed (Duany, pg. 255, 2002). Although introduced in 
1970, the option to select “other”, as opposed to “white” or “black” was not embraced by Puerto 
Ricans until 1980. In this particular Census collection the percentage of Puerto Ricans choosing 
“white” decreased by half, from over 93% to 48%, while the percentage selecting some “other” 
race grew from almost none to nearly fifty percent of the mainland-based Boricua community. 
How much of this shift is based upon the available categories, and how much is based upon a 
 
person’s self-identification is debatable (Clara E. Rodriguez, 2001). 
 
Although the term “Hispanic” was certainly on the rise in the articles gracing the New 
York Times, in the first issue of the decade it was nowhere to be found. In fact, the term 
Hispanic does not appear until January 7th, one week into the year.  What seemed most relevant 
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to the community, the dire economic prospects throughout the nation, comparable to those found 
in the 1974-1975 recession, did happen to make the front page on the first edition of the year- 
although the impact on “Hispanics” is not noted. 
The first issue to make note of the Hispanic community of New York in 1980, tells the 
story of the celebrations of Three Kings’ Day, or the Epiphany as it is called in the Catholic faith 
(Jan. 7th, 1980). In this story, the term “Hispanic” is used to describe the children of the Bronx 
and Brooklyn, although, the celebration is said to take place amongst “children in the Spanish 
Caribbean”. So, essentially, the children were either Puerto Rican or Dominican. But probably 
Puerto Rican, given the locations of the Bronx and Brooklyn- at the time, Dominicans were 
concentrated in Upper Manhattan- however, the only mention of Puerto Ricans is within the title 
of an organization funding a celebration in Greenpoint, Brooklyn. This example helps to 
illustrate the eclipsing of Nuyoricans from public view. 
Compared to 1970, when within the whole year there were 45 references to “Hispanic”, 
in the first month of 1980 there were already 64 references to the term.  In comparison, there 
were only 24 references to “Puerto Ricans” that month, a steep plummet from the number of 
references in January of the prior decade, when there were 91 references to “Puerto Ricans”, and 
this is prior to the Census collection.  Thus, the Census was not the only entity responsible for 
the uptick in the usage of panethnic terminology. Rather, print media has played a particularly 
large role in the positing of Hispanicity, both as a concept and as a practical means of 
identification. With post-1965 immigration, and the influx of other Spanish speakers to New 
York City, it no doubt got trickier for journalists to write articles that delivered their research in a 
concise manner when there were people from a variety of countries with varying generational 
statuses, and varying experiences in New York City- but who happened to have Spanish 
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surnames (usually) in common. All of the traditionally ethnic enclaves were suddenly becoming 
multi-ethnic. Ecuadorians and Colombians settled in Queens, Ecuadorians dispersed amongst 
Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side, and Dominicans overlapped with Puerto Ricans Uptown. 
Other places, such as in the Southwest, may have been easier to report on, given the prominent 
presence of Mexicans, and seemingly, this remains true, as the references to Mexicans have 
skyrocketed in recent decades. 
Figure 3. Mentions of Puerto Ricans, NYT 1980s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
There is a clear shift at the start of the 1980s, in which Puerto Ricans become less 
prominent in the New York Times. Hispanics take their place, as can be seen above. In fact, in 
1984 the Hispanic group surpasses the 1970 peak number of articles about Puerto Ricans, and 
references to the former would continue to grow. 
This trend towards a more “Hispanic” New York has been likened to the rapid rise of 






panethnic Census categories in 1980, Hispanic marketing rapidly rose to prominence in the 
creation and dissemination of Hispanicity. I would argue, however, that the New York Times was 
already starting to shape and promote the term, prior to the post-1970’s period she describes (pg. 
41). In addition, it seems as though it would be difficult to prove which of the two entities, 
Hispanic marketers or one of the largest local print media houses, would be more powerful in 
influencing New Yorkers’ views, given the confluent rise in the promotion of the concept. What 
no doubt played a role, however, is the U.S. Census. 
Figure 4. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT 1980s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
As can be seen above, the number of articles referring to the Hispanic population 
continues to rise throughout the 1980s, whereas references to Puerto Ricans start out weak, and 
continue to decrease. In fact, by 1980, the number of articles referring to Hispanics more than 
doubles the number of references to Puerto Ricans, and the gap continues to grow over the 
course of the decade. There is also some growth with respect to the number of references to 









1980, the number of articles referring to Dominicans outnumbers those referring to Puerto 
Ricans, despite the clear dominance of Puerto Ricans in New York City at the time, although 
there seems to be some loss of popularity for Dominicans by 1989. As well, while articles about 
Cubans continue to outnumber those about Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, by the end of the 
1980s there was a moderate decline in the references to this population. What is most apparent, 
however, is that 1980-1989 was the decade of the Mexican in the New York Times, although 
references to this group had not yet peaked. 
 
 




Articles about Mexicans continued to rise in popularity in the New York Times in the 
1990s. In 1990 there were over 1,500 articles including the term “Mexican” and by 1995 there 
were over 2,000 articles about Mexicans, the peak number of articles about this population to 
date. Not only was this the peak with respect to references to the Mexican population, but also 
the peak number of references to any of the four major ethnic groups – or even the general 
panethnic population. In terms of Mexican residents in New York City, this population was on 
the rise, although it had not yet reached its pinnacle, and perhaps still has not.  In 1990 there 
were only 55,698 local Mexican residents and by 2000 there were 186,872 such residents, but 
even then they only comprised 8.6% of the local Hispanic population. However, they held a 
34.8% share of the articles including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, Mexicans, Hispanics, 
or Latinas/os- the largest share held by any of these categories (ProQuest Database of the New 
York Times Full Text Articles; Social Explorer-Dicennial Census of 1990 and 2000). Usage of 
the term “Hispanic” would also peak in the 1990s, but the number of references would not come 
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close to the number of articles on Mexicans. Compared to the peak of 2,180 articles containing 
the term “Mexican” in 1995, the peak number of articles containing the term “Hispanic” was 
1,591 in 1992. As well, unlike the term “Mexican”, after 1992, the number of articles about 
Hispanics would dip back down to levels found at the start of the decade. 
Associated with the downward trend for the term “Hispanic”, is the increasing popularity 
of the term “Latina/o” in the New York Times.  Between 1990 and 1990, use of the term more 
than doubled, from 212 articles containing “Latina/o” to 491 articles containing the term, and 
this trend would continue into the next decade. There is a somewhat steady rise in the number of 
Latina/o articles between 1990 and 1998, when there is a sudden increase of 153 articles 
containing the term in 1999. 
Like the terms “Mexican” and “Hispanic”, use of the term “Dominican” would also peak 
in the 1990s. In 1998 there were 769 articles containing the term “Dominican”, the highest 
number to date. Although the Dominican population had not yet reached its peak, and perhaps 
has still not, there is some logic to the expansion of articles between 1990 and 2000, as the 
Dominican population in New York City grew by more than 170,000 residents, from 332,713 
local residents to 406,806 residents (Social Explorer-Dicennial Census of 1990 and 2000). 
Despite the rise in the number of articles about Dominicans, as in the case of Puerto Ricans, their 
share of attention in the New York Times was decreasing. In 1990, Dominicans held a 10.4% 
share of the articles including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, Mexicans and the two 
panethnic terms, a drop from the 12% share they held in 1980- but still a higher share than 
Puerto Ricans for both years. As well, their share of the local Hispanic population, also like 
Puerto Ricans, decreased from 19.1% to 18.8%, albeit at a much lesser rate than their fellow 
panethnics. 
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In contrast to the rise in use of the term “Mexican”, “Hispanic”, “Latina/o”, and 
“Dominican”, by 1990, the articles containing the term “Cuban” had declined from the 1980s. 
Peaking in 1980 with over 1,400 articles about Cubans, the number of articles about this 
population would dip down to 609 articles in the mid-1990s, making a recovery at the end of the 
decade to about 1,200 articles, in large part associated with the controversy surrounding Elian 
Gonzalez, but would not reach the same level of popularity as were found in the 1980s. Despite 
this dip in popularity, their share of articles including Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, 
Mexicans, or the two panethnic terms, remained much larger than their share of the New York 
City Hispanic population, as was the case in 1980. In 1990, between the articles that contained 
any of the six ethnic or panethnic terms, 15.2% of such articles pertained to Cubans, whereas 
Cubans comprised a mere 3.3% of the local Hispanic population. In comparison, Puerto Ricans 
held less than half the share of articles maintained by Cubans, while their share of the local 
Hispanic population was tenfold that of their Caribbean counterparts. 
The least popular group of any of these ethnic or panethnic categories would be Puerto 
Ricans by 1999. Between 1990 and 1999 they would become increasingly less popular than 
Dominicans and Cubans, and even the term “Latina/o”- largely due to the highly stable small 
number of articles printed about Puerto Ricans each year throughout the decade. As can be seen 
below, the number of articles about Puerto Ricans would not reach 400 throughout the 1990s, 
and would only continue to decline. Granted, by 2000 there was a loss of Puerto Ricans from 
three of the five boroughs and a net loss of Puerto Ricans from New York City proper over the 
course of the decade. As well, the Puerto Rican share of the Hispanic population had decreased 
to 36.5% by 2000, however, these losses do not seem on par with the paltry number of articles 
including Puerto Ricans in their text. 
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Figure 5. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT 1990s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees 
Library website. 
In 1990, Puerto Ricans made up 50.3% of the local Hispanic population, and yet the 
number of articles containing the term “Puerto Rican” in the New York Times was already only 
7% of the total number of articles dedicated to Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Cubans, 
Hispanics, or Latinas/os, and by 2000, compared to their 36.5% share of the local Hispanic 
population, they only comprised 6% of such articles. In 1980, when Puerto Ricans made up an 
even larger share of the local Hispanic population at 61.2%, their share of the Hispanic articles in 
the New York Times was only 8%. So, even when Puerto Ricans were the majority Hispanic 
subgroup in New York City in 1980 and 1990, for both decades they were the minority when it 









Share of the New York City Hispanic Population 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Puerto Ricans 67.5%* 61.20% 50.30% 36.50% 
Dominicans *** 8.8%** 19.10% 18.80% 
Cubans *** 4.30% 3.30% 1.90% 
Mexicans *** 1.60% 3.20% 8.60% 
Source: Social Explorer Census Data 
*Puerto Rican resident figure from Rivera-Batiz, pg. 108 in Haslip-Viera, et al,
2004
**Dominican resident figure from Grasmuck and Pessar, pg. 163, 1991,
figures not available in publicly available Census data.
***Hispanic origin data not available, as this variable was not yet included on
the Census short form.
Table 18. Share of Hispanic Articles 
The New York Times: Share of Hispanic Articles 
1970 1980 1990 2000 
Puerto Ricans 30.40% 8.10% 7.30% 6.40% 
Dominicans 10.90% 12.00% 10.40% 8.10% 
Cubans 13.80% 29.00% 15.20% 26.20% 
Mexicans 42.50% 30.50% 34.80% 31.60% 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina 
Rees Library website. 
As can be seen above, for every decade through 2000, there is a mismatch between the 
share held of the local Hispanic resident population, and the share held of the six categories of 
ethnic and panethnic articles in The New York Times.  Part of this is due to the expanding 
presence of articles including panethnic terminology.  It remains quite puzzling that from 1980 
on, Puerto Ricans would hold the smallest share of all six types of Hispanic articles printed in 
the New York Times. 
Table 17. Share of New York City Hispanic Population 
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In 2000, for the first time, the Census reported that the number of Puerto Ricans living in 
New York City was on the decline. Instead of hovering around 900,000 residents, the number 
dropped to about 800,000 Puerto Ricans living in the 5 boroughs (Haslip-Viera, et al, 2004). 
Several trends are associated with this drop, including the slowed migration from Puerto Rico to 
the mainland, the flight of Puerto Ricans from New York City to other towns and U.S. states, and 
to some extent, return migration to the island (Rivera-Batiz, 2004; Flores, 2009). However, even 
with return migration, there were now a nearly equal number of Puerto Ricans living on the 
mainland as were living on the island, resulting in Puerto Rico being deemed the “divided 
nation” (Whalen and Vasquez, 2005). Some scholars argue that the aging of the population, and 
the subsequent increased mortality rates, also contributed to the declining Puerto Rican 
population in New York City (Batiz-Rivera, 2004). This decline, combined with a greater influx 
of other “Hispanic” populations such as Dominicans and Mexicans, also resulted in Puerto 
Ricans no longer being the majority Hispanic population in Gotham. 
As these figures came to light in 2000 and 2001, there was a slight jump in the number of 
references to Puerto Ricans in the New York Times, but by 2002, a fairly steady decline took 
place to rates not seen since the 1940s. As can be seen below, in 2009 Puerto Ricans were 
included in 196 articles, whereas in 1948 they were included in 191, although in 2009 the 
population was at least three times the size that it was in 1948 (Haslip-Viera, et al; U.S. Census 
American Factfinder). Mexicans and Cubans also experience a drop over the course of the 
decade, however, Mexicans remain the most popular ethnic or panethnic category and Cubans’ 
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rate of inclusion remains more than double that of Puerto Ricans by 2009. Comparatively, the 
inclusion of Hispanics and Latinos remains relatively stable between 2000 and 2009, while the 
rate of Dominican inclusion is the only to rise over the course of the decade. 
Figure 6. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT 2000s 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
The decline experienced by Puerto Ricans between 1970 and 2000, is not found for the 
other ethnic and panethnic categories. As can be seen below, the number of articles including 
Puerto Ricans drops off between 1970 and 1980, and remains low through 2000. In comparison, 
Dominicans and Mexicans experienced a relatively stable rate of inclusion between 1970 and 
2000, however the inclusion of Cubans, Hispanics, and Latinos vary. The inclusion of Cubans 
and Hispanics rise and fall over the decades, ultimately increasing significantly between 1970 






Figure 7. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
Continued Puerto Rican Decline: The Rise of Dominicans in the New York Times in 2010 
By 2010, there were many changes taking place both within the Puerto Rican population, 
and within the general Hispanic population of New York City- many of which were 
continuations of the pattern set in 2000. While the Puerto Rican residential population continued 
to shrink, although at a lesser rate than the previous decade, the number of Dominicans and 
Mexicans in New York City continued to rise. Compared to the 36.5% share of the Hispanic 
population held by Puerto Ricans in 2000, in 2010 Puerto Ricans made up 33.8% of the local 
panethnic population. As well, despite the incredible growth in the Dominican and Mexican 
populations, their shares of the local Hispanic populous did not increase, but rather slightly 
decreased.  In 2000 Dominicans made up 18.8% of the local Hispanic population, and Mexicans 
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held an 8.6% share, and by 2010, their respective shares were 17.4% and 8%. This decrease in 
the Dominican and Mexican share of the population is partially due to the increasing diversity 
within the Hispanic population. For example, the number of Ecuadorians increased by nearly 
40% from 101,005 to 166,209 residents, concentrated mostly in Queens, and the Honduran 
population increased by nearly 40% from 25,600 to 42,400 residents, largely concentrated in the 
Bronx (Falcon, 2004; American Factfinder, 2010 Census data). 
By 2010, although the local Hispanic population shifts in New York City were 
exceptional compared to past decades, the number of articles containing the terms Hispanic and 
Latino had declined. The use of the term “Hispanic” declined by 25% between 2000 and 2010, 
from 921 articles including the panethnic group to 687 such articles. The decline was less drastic 
with respect to the term Latino, although use of the more recently popular term declined 12% 
between 2000 and 2010. On the rise, however, were references to the Dominican population. As 
can be seen below, the number of articles containing the term “Dominican” grew by 69% 
between 2000 and 2010, increasing from 412 articles to 697 articles. This was the only group to 
experience growth between the two decades, as the overall number of articles including the six 
ethnic and panethnic terms declined 27%, from 5,113 articles to 3,732 articles. 
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Figure 8. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, NYT Part 2 
Source: The New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library 
website. 
EL DIARIO LA PRENSA 
 In the ‘70s Puerto Ricans Still Exist 
Unexpectedly, at the start of 1970 there was already frequent use of the panethnic term 
“Hispanic” (in Spanish, “Hispano”) in the Spanish language newspaper. In fact, the term 
“Hispana/o” was the second most popular descriptive term used, including ethnic terminology. 
Although this perhaps should not be surprising as El Diario La Prensa had already self-ordained 
itself the champion of the “Hispanos”. In fact, there were a large number of terms used to 
describe the broader panethnic population- much more than in the New York Times, which only 
utilized the two terms “Hispanic” and “Latina/o”.  Although, like the New York Times, 
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“Hispano” was clearly the preferred term, contained within 115 El Diario La Prensa articles. 
Some other terms used in the Spanish language press include “Caribe” or “Caribeno”, which 
denote more specific references to people of Caribbean descent, in addition to other more broad 
terms such as “Latina/o” and “Hispano-Americana/o”. In all, there were 18 terms used to 
describe the panethnic population in January of 1970. 
In comparison, within the same month, the New York Times only printed 4 articles that 
contained the term “Hispanic”. The other less popular panethnic term, “Latina/o”, only appeared 
2 times. The fact that El Diario La Prensa printed 100 more articles with the term “Hispano” 
than the New York Times is interesting for a number of reasons. For one thing, to an ethnic 
readership, the term “Hispano” would be less meaningful to Spanish speakers than it would be to 
English speakers. A person who is ethnic enough to read an ethnic newspaper is likely quite 
sensitive to the differences between people from different nations, and even towns. Likewise, a 
person who is less knowledgeable about Spanish speaking people would likely think that this 
variable would logically group them together. Thus, taking into account the experience of the 
reader, the reverse would be expected, in which the term “Hispanic” would take up more space 
in articles within the New York Times. However, from the perspective of the writers, it might 
have been easier to write about “Hispanos” than the specific group in each and every article. 
Spanish speaking New York was becoming increasingly complex, the spatial and socioeconomic 
lines between Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and other groups becoming increasingly blurry.  In 
any respect, the concept of Hispanicity was far more utilized in El Diario La Prena than in the 
New York Times. 
Despite the regular presence of panethnic terminology in El Diario La Prensa’s articles, 
 
in large part each story, when pertinent, mentioned the specific ethnic or national group: 
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Cubanos, Dominicanos, Puertorriquenos- although most ethnic-specific news was related to 
Puerto Ricans/Puerto Rico at the time. In the case of ethnic specificity, things were a bit more 
complicated. For example, in news from Puerto Rico, it would be obvious that the news would 
pertain to Puerto Ricans. For this purpose, I separated news based in the U.S. and news based in 
particular islands or countries, such as Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Mexico. 
Thus, there are a number of articles that reference Puerto Ricans in the United States, and a 
number of articles that reference Puerto Rico. In January 1970, the number of articles and 
captions referencing Puerto Ricans in the United States far surpassed any other type of article, as 
would be expected at the time.  Within this month, there were hundreds of references to 
mainland Puerto Ricans, using a quite diverse set of terms, although the predominant term was 
“Puertorriquena/o”. Compared to the 115 articles that referenced the “Hispana/o” population, 
there were 230 articles that mention “Puertorriquenos” in the mainland context, exactly double 
the number of articles utilizing the panethnic term. 
Figure 9. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, 1970 EDLP 
 





The New York Times printed 91 articles containing the term “Puerto Rican” in January of 
1970. This was quite high for the newspaper, compared to earlier and later years. However, 
Puerto Ricans were clearly more popular in El Diario La Prensa, given the number of references 
more than double that in the New York Times, and given is it a much smaller news source. 
The prevalence of town-based identification within El Diario La Prensa’s text in 1970 is 
a complicating issue, which matters most for Puerto Ricans from Puerto Rico. Each town is 
known for something different, which is a source of pride for its residents. In early 1970, there 
were numerous social clubs and organizations that were identified by town, and not called 
“Puerto Rican”. For example there was reference to “Bayamonenses”, which is referring to a 
group of Puerto Ricans from Bayamon- however, this might not be clear to someone that is not 
Puerto Rican. In fact, 20 mainland-based articles contained the term “Ponce” or “Ponceno”, 13 
articles contained “San Juan”, and 11 contained “Yauco” or “Yaucano”, which indicated that for 
many, the hometown took precedence over homeland, and that there was still a quite strong 
relationship between the island and the mainland. 
More clearly indicating the strong relationship between the island and the mainland was 
the large number of articles with news from Puerto Rico. In every issue within the first month of 
1970, most of the third page was dedicated to news from the island, and from specific towns. 
Toa Baja, San German, Mayaguez, among other towns, preceded the text of the articles to 
indicate just where the news was coming from. In fact, the number of articles with news from 
Puerto Rico far surpasses the number of articles about the mainland Puerto Rican population. 
Compared to the 230 articles referencing mainland “Puertorriquenos”, 347 articles referenced 
Puerto Rico.  This indicates that the news source was more interested in bringing news from the 
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homeland to the reader, than providing news about the reader’s circumstances, which seems to 
 
be the point of many ethnic newspapers. 
 
Puerto Rico and mainland-based Puerto Ricans clearly dominated El Diario La Prensa’s 
news in early 1970 when compared to news about other mainland populations and countries of 
origin.  While there were 347 articles referring to Puerto Rico, and 230 articles referring to 
Puerto Ricans in the U.S., there were only 59 articles referring to the Dominican Republic, and 
73 articles referring to Dominicans on the mainland.  A similar trend was in place in the New 
York Times. Compared to the 91 articles referring to Puerto Ricans and the 60 referring to Puerto 
Rico, only 14 articles contained the term “Dominican”, and only 7 contained the term 
“Dominican Republic”. But to some extent this makes sense, as the Dominican population was 
newer to New York City, the migration from the Dominican Republic only taking off after 1960. 
In comparison, Puerto Rican en-masse migration to New York City started after 1940. 
Although Cubans were a relatively small community in New York City in 1970, as en- 
masse migration from the island largely landed in Florida, the number of articles referencing 
Cuba or Cubans in El Diario La Prensa was nearly identical to the number of articles referencing 
the Dominican Republic and Dominicans- in fact, the number referring to Cubans surpassed 
those referring to Dominicans.  Within January there were 87 references to Cubans and 51 
articles referring to Cuba, compared to the 79 references to Dominicans and the 59 references to 
the Dominican Republic. Again, the New York Times followed suit, printing 19 articles referring 
to Cubans, and 48 articles referring to Cuba, compared to the 14 articles containing the term 
“Dominican” and 7 containing the term “Dominican Republic”. This made less sense, as there 
was en-masse migration taking place from the Dominican Republic to New York City, whereas 
there was never en-masse migration from Cuba- although El Diario La Prensa did report news 
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from other national and international locales, including Florida.  Another matter was the 
continued interest among English and Spanish speakers in Fidel Castro’s regime, and his 
relationship with other nations, as numerous articles discussed these topics throughout January of 
1970, which contributed to the seemingly greater popularity of Cubans. 
The Southwest also received some attention from El Diario La Prensa, in which 
Mexicans were mentioned, although this news was much less prominent. There were only 36 
articles referring to Mexico, and 36 articles referring to Mexicans in the U.S. This made sense to 
some degree, as there were hardly any Mexicans in New York City at the time. For this reason, 
unlike Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans, Mexicans did not have a section dedicated to 
their news. Puerto Ricans had a “Boricua” section of the paper, Dominicans a “Bohio” section, 
and Cubans a “Miami” section- and with reason, there was no Mexican section in 1970.  Unlike 
El Diario La Prensa, however, the New York Times printed the term “Mexican” regularly at this 
time. In January, there were as many articles referencing “Mexicans” as there were referring to 
“Puerto Ricans”, which seemed highly unusual given the paltry number of Mexicans living in 
New York City at the time, although the New York Times seemed to have a much broader lens 
than El Diario La Prensa. 
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Figure 10. Mentions of Homeland, 1970 EDLP 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library. 
 
 
Comparing El Diario La Prensa and the New York Times with regard to territory/nation 
references, there are clear differences between the two news sources, as can be seen in the above 
chart. Firstly, the New York Times seems to have much more interest in issues pertaining to 
Mexico than Puerto Rico, Cuba, or the Dominican Republic- in fact the number of references to 
Mexico more than double the number of references to Puerto Rico.  And El Diario La Prensa 
was much more preoccupied with issues pertaining to Puerto Rico than any of the three other 
nations-unlike the New York Times, ranking Mexico last in terms of the number of articles 
printed. Interestingly, there is a nearly equal interest in Cuba between El Diario La Prensa and 
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Figure 11. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, Comparison 1970 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and 




As can be seen above, the number of articles referring to the different ethnic and 
panethnic groups seems to follow a similar pattern for both the New York Times and El Diario La 
Prensa for Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, Cubans, and Latina/os- the New York Times on a smaller 
scale- until the case of the Mexican and Hispanic groups. In both cases, the similarities between 
the two news houses end: the New York Times publishing articles on Mexicans at a much higher 
rate, and El Diario La Prensa printing text on Hispanics at a much higher rate.  Perhaps the lens 









What is most compelling about the comparison between the New York Times and El 
Diario La Prensa, is the continued dominance of Puerto Ricans in the ethnic press, and that the 
ethnic press seems to have instituted Hispanicity before the English language press.  Puerto 
Rican demographic dominance is represented in the text of El Diario La Prensa, while in the 
New York Times, it is not. And while most existing work points to the development of 
Hispanicity as having “emerged” in English language institutions in response to the experience 
of inequality, content analysis of El Diario La Prensa contradicts these findings (Padilla, 1985; 
Mora, 2014). Rather, Hispanicity appears to be reflective of a pre-existing, ground-up, notion of 
panethnic identity. 
El Diario La Prensa: “The Champion of the Hispanics” in the 1980s 
The subtitle of El Diario La Prensa has always been “Champion of the Hispanics” 
(Campeon de los Hispanos), however in 1980 the newspaper truly embraced this intention. With 
the start of the new decade, the first issue of the year happened to be a “national edition”, which 
in fact, seemed more to be an international edition- an edition where neither Puerto Ricans nor 
Hispanics could be found on the cover.  The front page of the January 3rd, 1980 issue was 
adorned first with the story about the turmoil in Iran, and the inability U.N.’s Secretary General, 
Kurt Waldheim, to pass the student formed barricade, and reach 50 North Americans being held 
hostage within the U.S. Embassy. Secondly, there was a story about a Moslem religious leader 
from Russia, who was defending the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, in an effort to placate the 
worldwide Moslem community. Just in evaluating the appearance of the issue, there was a 
marked difference in presentation between the El Diario La Prensa of 1970 and that of 1980. At 
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the start of 1970, the picture on the cover was much larger than any of the headlines or print, and 
included exclamatory phrases. But by 1980 the front page appearance and content was much 
more similar to that of the New York Times- several stories not related directly to Puerto Ricans 
or Hispanics, in a more block-like arrangement. If appearance can convey such a thing, on the 
surface it appeared to be a more refined and sophisticated news source from a decade prior. The 
print was clearer, the quality of the press seemed to be improved, and the layout of the page was 
used to utilize the space with more article than photo and headline. But this could also be due to 
changes in print technology. In any event, there was a marked difference in the appearance and 
content of El Diario La Prensa between the two decades. 
Not only was the appearance of the daily paper changed, but also the content. Although 
some of the same article types from 1970 continued to be included, such as “Bohio 
Dominicano”, by 1980, “Con Los Boricuas” and “Correo De Miami”, staples in the 1970’s 
issues, were gone. Also gone were the numerous articles from towns in Puerto Rico on the third 
page of every January 1970 issue. As well, there were many more articles including the term 
“Hispana/o” than including “Puertorriquena/o”, or any other ethnic group. The number of 
articles about the panethnic group had skyrocketed between 1970 and 1980, nearly tripling. In 
January of 1970 there were 115 articles and captions containing the term “Hispana/o”, whereas 
by 1980 there were 321 such occurences.  Additionally the number of references to Puerto 
Ricans had dropped 18%, from 230 articles or captions in 1970 to 188 in 1980. Aside from this 
drastic shift from Puerto Rican to Hispanic prominence, the pattern remains quite similar with 
regard to ethnic popularity, despite the changed figures. As can be seen below, Puerto Ricans 
remain the most frequently printed ethnic group, while Dominicans and Cubans are the two next 
most popular, and Mexicans rank last in the number of printed articles or captions. 
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Figure 12. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, EDLP 1980 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library. 
 
 
Although references to Hispanics were clearly on the rise in the New York Times, the 
news source had nowhere near the number of references that were included in El Diario La 
Prensa. While the New York Times included the term in 64 articles in January of 1980, El Diario 
La Prensa included it in 321 articles, as can be seen below. With respect to the overall pattern 
between January 1970 and January 1980, there are several similarities, in that El Diario La 
Prensa and the New York Times display similar trends with respect to Puerto Ricans, 
Dominicans, and Latinos.  As well, there continue to be differences between the two news 
sources in the trends related to Mexicans and Hispanics, the New York Times including many 
more articles on Mexicans and many fewer articles on Hispanics- the former maintaining a larger 
number of printed articles than the Hispanic group. However, in the case of Cubans, there is a 
change. As opposed to January of 1970 when the New York Times included far fewer articles 
about Cubans than did El Diario La Prensa, in January of 1980 the gap is substantially closed 




New York Times printed 77, only 10 fewer articles than the Spanish language press- an 
interesting change. 
Figure 13. Mentions of Ethnic Terms, Comparison 1980 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and 
the New York Times Full Text database accessed through the Mina Rees Library website. 
Just as Puerto Ricans became less popular in both Spanish and English newspapers, 
Puerto Rico became a less prominent news topic as well. Whereas in January 1970 there were 
347 articles including Puerto Rico in El Diario La Prensa, by January 1980 there were only 152. 
Despite this drastic drop, the island continued to be the most frequently referenced in the Spanish 
language press, although the references to the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and Mexico rose 
slightly.  The Dominican Republic maintained the second highest number of articles, Cuba a 




January 1970 and January 1980 remained unchanged in some respects.  As can be seen below, 
the pattern is quite similar for Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, as was the case in 
January 1970.  Also like January 1970, Mexico is much more popular in the New York Times 
than in El Diario La Prensa. What is changed, however, is that unlike January 1970, when there 
was a nearly equal number of articles including Cuba in the two news sources, now there are 
many more references to Cuba in the New York Times than there are in El Diario La Prensa, 
another interesting finding. However, most striking, is the fact that compared to January 1970, 
when the number of articles referring to Puerto Rico in El Diario La Prensa outpaced the 
number of articles referring to Mexico in the New York Times, in January 1980, the reverse was 
true. Within this month there were 173 articles referring to Mexico in the English language news 
source, and 152 articles referring to Puerto Rico in the Spanish press. 
Figure 14. Mentions of Homeland Terms, Comparison 1980 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and 





Puerto	Rico	 Dominican	Republic	 Mexico	 Cuba	
106	 
Another interesting trend between the January 1970 and January 1980 El Diario La 
Prensa issues is the decreasing focus on local news. Instead national and international stories 
dominate. It is possible that this lessened focus on New York City could have contributed to the 
decreasing attention paid to Puerto Ricans, as 42.7% of the mainland Puerto Rican population 
remained concentrated there in 1980. However, the fact that the number of articles about other 
local groups, such as Dominicans, either remained unchanged or increased, decreased the 
validity of this argument. 
1980 brought a significant shift, one in which Hispanic panethnicity took center stage in 
both the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa. The shift was much more rapid for the New 
York Times, however, the shift in El Diario La Prensa was no less influential. Puerto Ricans 
remained the majority subgroup in New York City, and yet, their public presence continued to 
decline, in part, with the surge in Hispanicity. There were, however, other factors at play. By 
1980, the influx of other immigrant groups, such as Dominicans, was shifting the makeup of the 
Hispanic population. As well, El Diario La Prensa’s increased focus on international news 
contributed to the decline in the Puerto Rican presence within the daily issues, however, these 
factors do not present sufficient evidence for the pace of decline. 
 
 




The 1990 Census collection would capture the largest number of Puerto Ricans residing 
in New York City to date, which would later be noted as the population’s peak. Although the 
population continued to rise, the focus on the broader Hispanic population within local news 
outlets obscured this massive population.  But there were several trends associated with this 
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phenomenon. Immigration from other Spanish speaking countries increased, progressively 
dispersing Puerto Ricans amongst others.  Although the number of Puerto Ricans had continued 
to rise the influx of other groups meant that the Puerto Rican population, although still the 
majority, made up an even smaller percentage of the local Hispanic community. In 1980 Puerto 
Ricans held a 61.2% share of the Hispanic population and by 1990 they comprised only 50.3% of 
local Hispanics. In addition, between 1985 and 1990 began a new trend towards Puerto Rican 
outmigration from New York City, to suburbs and other locations throughout the U.S. (Batiz- 
Rivera, pg. 110). In this period, there was a net loss of 86,687 Puerto Ricans from New York 
City.  Concurrently, the 1980s had given way to a 3rd generation of Gotham-based Puerto Ricans, 
a group increasingly acculturated to the urban New York City landscape. The local New York 
Boricua community thus became a less Puerto Rican and more Nuyorican cohort of young 
people. 
Despite these demographic changes, Puerto Ricans continued to constitute the majority 
subgroup within the Hispanic umbrella population in New York City. Nonetheless, Puerto 
Ricans’ presence continued to decline in local news outlets, and at an exceptionally accelerated 
rate compared to the rate at which their share of the population was declining, particularly in the 
New York Times. As was the case in the 1980s, the English language press continued to have an 
unwarranted disinterest in largest Hispanic subgroup in New York City, a population that 
continued to suffer the ill effects of the previous decade’s recession and flight of industry. In 
fact, the number of articles containing the term “Puerto Rican” in the New York Times would 
reach a new low of 243 articles in 1995- a figure lower than any found since 1958. At the same 
time, interest in other ethnic groups was increasing, particularly with respect to Mexicans. 
108	 
Even within El Diario La Prensa, which maintained much greater coverage of Puerto 
Ricans and Puerto Rico than did the New York Times, the number of articles about Puerto Ricans 
declined significantly between 1980 and 1993. In January of 1980 alone, there were 188 articles 
that contained the term “Puertorriquena/o”, but by 1993, according to a search performed in the 
Ethnic Newswatch database, within the whole year there were only 422 articles that contained 
any of the commonly used terms used to describe both Puerto Ricans and Puerto Rico. However, 
the number of articles about the other ethnic groups seems to have declined as well.  One 
possible explanation for this decrease in overall number of articles, are the changes related to the 
paper’s ownership that took place in the 1980s. In 1981, O. Roy Chalk, the owner since 1963, 
sold the paper to Gannett Company, who then sold the paper to its publisher, Carlos D. Ramirez, 
in 1989 (Stout, 1995; Scardino, 1989). For the three years leading up to this 1989 sale, the paper 
suffered from declining readership, and it is possible that the change in ownership could be 
related to these trends. 
Regardless of the reason behind the decline, the overall drop in the number of articles 
only slightly decreased the share of articles about Puerto Ricans in El Diario La Prensa between 
1980 and 1993. In January of 1980, 25.6% of the articles that contained the terms 
“Puertorriquena/o”, “Dominicana/o”, “Cubana/o”, “Mexicana/o”, Hispana/o”, or “Latina/o” 
included Puerto Ricans, and in January 1993 their share dropped by only 1 percentage point to 
24.1%. Thus, the share of attention paid to Puerto Ricans in El Diario La Prensa between 1980 
and 1993 remained fairly constant. However, like the New York Times, the share of articles 
dedicated to Mexicans was on the rise. 
By 1993, El Diario La Prensa printed nearly four times as many articles containing 
panethnic terminology as there were containing terms describing Puerto Ricans.  Full text articles 
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are available by way of the Ethnic Newswatch database, and so there is much less subjectivity in 
the interpretation of counts. There were 1,681 articles containing the terms “Hispana/o”, 
“Latina/o”, “Hispanic”, “Spanish”, and “Habla Espanol”- all terms utilized in earlier decades to 
describe the panethnic population, while there were only 422 articles containing the terms 
“Puertorriquena/o”, “Boricua”, “Borincana/o”, “Puerto Rican”, “Nuyorican”, or “Puerto Rico” in 
all of 1993.  Compared to the 188 articles containing “Puertorriquena/o” in January of 1980 
alone, this indeed seems to be a sharp decrease in the attention paid to Puerto Ricans between the 
1980 and 1993 issues of El Diario La Prensa. However, unlike in previous years, by 1993, the 
term Latina/o was becoming much more in vogue. Whereas in January 1980 there were 321 
articles containing the term “Hispana/o” and only 24 articles containing the term “Latina/o”, at 
the start of the next decade the two terms were printed at a pretty similar rate, although 
“Hispana/o” remained the more popular term. In 1993 there were 297 articles that contained the 
term “Hispana/o” and 258 articles that contained the term “Latina/o”. 
While comparing the number of El Diario La Prensa articles between the 1970-1980 
period and 1993 is interesting, it may be more useful to look at the share of articles dedicated to 
each ethnic and panethnic category, as the number of total articles varies throughout the years. 
As can be seen below, regardless of the overall number of articles, by 1993 Puerto Ricans 
maintained the largest share of articles between the ethnic groups, however, as in the January 
1970-January 1980 period, their share continued to decrease between 1980 and 1993, from 25% 
of the articles containing the six ethnic and panethnic terms, to 24%. As well, compared to the 
steep jump between January 1970 and January 1980 wherein the term “Hispana/o” held the 
largest share compared to any of the six other categories, interestingly the share of articles 
containing the term “Hispana/o” substantially decreased between January 1980 and January 
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1993, back to similar a similar level as was found in January 1970, although this is likely related 
to the increasing share of articles containing the term “Latina/o”.  The share of articles 
containing the term “Latina/o” jumped 10% between January 1980 and January 1993, from 3.3% 
to 14.5%. The share of articles dedicated to Dominicans was also on the rise; while it dips 
slightly between January 1970 and January 1980, between January 1980 and January 1993 their 
share increased from 11.8% to 17.2%. With regard to Cubans, this group’s share decreased 
slightly between January 1970 and January 1980, remaining fairly steady between January 1980 
and January 1993. In contrast to Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Cubans, the share of articles 
dedicated to Mexicans was clearly on an incline between January 1970 and January 1993, the 
steepest jump taking place between January 1980 and January 1993. 
Figure 15. Mentions of Ethnic Articles EDLP 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library. 
 
 
With regard to the trends between the ethnic and panethnic categories over time, whereas 
Puerto Ricans’ share of articles was clearly dominant in January 1970, by January 1980 their 






more comparable to the shares held by the Hispanic category and the Dominican category. In 
terms of the Dominican share of articles, in January of 1970 and January of 1980 their share was 
less than the Cuban share, but by January 1993, the reverse was true. While Mexicans remained 
the least popular ethnic group in all three years, in January 1970 and January 1980 their share 
was larger than the Latino share, whereas in January 1993, the Latino share was larger than that 
of both Mexicans and Cubans. Interestingly the pattern of ascent between the Mexican share and 
the Latina/o share seems to be related, as there is a rapid rise for both categories between January 
1980 and January 1993. Additionally, the gap between the Mexican share and the Cuban and 
Dominican shares rapidly closed between January 1980 and January 1993. 
Because of the equity in the popularity of the terms Latina/o and Hispana/o in January 
1993, it seemed prudent to combine the two terms into one panethnic category. With the 
consolidation of the Hispanic and Latino terms, there is a slight change in the pattern that takes 
place over time. When the Hispanic and Latino terms were counted separately (as seen above), 
the Puerto Rican share was largest in both January 1970 and January 1993. However, as seen 
below, when the two terms are combined, while the Puerto Rican share clearly dominated all 
others in January 1970, in January of the following two decades the consolidated panethnic 
category clearly dominates with respect to the share of articles. 
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Figure 16. Mentions of Ethnic Articles EDLP, Part 2 
 
Source: Archival EDLP Issues accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Library and 
Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
 
 
Unlike the 1970 and 1980 issues of El Diario La Prensa, which are only available on 
microfilm, starting in 1993 issues are available electronically through the ProQuest Ethnic 
Newswatch search engine. In addition to being able to search for a given word or multiple word 
combinations, the search engine also groups the resulting number of articles retrieved into the 
most popular subject areas.  Although not a perfect tool, it provides an interesting snapshop of 
the most popular topics, as determined by the ProQuest Ethnic Newswatch search engine. 
Despite the clear drop in popularity for Puerto Ricans and the prominence of 
panethnicity, interestingly, the top five topics contained within the panethnic and the Puerto 
Rican articles were quite similar in 1993. The panethnic terms used in the search include: 
“Hispana/o”, “Latina/o”, “Hispanic”, “Spanish”, or “Habla Espanol”, and the search for Puerto 
Rican terms includes: “Puertorriquena/o”, “Boricua”, “Borincana/o”, “Puerto Rican”, 






and Boricuas, government was the most popular topic, while politics was the second. Both also 
included local government in the top five article topics, however, in a different placement. For 
the Puerto Rican articles local government was the third most popular issue, while for the 
Hispanic articles, it was the fourth. The remaining popular topics for the Hispanic articles were 
municipal government and crime, while the next most frequent topics for the Puerto Rican 
articles were voting rights and state government. 
Table 19. EDLP Topics, 1993 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
El Diario La Prensa: 1993 
Puerto Rican 
Terms Panethnic Terms 
Most Popular Topics 
(In Order) 
Government (225) Government (716) 





Voting Rights (99) Local Government (296) 
State Government 
(97) Crime (278) 
Total Articles 422 1,681 
As in previous decades, Puerto Ricans continued to be more popular than Dominicans, 
Mexicans, and Cubans in 1993 issues of El Diario La Prensa, being referenced more than twice 
the number of times their fellow ethnics were.  This gap is quite similar to that found in 1980, 
but much smaller than that found in 1970, when references to Puerto Ricans were at least triple 
the number of references to other ethnic groups. Interestingly, however, unlike 1980 when there 
were very few articles on Mexicans or Mexico, by 1993 there were a nearly equal number of 
articles dedicated to Dominicans, Mexicans, and Cubans, although at the time there were many 
fewer Mexicans and Cubans living in New York City than Dominicans.  In 1990, there were 
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almost 6 times as many Dominicans living in New York City than Mexicans or Cubans (Social 
Explorer-1990 Census data). Despite the demographic dominance of Dominicans, as can be seen 
below, there were only 20 more articles on Dominicans or the Dominican Republic than there 
were on Mexicans or Mexico. 
Table 20. EDLP Topics by Ethnic Terms, 1993 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
El Diario La Prensa: 1993 





Topics Government (225) Politics (73) Politics (92) Politics (50) 
(In Order) Politics (223) Government (72) Government (60) Recreation (44) 




(41) Sports (44) 











Articles 422 193 173 175 
When is comes to the most popular article topics between the four ethnic groups, Puerto 
Ricans seem to have the least in common with their co-panethnics. Whereas Dominicans share 
four of their most popular topics with at least one other ethnic group, and Cubans share three of 
theirs, Puerto Ricans only have two of their most popular topics in common with any of the three 
remaining ethnic groups, which happen to be shared by all of them: Government and Politics. 
Although a shared topic, only the Puerto Rican category marks Government at the top, whereas 
the Dominican and Cuban categories rank it second, and the Mexican category ranks it fourth. 
Mexicans share each of their top five topics with the other ethnic groups, three out of five with 
Cubans: Politics, Government, and Federal Government; and four out of five with Dominicans: 
Politics, Government, Recreation, and Sports, albeit Government, Recreation, and Sports are in 
different ranking. 
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With regard to differences, only the Puerto Rican category includes Local Government, 
Voting Rights, and State Government within its top five categories. The topics of local 
government and state government only being included for the Puerto Rican category makes 
sense, as Puerto Ricans continued to make up the largest share of the local and state Hispanic 
population. In terms of the topic of voting rights, this also makes sense, as Puerto Ricans were 
the only group to not be subjected to issues surrounding immigration and citizenship, unlike 
Dominicans, Cubans, and Mexicans. Interestingly, only the Dominican category includes 
Municipal Government, and only the Cuban category includes Presidents. 
In spite of the differences in subject and order of subjects between the different ethnic 
and panethnic categories, and despite the decreasing focus on the Puerto Rican population, the 
share of articles for each ethnic and panethnic group in El Diario La Prensa’s January issues are 
much more reflective of New York City’s Hispanic demographics than is the New York Times. 
As can be seen below, although the pattern of El Diario La Prensa’s ethnic group shares are not 
entirely comparable with the actual demographic patterns taking place over time, the largest and 
smallest shares are held by the same ethnic groups up through 1993, when the similarities cease. 
Dominant in the general New York City Hispanic population, the Puerto Rican share of El 
Diario La Prensa’s articles is also dominant between 1970 and 1993- albeit by a much smaller 
margin than their share of the local panethnic population. While Puerto Ricans comprised 50% 
of the local Hispanic population in 1990, they only comprised 24% of the articles analyzed in 
January of 1993. 
Related to the decreasing dominance of Puerto Rican articles, is the rate of growth for the 
smallest shareholders, Dominicans and Mexicans. In 1980, Dominicans, the second smallest 
shareholder, were featured in 11.8% of the articles, but by January 1993 were included in 17.2% 
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of the articles. And Mexicans in 1980 held a 3.5% share, which jumped to 11% in January of 
1993. However, by 2000 the order of shareholders would change once more, and Dominicans 
would achieve the largest share of articles. No longer the smallest population of the four ethnic 
groups in New York City, Mexicans would continue to maintain the smallest share of El Diario 
La Prensa’s articles. Despite this discrepancy, by January of 2000 both Dominicans’ and 
Mexicans’ share of El Diario La Prensa would become the most representative of Hispanic 
landscape of New York City. 
Table 21. EDLP Share of Hispanic Articles by Ethnic Terms 
Source: Archival EDLP articles accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies Libraru 
and Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
El Diario La Prensa: Share of Hispanic Articles 
Jan-70 Jan-80 Jan-93 Jan-00 
Puerto Ricans 43.0%* 25.6%* 24%** 14.4%** 
Dominicans 13.7%* 11.8%* 17.2%** 20.5%** 
Cubans 16.3%* 12.1%* 12.4%** 17.4%** 
Mexicans 3.4%* 3.5%* 11%** 10.2%** 
Source: El Diario La Prensa. 
*January 1970 and January 1980 figures collected manually from
microfilm.
**January 1993 and January 2000 figures collected from Ethnic Newswatch search engine. 
Latinos Primero: El Diario La Prensa in the 2000s 
Although there was an increase in the number of references to Puerto Ricans in the 
largest Spanish language press in New York City (as Puertorriquena/o or Boricua), between 1993 
and 2000, the number of references to Latinos (both the feminine and masculine terms) 
surpassed that of the largest local Latino population.  This reversed the trend set in previous 
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decades, wherein Hispanic was the most popularly referenced panethnic category. Although still 
the more popular panethnic category in the the New York Times, the term Hispanic seemed to be 
going out of style in El Diario La Prensa, and the term Latino was replacing it. If references to 
Latinos and Hispanics are combined, articles containing the panethnic category nearly double the 
number referring to Puerto Ricans.  Given the trends in the decades leading up to the new 
century, this is not particularly shocking, although the associated ethnic references in 2000 are 
quite interesting. 
In 2000, Cubans and Mexicans made up a relatively small proportion of New York City’s 
Hispanic population, and so the number of articles on these groups was disproportionate to their 
share of the local population. However, there are limits to this interpretation, as the overall 
number of articles increased substantially between 1993 and 2000. 
Figure 17. Mentions of Ethnic Articles EDLP, 1993-2000 
 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
 
 
In addition to the change in the ethnic and panethnic makeup of El Diario La Prensa 
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panethnic group between 1993 and 2000. As can be seen below, with the exception of politics, 
all of the topics included in 2000 were not included in 1993. And for Puerto Ricans, Hispanics 
and Mexicans, politics changed its order. Politics rose in importance for Puerto Ricans and 
Hispanics, but dropped in importance for Mexicans. In terms of the new topic of importance, 
Minority and Ethnic Groups, Hispanics, and Culture appear in 2000 for Puerto Ricans, 
Hispanics, Dominicans and Mexicans. And Hispanic Americans appears as a topic for Puerto 
Ricans, Hispanics, Cubans, and Mexicans.  There is some variation in the order of these topics 
by ethnic or panethnic group, but for all groups the topic of “Hispanics” is more popular than 
“Culture”. For Puerto Ricans, Hispanics, and Dominicans the topic “Minority and Ethnic 
Groups” is more popular than “Hispanics”, but for Cubans and Mexicans, the reverse it true. As 
well, Cubans are the only group to have a unique topic included in 2000, that being “Music”, 
which is the second most popular topic for the year following “Politics”. 
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Figure 18. Mentions of Ethnic Articles by Topic EDLP, 1993-2000 
 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
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Another method of analysis, as is the case demographically, is to view the share of 
articles each category achieves over time. As can be seen below, although the number of articles 
including Puerto Ricans increases between the two years, their share of the articles decreases. 
Figure 19. Share of Ethnic Articles EDLP, 1993-2000 
 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
 
 
This declining Puerto Rican share of the Spanish speaking news was not a new 
occurrence, as the trend began in previous decades. Within El Diario La Prensa the trend 
towards a decreasing Puerto Rican share, like the New York Times, begins in 1980. Likewise the 
upward trend for Hispanic is isolated to 1980.  However, the increasing share of articles 
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Figure 20. Share of Ethnic Articles EDLP, 1970-2000 
 
Source: Archival EDLP articles accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies and Ethnic 
Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
 
 
Although panethnic identity continued to flourish, the utilized terms shifted. Between 
1990 and 2000, the term “Hispanic” became less popular, while the term “Latino” gained 
momentum. This is reflected in both the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa. Scholars 
have noted that identification with the term “Latino” is associated with experiences of racial 
discrimination in the U.S. context, thus the shift towards a “Latino” identity is also a political 
shift (Golash-Boza, 2006). Associated with the shift in terminology, is the continued decline in 
Puerto Ricans’ public presence. The number of articles on Puerto Ricans reached new lows by 
the 1990s, in both the English language and Spanish language press.  At the same time, the 
largest number of Puerto Rican residents in New York City was recorded in 1990. Demographic 
shifts played a greater role in the 1990s and 2000s, with the rapid influx of Dominican and 
Mexican immigrants to the region. However, again, the demographic shifts do not offer 
sufficient evidence for the level of Puerto Rican public decline. 
Share	of	Hispanic	Articles	(%):	
El	Diario	La	Prensa	50.0%	45.0%	40.0%	35.0%	30.0%	25.0%	20.0%	15.0%	10.0%	5.0%	0.0%	
Puertorriquena/o	Dominicana/o	Cubana/o	Mexicana/o	Hispana/o	Latina/o	Jan-1970	 Jan-1980	 Jan-1993	 Jan-2000	
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Unlike in previous decades, wherein either Puerto Ricans or a panethnic category held the 
largest share of articles including the six ethnic or panethnic categories, by 2010, Mexicans held 
the largest share by far.  As can be seen below, compared to January 2000 wherein Mexicans 
held a 10.2% share, by January 2010, they held a 28.9% share. Dominicans held the next largest 
share at 19.5%. 
Figure 21. Share of Ethnic Articles EDLP, 1970-2010 
 
Source: Archival EDLP articles accessed through the Center for Puerto Rican Studies and Ethnic 
Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
 
 
Like the change in prominence of Mexicans, by 2010 there was a great change in the 
most popular topics for each of the ethnic and panethnic groups. By 2010 Athletes and 
Tournaments and Championships were now included as popular topics for all ethnic and 
panethnic groups, and the topic “Hispanic Americans”, which appeared for all groups but one in 





Soccer were now included for every group except for Cubans. Although only shared by two 
groups, “Singers” appeared as a popular topic for Puerto Ricans and Cubans, and “Presidents” 
appears for Hispanics and Cubans. The unique topics that appear in 2010, are “Drug 
Trafficking” for Dominicans, and “Immigration Policy” for Mexicans, although both are ranked 
as being the lowest of the five most popular topics for each group. 
What is most striking is the shift away from politics and towards sports.  As well, the 
 
dropping of the topic “Hispanic” in favor of the topic “Hispanic American” is interesting. 
Thirdly, the only inclusion of any political topic is “Presidents”, and that is only for Hispanics 
and Cubans. 
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Figure 22. Mentions of Ethnic Articles by Topic EDLP, 1993-2010 
 
Source: Ethnic Newswatch accessed through the Mina Rees Library. 
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Two of the largest news sources in New York City have helped remove Puerto Ricans 
from public view. Both the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa have readily promoted 
Hispanic identity over the past several decades, while minimizing Puerto Rican coverage. 
Contrary to existing work on the subject, El Diario La Prensa was the first organization to 
disseminate and promote the current notion of a Hispanic community in New York City. The 
original slogan of El Diario La Prensa says it all: “champion of the Hispanics”. 
The New York Times contributed to Puerto Rican invisibility through the rapid decrease 
of coverage between 1970 and 2010. This decrease in coverage did not apply to other ethnic 
groups, but was reserved for Puerto Ricans. While the local Puerto Rican population did 
decrease in 2000 and 2010, the loss of coverage was disproportionate to the loss of population. 
El Diario La Prensa also decreased their focus on Puerto Ricans, but this was largely a 
loss in their share of coverage. In 1970, news from Puerto Rico dominated the newspaper, but 
by 1980 this coverage was gone. Instead, El Diario La Prensa would turn to news on Puerto 
Rican athletes and celebrities, instead of issues pertaining to the local Puerto Rican population. 
Part of the loss of Puerto Rican interest at both news houses is related to the increase in 
interest towards Mexicans and other ethnic populations. Also related to the loss of Puerto Rican 
interest is the rise in Hispanic and Latino references.  Although “Hispanic” was not a new term 
in either press, its use would rapidly increase in the 1960s and 1970s.  In the New York Times, 
the term “Hispanic” would quickly replace “Puerto Rican”, while in El Diario La Prensa the 
term would first overlap with ethnic terminology, before taking over. 
Regardless of the reasoning behind the shift, the New York Times and El Diario La 
Prensa have both contributed to Puerto Rican invisibility.  Through ignoring their presence and 
126	 
experiences in news coverage, the two presses have helped to remove Puerto Ricans from public 
view. It is as if Puerto Ricans cease to exist. The following chapters will address the role of 
politics in Puerto Rican invisibility. 
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Chapter 4. Politics I: The Evolution of Puerto Rican and 
Hispanic Politics 1970-2010 
The shift toward Hispanicity in the local media would have a tremendous impact on 
Puerto Rican politicians in New York City. The greatest impact would be the change in the 
media’s identification of Puerto Rican politicians. In the New York Times and El Diario La 
Prensa, Puerto Rican politicians ceased to be called Puerto Rican and instead were called 
Hispanic.  Another significant impact would be the lacking public documentation – in the form 
of news reports – of the history of Puerto Ricans, and Puerto Rican succession, in local politics. 
The media, however, was not the only factor to impact Puerto Rican politicians’ public identities. 
Other shifts, including an influx of non-Puerto Rican Spanish-speaking immigrants, the 
movement of Puerto Ricans to locations outside of New York City, paltry voter rates among 
Puerto Ricans, and the gentrification of impoverished Puerto Rican neighborhoods, have 
contributed to the Hispanicizing of Puerto Rican politicians in New York City. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Puerto Rican politicians were just getting their start. Prior to the 
entry of Puerto Ricans into politics, Irish machine politics were the primary example of 
successful ethnic politics (Erie, 1990). While the Irish left a political legacy, the era of machine 
politics was fading by the time Puerto Ricans entered the fray. Additionally, by the 1960s the 
Irish had succeeded in becoming mostly indistinguishable from other Americans. This trend was 
largely due to the advantage of being a European immigrant who could eventually become white. 
Many Puerto Ricans do not have this advantage, and so have not succeeded in overcoming the 
obstacle of race. 
Perhaps the closer example would be Jewish New Yorkers in education. According to 
Erie (1990), the Irish political machine offered concessions to the Jewish community through 
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education.  To this end, many Jewish New Yorkers became teachers and obtained leadership 
roles in the field of education in New York City (Podair, 2004). These teachers also happened to 
often work in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods. Thus, there was a direct link between local 
Jews and Puerto Ricans through the politics of education. This link was contentious, to say the 
least, as effort towards community control meant that black and Puerto Rican parents sought to 
regain control over the education of their children, which by default meant taking control away 
from a Jewish cohort of teachers. While the Irish may have set the stage for Jewish gains in local 
education, there was little connection between the Irish political machine and the political 
developments that would take place in the Puerto Rican community in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The Irish had much more in common with Puerto Ricans outside of politics, in that both 
groups were largely Roman Catholic. The Irish utilized the Catholic Church as another means to 
organize the community, and succeeded in gaining positions of power within the Church (Erie, 
1990). While there were some examples of Catholic Churches offering concessions to Puerto 
Ricans, there are not many Puerto Rican priests or bishops, so Puerto Ricans did not achieve 
mobility through the Church like the Irish did (Chan, 2008). 
In this early phase of political development, Puerto Rican politicians were readily 
identifying, and identified, as Puerto Rican. The 1970s would serve as the foundation for what 
would follow: the proliferation of Puerto Rican representation for Puerto Rican neighborhoods 
throughout New York City. However, much would change over the next few decades in both 
local media and the political environment. Reporters rapidly instituted the use of “Hispanic” in 
lieu of ethnic terminology, and the increasingly large cohort of Puerto Rican politicians grappled 
with the changing demographics of their constituencies. A key shift seems to take place around 
the 2010 mark, when other Hispanic politicians would enter the political fray in larger numbers. 
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Despite the entrance of other groups, Puerto Ricans continue to make up the bulk of 
representatives serving Hispanic neighborhoods. Ironically, however, they are often not publicly 
identified as Puerto Rican and so their ethnic identity remains hidden in plain sight. This chapter 
addresses the history of Puerto Rican politics in the New York City metropolitan region. 
 
 




By 1970, as the children of the airborne migration generation were coming of age, there 
were already a number of Puerto Rican politicians representing them- both mainland- and island- 
born. Carlos Rios, an East Harlem native, was the first Puerto Rican elected to New York City 
Council in 1965. Also in 1965, Gilbert Ramirez was the first Puerto Rican elected to the New 
York State Assembly. In 1966 Robert Garcia would follow suit. In 1967 Eugene Rodriguez 
would be the first Puerto Rican elected to the New York State Senate, however, he would never 
take his seat because of a prison sentence. Robert Garcia would take his place representing the 
Bronx and parts of Manhattan in the 29th District. By 1970 Manuel Ramos, born in Puerto Rico, 
had been serving the 79th District in the Bronx on the New York State Assembly for three years, 
and Armando Montano had been serving the 77th District for two years.  Arnaldo Segarra, also 
an East Harlem native and current appointee by Mayor Bill de Blasio, was politically employed 
and subsequently dismissed in 1970 for publicly supporting the Young Lords. Herman Badillo, 
born and raised in Puerto Rico until age 11, began his four year stint as Bronx Borough President 
in 1966. During this period, he entered his first race to become Mayor of New York City - until 
1970, when he was elected to U.S. Congress.  He was the first Puerto Rican to hold the post. 
Roberto LeBron was City Councilman for the 10th District in the Bronx between 1969 and 1970. 
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Charles Rangel, who downplays his Puerto Rican parentage, had already served on the New 
York State Assembly among other political positions, and was running for U.S. Congress. In 
1970, Puerto Rico-born Louis Nine was elected to serve the 78th New York State Assembly 
representing the Bronx, and Antonio Mendez, also Puerto Rico-born, was a long-term 
Democratic politician in East Harlem by this time. Although not connected to the city’s formal 
political system, the New York City chapter of the Young Lords was in its first year of operation 
as 1970 began. Thus, despite the youth of the burgeoning Puerto Rican population in New York 
City, there was already a cohort of politicians on the scene, albeit predominantly male, working 
to combat the social ills of the time1. 
The combination of the political fervor of the time, the economic and social turmoil 
throughout the city, the segregation and thus cohesiveness of the downtrodden Puerto Rican 
community, and the critical second generation moment created the circumstances in which 
Puerto Rican politicians could make waves in politics. By 1970, although New York City Puerto 
Ricans already made up a decreasing share of the local Hispanic population, they still made up 
67.5% of the Spanish surnamed community, and 59.2% of the stateside Puerto Rican community 
(Batiz-Rivera, 2004, p. 108; Falcon, 2004, p. 167). This is indeed a drop from the 80.8% share 
that Puerto Ricans held within Hispanic New York in 1960, and the 71.9% share of stateside 
Boricuas, but nonetheless, they were still the clear majority.  Although in limited numbers, 
young Puerto Ricans were entering the city’s universities, learning about the movements 





1 The historical timeline presented in this chapter was pieced together through an exhaustive 
internet search and sifting through the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa archival issues. 
Even still it may not be complete. 
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sphere, in varying ways. And even Puerto Rican parents of school aged youth were inspired by 
the times to take action. 
Dolores Torres, an English speaking Puerto Rican mother to three school aged children in 
Ocean Hill-Brownsville, Brooklyn, had reached her limit with the public school system in 1967. 
She galvanized other parents in her community, and took to the streets to try to change the school 
for the better so that her children could learn.  These efforts initially produced positive results- 
her community effectively gained control of the school, as did other communities in New York 
City, such as the heavily Puerto Rican Lower East Side. The first Puerto Rican principal in New 
York City would be instated as a result as well. However, community control would not last in 
New York City’s public schools, and conditions would continue to deteriorate for Puerto Rican 
youth. 
The example of community control is particularly telling of the political relationship 
between Puerto Ricans and African Americans. In his book, The Strike That Changed New York, 
Podair (2004) outlines the clear divisions between the white teachers and African American 
communities they served during the 1968 teacher strikes in Ocean-Hill and Brownsville.. What is 
not mentioned, however, are the Puerto Rican families, such as that of Dolores Torres, who 
participated in the community control movement side by side with African Americans. A 
complicating issue to be sure, but omitting this fact only obscures the intricate connection 
between two groups living in such close proximity to one another. Another such example, would 
be the Open Enrollment movement at CUNY, in which Puerto Ricans and African Americans 
organized and took action together. The Young Lords are yet another example, by way of the 
support of the Black Panthers for their efforts to militantly galvanize and advocate for their 
community. 
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At the post-secondary level, Hostos Community College is a result of Puerto Rican 
political action as well. In 1968, Boricua parents successfully fought for the creation of a 
community college that would serve the residents of the South Bronx, an overwhelmingly Puerto 
Rican community. Named for Eugenio Maria de Hostos, a leader in the fight for Puerto Rico’s 
national independence at the turn of the 20th century, the college stood for a newly revived topic 
on the minds of many Puerto Rican activists at the time - a topic that would later fracture the 
mainland based Puerto Rican movement. 
While not explicitly political, there were a number of non-profit organizations on the 
scene at the time as well, working both to remedy the problems facing the Puerto Rican 
community and support it. The Puerto Rican Family Institute for example, was founded in 1960. 
Antonia Pantoja’s ASPIRA (an acronym meaning aspire in Spanish) was founded in 1961, an 
educational and leadership agency which numerous Puerto Rican success stories, such as 
Fernando Ferrer, include on their resume. In 1966 UPROSE, the United Puerto Rican 
Organization of Sunset Park, was founded in Sunset Park and the United Bronx Parents was 
founded in the Bronx. And El Museo Del Barrio was founded in 1969 in an East Harlem school. 
All of these remain functioning today, but they now serve the broader Latino population instead 
of Puerto Ricans. 
Also important, although perhaps not explicitly political, are the notable contributions to 
Puerto Rican scholarly and literary work at the time, although much of it came from non-Puerto 
Rican authors. Oscar Lewis’ La Vida was released in 1966, a controversial but widely circulated 
work pointing to manner in which poverty can become self-perpetuated under specific structural 
conditions, as Lewis observed in the Puerto Rican families he studied.  Piri Thomas’ classic 
book, Down These Mean Streets, is a first-hand counter to Lewis’ work and describes his 
133	 
experience growing up in an upwardly mobile family from Spanish Harlem; it was first 
published in 1967. By 1970, Glazer and Moynihan had revised their still influential 1963 work 
Beyond the Melting Pot, retracting their previous assertions that Puerto Ricans, due to their 
migrant characteristics, could bypass the difficulties experienced by many African Americans in 
urban centers. As Falcon describes it, the authors lamented the “resurgence of ethnicity”, and the 
manner in which Puerto Ricans seemed to embrace the “Black model of a racial minority 
oppressed in American society” (Falcon, 2004, pg. 94). And in 1971, Joseph Fitzpatrick 
published Puerto Rican Americans: The Meaning of Migration to the Mainland, a rich analysis 
of mainland living and an optimistic take on what would become of Puerto Ricans in the U.S. 
context. 
What seems strange is that the majority of these politicians, organizations, and activists 
were clearly identified as being Puerto Rican in both the English and Spanish language press, 
and yet the Spanish language press frequently used the term “Hispano” to describe the 
populations they served. This is reflected in the high usage of the two terms “Puertorriquena/o” 
and “Hispana/o” throughout these issues, as there was a lot of overlap taking place within 
articles. There is no clear answer available in the text of El Diario La Prensa, aside from an 
inclusion of the term “hispano” in the same paragraph or sentence describing a Puerto Rican 
phenomenon. It’s almost as if the author is trying to make sure that all Spanish language 
populations were impacted by the particular point being made in the article. 
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New York City Metro Area Politics: Urban Poverty and the Growth of Puerto Rican Non- 
Profits in 1980 
 
 
By 1980, The Young Lords were fading from memory with the increasing submersion of 
radical politics; Herman Badillo had given up his post in the U.S. Congress, had unsuccessfully 
run for Mayor of New York City three times, as well as resigned his position as Deputy Mayor 
under Ed Koch and returned to practicing law; the fervor surrounding the idea of Puerto Rican 
independence from the United States had receded, and the community’s dire living conditions, in 
general, remained.  There was a more resigned sense that many on the mainland were, for the 
most part, here to stay, and that their living conditions would be difficult to change. By 1980 it 
seemed clear that Puerto Ricans in New York City would not become a darker skinned example 
of Italian and Irish assimilation into the middle class, but rather maintained a position much more 
similar to that of African Americans- less migrant and more native minority. 
One point of similarity between Puerto Ricans and African Americans remained in the 
spatial location of these urban New York City residents. A good chunk of both communities 
remained located in housing provided by New York City’s largest landlord, the New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA). Part of the persistent role of NYCHA in Nuyorican life is due to 
the incredible stability of its resident population (Prof. Kasinitz-need to find exact source). With 
the never-ceasing rise in local rents, it would be illogical to give up housing where one’s income 
determines how much rent will be paid. There is also the issue of limited economic 
opportunities. With the continued flight of manufacturing from New York City unemployment 
continued to be a problem for many Puerto Ricans, which meant little to no income, and thus no 
choice, when it came to the projects. 
135	
Unlike other cities, such as Newark, NJ, the site of public housing was never that far 
away from other buildings and commercial life, due to the sheer density of New York City. Of 
course, there were more isolated areas such as Hunts Point in the Bronx, however, in general, a 
good number of public housing projects were located within or adjacent to highly populated 
neighborhoods.  Isolation was less a factor in the New York City case, and so the issues related 
to physical isolation were less present. In less densely populated places like Newark, however, 
public housing buildings were set apart from more residential areas of the city and became so 
decrepit that flowers and curtains were painted on the outside of the windows, to mask the 
deplorable conditions within. By the end of the decade, many of these more isolated public 
housing projects throughout the country would be demolished- a fate that New York City would 
be spared. 
Despite the continued downtrodden experience that many Puerto Ricans faced, there were 
bright spots as well.  In The Uptown Kids, Williams and Kornblum (1994) illustrate that hope 
was not lost in the projects of New York City. As they describe their observations, no matter the 
bleak outlook portrayed in academic work at the time and the uphill battle many faced in the 
1970s and 1980s, black and Puerto Rican youth born into Harlem’s public housing still strove for 
success and some attained it. 
An example of Puerto Rican success can be seen in the continued proliferation of non- 
profit organizations that sought to combat the deleterious conditions many in the community 
faced. By 1980 the Nuyorican Poets Café, the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, 
Boricua College, and the National Conference of Puerto Rican women had been in operation for 
several years, striving for Puerto Rican equity. In 1972, three Puerto Rican lawyers came 
together to help dispel discriminatory practices against Puerto Ricans through litigation, naming 
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their organization the Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund. The Nuyorican Poets 
Café came into existence in 1973, when a Puerto Rican poet and professor created an artistic 
salon out of his living room, later expanding into a storefront on the Lower East Side. In the 
same year, the New York Chapter of the National Conference of Puerto Rican Women sought to 
attain equity, specifically for Puerto Rican women- a fairly innovative cause for the time.  Also 
in 1973, the Center for Puerto Rican Studies opened its doors, to work for Puerto Rican 
representation and equity in the academy (Center for Puerto Rican Studies, 2017). Founded in 
1974 in Brooklyn, Boricua College intentionally invoked the Taino culture from Puerto Rico in 
its name, working to improve Puerto Rican postsecondary educational attainment. Teatro 
Pregones, a Bronx neighborhood theater, was founded in 1979 to create art programs for low to 
moderate income Bronx residents (Teatro Pregones, 2016). 
The non-profit sector was not the only site of improvement for Puerto Ricans, as there 
were several developments taking place in politics, albeit in a different nature from the past. The 
Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan were sites of growth for Puerto Rican politicians – which now 
included two females. This growth is related to the continued concentration of Puerto Ricans in 
these three boroughs, specifically in the districts where Puerto Rican politicians would flourish. 
The influx of other Latinos to New York City was steadily rising, however at this point other 
Spanish-speaking populations, such as Dominicans, remained concentrated in other boroughs 
and neighborhoods. Thus, there remained a correlation between residential concentration and 
political representation. 
The Bronx would serve as the primary area for Puerto Rican political growth. This was 
the site where the first two female Puerto Ricans would take office. The Bronx was also home to 
the largest number of Puerto Rican representatives.  In large part this was due to the Bronx being 
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the site of the largest number of Puerto Rican residents in New York City. Additionally, the 
Bronx was the most Puerto Rican borough in that Puerto Ricans made up a larger percentage of 
the population when compared to other boroughs. What is inconsistent, however, is that as the 
population matured, and the percentage of Puerto-Rico born residents decreased, the latest wave 
of Puerto Rican politicians were mostly born in Puerto Rico. 
In 1972 Puerto Rico-born Olga Mendez was elected as a New York Delegate at the 
Democratic Convention, committed to Senator George McGovern, and in 1978 was the first 
Puerto Rican woman elected to a State Legislature on the mainland, serving as a New York State 
Senator for the 28th district in the Bronx. In 1973 Carmen Arroyo, also Puerto Rico-born, would 
serve as President of School Board 7 in the Bronx and be appointed to the New York State 
Medicaid Council, and in 1978 would be elected as the Female District Leader of the 74th 
Assembly District in the Bronx. These were two of the first Puerto Rican women to make waves 
in electoral politics in New York City. 
In addition to the new female addition to the cohort of Puerto Rican politicians at work 
for the Bronx, Puerto Rican men continued to take part in the political scene. Bronx-born Robert 
Garcia would replace Herman Badillo in Congress in 1978 representing the 21st District in his 
hometown, following his lengthy service on the New York State Assembly and Senate. And 
Puerto Rico-born Eugenio Alvarez would be a Delegate to the Democratic Convention in 1972, 
later serving the 75th District in the Bronx on the New York State Assembly from 1973-1974. 
Brooklyn was home to the second largest number of Puerto Rican residents in New York 
City and was also a site of Puerto Rican political growth, but not to the same extent as the Bronx. 
Louis Olmedo would twice be elected to serve the 27th New York City Council District in 
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Brooklyn in 1974 and 1978. He was one of two Puerto Rico-born politicians representing 
Brooklyn in 1980.  The other was Victor Robles, serving on the NYS Assembly. 
Manhattan would also be a site of Puerto Rican political growth, specifically the 
neighborhoods of East Harlem and the Lower East Side. Part of this growth was related to 
growth in the Bronx, as several districts contained parts of both boroughs. But both East Harlem 
and the Lower East Side were also home to a concentrated Puerto Rican population. Puerto 
Rico-born Ramon S. Velez, the political heavyweight, would get his start in 1974, serving the 
Bronx and East Harlem in New York City Council District 11, a post he would relinquish to 
Gilberto Gerena Valentin in 1978. Louis Nine, having served the Bronx on the New York State 
Assembly for ten years in 1980, would continue his service to the 74th District serving the Lower 
East Side until his death three years later. And current U.S. Congressman Jose Serrano, also 
Puerto Rico-born, would get his start in the same district, starting his service on the New York 
State Assembly in 1975. 
 
 




Not much analyzed, but noted in Angelo Falcon’s chapter within the book Boricuas in 
Gotham, is the early tendency for Puerto Rican politicians in New York City to be of the 
Pentecostal faith. Some such politicians include former Congressman Robert Garcia 
representing the Bronx, Herman Badillo, and Carlos Rios (Falcon, 2004, p. 95). This trend is 
reminiscent of what Weber found of the economic success of Protestants in the United States in 
the 19th century. Is there something particular about the practice of the Pentecostal faith that 
makes one more apt to enter the political field, just as the practice of the Protestant faith 
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coincided with the accumulation of wealth? Related research would suggest that the answer is 
“yes”. In their work examining Haitian immigrant identity in the United States, McAlister and 
Richman describe how Evangelical Protestants in the Haitian community are much more likely 
to embrace democracy, form political opinions, and participate in electoral politics (2009).  In 
this sense, the tenets of Evangelical Protestantism are more likely to contribute to political 
activity when compared to other faiths, such as Catholicism. In Puerto Rico, the religion 
manifested in what has been called “conservative fundamentalism”, or taking the Bible literally 
(Martinez-Ramirez, 2005). This stance gained popularity as the island underwent the change 
from an agrarian to industrial society with Operation Bootstrap starting in the 1940s, which 
caused tremendous social and economic upheaval. Conservative fundamentalism, which in 
general results in separatism, during this time of upheaval on the island resulted in a religious 
form of conservative political activism. This growth in the Pentecostal faith, and the related 
political activism, seems to also be related to the entrance of Puerto Rican politicians on the New 
York City scene, many of whom were born in Puerto Rico. 
 
 




Although the Puerto Rican non-profit scene seemed to be thriving and there were gains 
being made by way of increased female representation within Puerto Rican politicians, the 
prominence of Puerto Ricans within both the Spanish and English press was waning, while the 
spotlight shone on Hispanics was brighter than ever. By 1980 El Diario La Prensa had reversed 
the trend found in 1970, in which Puerto Ricans were the focus of most articles with Hispanics 
interspersed within the text.  By this time, Hispanics now dominated the headlines, while Puerto 
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Ricans were to be found within some, but not all, Hispanic-focused articles. This is in sharp 
contrast to the January 1970 El Diario La Prensa articles, wherein ethnic identification was most 
often included in the headline, with panethnic terminology used later in the text of the article. 
Although less prominent in the local Spanish and English press, by 1980 Puerto Ricans 
throughout New York City continued to face an increasingly dire economic reality. Between 
1970 and 1980 the unemployment rate for Puerto Rican men increased from 5.28% to 11.45%, 
and for Puerto Rican women increased from 6.42% to 12.24% (Cruz, 2004, p. 53). These rates 
are substantially higher than those found in the general New York City population. The overall 
rate for male New Yorkers was 3.88% in 1970 and 7.04% in 1980, and for female New Yorkers 
was 5% in 1970 and 7.15% in 1980. Thus, by 1980, unemployment was increasing at a 
significantly higher rate for Puerto Ricans than it was for the overall local population. Related to 
this problem of unemployment, 42% of the New York City Puerto Rican population was living 
in poverty in 1980 compared to 18.34% of the general local population, the highest percentage to 
date, although the problem would persist. 
 
 




Although their presence was waning in the local English and Spanish language press, by 
1993 Puerto Ricans were making remarkable gains in the realm of New York City politics.  At 
the federal level, Puerto Rico-born Jose E. Serrano would replace Robert Garcia as Congressman 
in 1990, representing what was the 18th District in the South Bronx- the third consecutive Puerto 
Rican to hold the post. Nydia Velazquez, also Puerto Rico-born, had been serving the 27th 
District on the New York City Council for 9 years by 1993, having been the first woman of 
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Hispanic descent ever to hold the position, and in that same year would be the first female Puerto 
Rican elected to U.S. Congress. 
At the state level, by 1993 East Harlem native Angelo Del Torro had been serving on the 
New York State Assembly for nearly 20 years, having been elected in 1974, and following his 
death in 1995 would be replaced first by Francisco Diaz, Jr., who lost his seat a year later to 
Nelson Antonio Denis. Puerto Rico-born Hector L. Diaz was recently elected to serve the New 
York State Assembly’s 75th District in Brooklyn, after having served the 74th District as 
Assemblyman for nine years. Puerto Rico-born David Rosado had been serving the South Bronx 
on the New York State Assembly’s 73rd District for three years, after winning the seat left vacant 
by Congressman Serrano, and would soon commence service to the 17th District on the New 
York City Council. Puerto Rico-born Roberto Ramirez was in his first year of service as New 
York State Assemblyman for the 78th District in the Bronx, having served as Assemblyman for 
the 77th District for three years. Puerto Rico-born Peter Rivera was in his first year of service for 
the 76th District in the Bronx, elected in 1992.  Also elected in 1992, Javier Nieves was starting 
his first, and only, term as New York State Assemblyman, serving the newly drawn Hispanic 
district carved from the 51st in Brooklyn- to be ousted by Puerto Rico-born Felix Ortiz in 1994. 
And Puerto Rico-born Carmen Arroyo, longtime Female District Leader of the 74th Assembly 
District in the Bronx, would become the first Puerto Rican or Hispanic woman to be elected to 
the New York State Assembly, or any State Assembly, in 1994. 
In the New York State Senate, Puerto Rico-born Olga Mendez had been serving the 28th
District representing East Harlem and parts of Brooklyn for nearly 15 years. Nellie Santiago, the 
first Puerto Rican from Brooklyn to be elected to the New York State Senate, and representing 
the 17th District, was starting her first year of service.  Puerto Rico-born Efrain Gonzalez, Jr., a 
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former grocery store stock clerk and bus driver, had been serving the 31st New York State 
Senate District in the Bronx for four years, elected in 1989. Pedro Espada, Jr., also Puerto Rico- 
born, had recently been elected to the adjacent 32nd New York State Senate District in the Bronx. 
At the city level, by 1993 Puerto Rico-born Jose Rivera was in his sixth year of service 
on the New York City Council’s District 15 in the Bronx, following five years of service on the 
New York State Assembly. Venezuelan-born Puerto Rican Rafael Castaneira Colon, in his 11th 
year of service to the Bronx’s 17th District on the New York City Council would soon be 
defeated by Assemblyman David Rosado, and would serve time for stealing City Council 
monies.  Puerto Rico-born Victor Robles, a former New York State Assemblyman, had served 
six years as New York City Councilman for the 27th District in Brooklyn, and was in his second 
year of service as New York City Councilman for the 34th District.  Also Puerto Rico-born, 
Adam Clayton Powell IV was in his second year of serving East Harlem, parts of the Upper West 
Side, and the South Bronx on the New York City Council. Also in his second year of service to 
New York City Council’s 2nd District, Manhattan-born and Puerto Rico-educated Antonio Pagan, 
was one of the first two openly gay members to be elected to the post, serving the Lower East 
Side.  And Israel Ruiz, Jr., an ousted New York State Senator barred from serving at the state 
level due to a Federal conviction, was in his first year of service for the New York City 
Council’s 14th District in the Bronx. Following a five year stint representing the Bronx in the 13th 
New York City Council District, and the imprisonment of Stanley Simon, Bronx-born Fernando 
Ferrer would take his place as Bronx Borough President in 1987- the second Puerto Rican to 
hold this position. 
At this stage, the number of Puerto Rican politicians had grown from 12 in 1980 to 16 in 
1990.  Additionally, there was expansion at different political levels.  By 1990, the number of 
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Puerto Rican City Council members had more than doubled, there was an increase in the number 
of NYS Assembly members, in addition to another Puerto Rican Borough President. There was 
also expansion with respect to the neighborhoods represented by these politicians. Whereas in 
1980, most representatives served the Bronx, this monopoly of sorts lessened by 1990.  There 
was an increase in the number of Puerto Rican politicians serving Brooklyn and Lower 
Manhattan by this point. 
Along with the shroud of Hispanicity enveloping them, the political stage would soon be 
shared with other Latinos. By 1993 Puerto Ricans were no longer the only Hispanic elected 
officials representing New York City, as Dominican-born Guillermo Linares, the first Dominican 
elected to the New York City Council and tied for first as the first Dominican elected official in 
the U.S. in 1991, had been serving on the New York City Council representing Washington 
Heights for two years. 
Curiously, by 1993, it seemed that the majority of the Puerto Rican officials elected to 
represent New York City at the city, state, and federal level were in fact born in Puerto Rico. 
This trend could be due to the age at which people tend to enter the field of politics. That is, the 
older members of the Puerto Rican community are more likely to be born in Puerto Rico, and 
also those who would likely run for office. The trend is still interesting, nonetheless, given the 
particular experience of Puerto Ricans born on the mainland- thought by many to be a dominant 
experience amongst Nuyoricans in the 1990s. Yes, there has been great intersection between the 
experiences on the island and on the mainland, given the ease of travel between the two, and the 
ability to reside in one or the other without dealing with the legal aspects of immigration- 
however, given the trends in other ethnic groups, say the Irish or Italians in New York City, most 
often it has been the second generation to enter into the political field.  Not to mention the trends 
144	 
in other Hispanic groups, such as Mexicans in the Southwest, it has more often than not been the 
heirs of immigration to take on public service.  Granted, Puerto Rican migrants, are not subject 
to immigration law, but Guillermo Linares is an immigrant from the Dominican Republic and 
took office. Why does the trend tend to be reversed for Puerto Ricans? Are people from Puerto 
Rico more politically versed than those born in New York City?  Angelo Falcon would say yes. 
In the 1980s, Puerto Rico born Angelo Falcon had nearly completed his PhD at Columbia 
University, but in the Hunter College Office of Puerto Rico born Professor Harry Rodriguez, he 
had a change of heart and opted to start a political non-profit instead of completing his 
dissertation- deeming his newly founded organization, The Institute for Puerto Rican Policy, a 
group of “Young Lords with computers”. Despite his flight from taking on a formal role in 
academia, he would continue to publish research on Puerto Ricans, taking an interest in the 
differences between the political activity of Puerto Ricans on the mainland and those on the 
island. 
Puerto Ricans on the island have exceedingly high voting rates. Between 1972 and 2000, 
on average, nearly 80 percent of the island population voted- and at one point an incredible 95 
percent were registered to vote (Camara Fuertes, 2004; Issenberg, 2012). Coinciding with this 
considerable electoral activity is a definitively public political process. Caravans make their way 
throughout the streets, and people come outside to engage in the process, in what becomes a 
festivity much like that of a holiday. Paradoxically, he found that there is a steep drop off in 
voting rates amongst Puerto Ricans on the mainland (Falcon, 1983). Recent work seems to see 
the paltry voter rates of mainland Puerto Ricans, among other mainland populations, as less a 
function of some characteristic of mainland Puerto Ricans, and more a function of the political 
atmosphere in the United States- where election day is far from a national holiday (Camara 
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Fuertes, 2004). As the saying goes, practice makes perfect, which applies to voting as well. 
Statistics have shown the relationship between socioeconomic status and voting in the United 
States, and that those from more affluent backgrounds are more prone to vote. Is it income that 
would make one more predisposed to vote, or is it that homes with higher incomes happen to 
have a more voter friendly culture? In Puerto Rico, for example, wherein much of the population 
is quite poor, the relationship between income and voting becomes irrelevant. 
Growing up and coming of age in Puerto Rico likely means that one has been exposed to 
a high level of political activity and civic engagement. As many of the Puerto Rican politicians 
in New York City were born and raised in Puerto Rico, it is likely that they were already 
predisposed to politics prior to entering the field on the mainland. They would maintain a 
political advantage in some respects, given their political education in Puerto Rico. This is true 
especially of the heirs to Puerto Rican political families, such as Congresswoman Nydia 
Velazquez. Additionally, there would likely be an ideological disconnect between these 
politicians and their mainland constituents, given the lacking political environment in the urban 
U.S. context. 
 
There are limits, however, to being raised in a political environment. The politics of 
Puerto Rico do not mirror the United States. In Puerto Rico, there is a blurriness between the 
government and parties, whereas in the U.S. context, the government and parties are viewed as 
distinct (Lewis, 1976). Additionally, changes in the political structure of U.S. cities, including a 
shift from machine politics to professional bureaucracy, reduced voter incentives on the part of 
the poor (Cloward and Piven, 1973). Overall, as Falcon (1983) explains, the structure of the two 
societies greatly differs, contributing to the vast difference in voting patterns. 
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Also striking in the expansion of Puerto Rican politicians between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s is the role of succession between Puerto Rican politicians and the various districts 
that they served, and the seeming Puerto Rican political machine that developed mostly in the 
Bronx. However, part of the Puerto Rican political expansion that took place must be tempered 
by the fact that in 1982 Mayor Ed Koch signed new redistricting boundaries ordering that 12 of 
the 35 New York City Council Districts had to contain a resident population that was at least 
65% black and “Hispanic”. This mandate also included two additional City Council seats from 
the 33 previous posts. Likewise, at-large positions on the New York City Council were deemed 
unconstitutional. Interestingly, this redistricting only led to black and Puerto Rican electoral 
success in the nine districts that were 80% black or Hispanic- and these districts happened to be 
either majority black or majority Hispanic (Reed, 1992). In the three remaining districts, weak 
voting registration and turnout rates amongst people of color in communities that were less than 
80% black or Hispanic, and competition between candidates of color, combined with a higher 
concentration of whites that had higher voting rates, led to electoral successes for whites. Later 
in the decade, in 1989 further redistricting took place, which created more Hispanic voting 
districts. As well, the overall number of districts was expanded, which then led to a steep 
increase in the number of New York City Council seats, from 35 to 51 seats, which also 
contributed to the increasing number of Puerto Rican politicians (Cruz, pg. 66, 2004). 
With respect to the seeming political advantage associated with being born in Puerto 
Rico, there are two important points to note. First, migration from Puerto Rico has been 
continuous from the time the United States acquired the island from Spain in the late 19th 
century. Secondly, there has been return migration as well. Because of the lacking role of 
immigration institutions in travel between Puerto Rico and the mainland U.S., and the mode in 
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which the Census currently collects information, it would be nearly impossible to track those 
Puerto Ricans who have recently come, those who have come four or more decades ago, or those 
who returned to the island. Thus, it is possible that previously held notions of Puerto Rican 
resident stability in New York City could very well be wrong, and that there has in fact been 
ongoing turnover between the two locales.  Earlier research found that two-thirds of Puerto 
Rican migrants to the United States have lived there before, pointing to the circular pattern 
available to Puerto Ricans as U.S. citizens (Melendez, 1993). In other words, perhaps there is no 
political advantage, and the high number of Puerto Rican politicians is reflective of the 
incredibly high rate of movement between Puerto Rico and the U.S. 
As in the case of Puerto Rican electoral success, Puerto Rican non-profits continued to 
flourish. The Institute for Puerto Rican Politics was founded in 1982, as a policy think tank and 
advocacy organization.  The following year, Juan Gutierrez founded Los Pleneros De La 21, in 
an effort to present and preserve Puerto Rican traditions for the Spanish Harlem community (Los 
Pleneros de la 21, 2016). Founded in 1986, Comite Noviembre was created to acknowledge the 
many Puerto Rican contributions to New York and the nation (Comite Noviembre, 2016).  Also 
in 1986, Marta Garcia founded the New York Chapter of the National Hispanic Media Coalition, 
working for fairness and inclusiveness with respect to Latinos in the media (National Hispanic 
Media Coalition, 2016).  Between 1986 and 1987, the Center for Puerto Rican Studies created 
the Centro Exchange Programs, seeking to foster collaboration both within and outside of the 
CUNY system, to further research in the area of the Puerto Rican Studies (Center for Puerto 
Rican Studies, 2017). And in 1987, Congresswoman Velazquez, at the time New York City 
Councilwoman and Director of the Department of Puerto Rican Community Affairs, initiated 
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Atrevete, a voter registration program working to galvanize Puerto Rican communities 
throughout the U.S. (Falcon, 2004, p. 98, 2004) 
Although less explicitly political, there were Puerto Rican successes in the academic and 
literary world as well. Virginia Sanchez Korrol’s classic work From Colonia to Community was 
published in 1983. The Memoirs of Bernardo Vega was published in 1984. And Juan Flores 
published his work Divided Borders: Essays on Puerto Rican Identity in 1992. 
It is extremely important to note that the successes noted above in the field of Puerto 
Rican politics and non-profits in New York City were not easy to locate in either the New York 
Times or El Diario La Prensa. The New York Times, in particular, goes so far to create maps and 
lists of candidates and winners for each and every New York City district election- and yet in 
1993, it was quite difficult to piece together a timeline of elected officials, notwithstanding their 
ethnicity, as the maps only provide a snapshot as opposed to longitudinal information and are not 
provided for every election.  Additionally, the articles pertaining to electoral races in which 
Puerto Ricans were in the running most often did not include the previous politician for a given 
district, but rather only included the two or three people in the running for the post. In several 
cases, when Puerto Ricans were running for a given post, the previous politician either resigned 
or was removed, but information about the resignation or removal was not included in the current 
race information making it quite difficult to locate said politician. Secondly, following the 1989 
redistricting, there were several new districts, which would not have a previous politician, and 
yet again this information was not included in the electoral race articles.  And more importantly, 
in both the New York Times and El Diario La Prensa ethnic identification of candidates and 
politicians had nearly disappeared, and in its place, Hispanic, or sometimes Latino, candidates 
had appeared- regardless of the fact that all but one of the elected Hispanic politicians 
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representing New York City at the time were Puerto Rican. Even El Diario La Prensa, which at 
times seemed to note the ethnic identification of the more prominent elected officials, such as 
former Congressman Herman Badillo and current Congressman Jose Serrano, at the State and 
city level more often than not the Puerto Rican identity of elected officials was omitted in place 
of Hispanic or Latino panethnicity. So, I was left with a name, a district (or sometimes two), and 
had to piece together the rest of the information through other online sources such as The New 
Yorker Magazine, The Village Voice, The New York Post, among others (many of which 
contained contradictory information to the New York Times), and the few books that include such 
information (Puerto Rican Politics in Urban America, 1984; Boricuas in Gotham, 2004; etc.)- 
but even those do not include the significant number of elected Puerto Rican politicians on the 
New York State Assembly and Senate at the time. In spite of my efforts to do otherwise, I don’t 
doubt that my 1993 Puerto Rican political map of New York City is flawed. 
The inability to accurately record the rich political timeline and history of Puerto Rican 
politicians in New York City in the 1990s is a very real adverse effect associated with panethnic 
identification. The so-called “Hispanic” districts created in the Bronx and Brooklyn at the time 
were Puerto Rican districts- although this fact is also obscured. Perhaps the only people 
interested in this information are the politicians themselves, who being in the field, have the 
information committed to memory- but being an outsider, the task of completely uncovering this 
relatively recent past seems to be almost impossible. Thus, even El Diario La Prensa had at this 
point effectively obscured the role of Puerto Ricans in forming the Spanish speaking leadership 
of the time, and making the endeavor of locating these politicians’ ethnic identity a much more 
difficult process. 
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Another adverse effect of panethnic identification is the nearly nonexistent public 
attention paid to Puerto Rican residents’ lives in New York City throughout the 1990s, on the 
part of both the English language press and Puerto Rican academics. By then, as Haslip-Viera 
notes, even “Puerto Rican scholars and writers paid little attention to the economic and social 
issues of critical importance to New York’s Puerto Rican community” (Haslip-Viera, 2004, p. 
138). Even within El Diario La Prensa, many of the articles discussing Puerto Ricans are 
focused on matters pertaining to Puerto Rico, not on the residents in New York City. In contrast 
to the successful political fortunes of elected Puerto Rican officials at the time, the Puerto Rican 
residents of New York City in 1990 continued to suffer the ill effects of repeated economic 
downturn, the continued flight of manufacturing from New York City, and a public education 
system that in many ways failed to promote Puerto Rican student success (Nieto, 2001). 
Additionally, some scholars argue that although Puerto Rican politicians were making 
gains in the 1990s, the political progress at the community level had already stalled by the 1980s 
(Falcon, 2004, p. 97). Economic downturn in the 1980s had a harrowing effect on many of the 
non-profits that served the community, and with the ever-changing New York City 
demographics, the community being served was also changing. By 1990, although the highest 
number of Puerto Ricans to be recorded was living in Gotham, only 32.8% of all mainland 
Puerto Ricans lived in New York City (Falcon, 2004, p. 163). Puerto Ricans were settling 
elsewhere in New York State, New Jersey, Florida, Illinois, and Massachusetts (Perez y 
Gonzalez, 2000). New York City was no longer the hub of mainland Puerto Rican life, although 
the residents there continued to display similar characteristics as were seen in previous decades. 
Between 1970 and 1990, poverty rates for both the general population and the Puerto Rican 
population in New York City followed the same pattern: an increase between 1970 and 1980, 
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and a decrease between 1980 and 1990. Although slightly lower than the rate found in 1980, in 
1990 more than a third of Puerto Ricans in New York City were living in poverty. In 1990 
37.26% of Puerto Ricans were living below the poverty line, which was almost 5% higher than 
the rate found in 1970 (Cruz, 2004, p. 52). Compared to the 17.25% poverty rate found in the 
general population of New York City in 1990, the Puerto Rican experience continued to be 
disadvantaged. And with respect to unemployment, although poverty rates had slightly 
decreased, the percent of unemployed Puerto Ricans in New York City continued to rise. 
Between 1980 and 1990 the percentage of unemployed Puerto Rican men increased from 11.45% 
to 14.38%, and the percentage of unemployed women increased from 12.24% to 13.13% (Cruz, 
2004, p. 53). The unemployment rate for New Yorkers overall followed the same pattern, 
however was markedly lower, at 7.04% for men and 7.15% for women in 1980 and at 8.67% for 
men and 8.08% for women in 1990. 
Part of the problem of unemployment continued to be related to the flight of 
manufacturing firms from New York City. As Haslip-Viera (2004, p. 118) describes, “the 1989- 
1992 recession had a further devastating effect on manufacturing, reducing employment in that 
sector by an additional 100,000 jobs. Although manufacturing was no longer the leading sector 
of employment, it was a significant source of jobs. In 1990, about 15 percent of Puerto Rican 
workers were employed in manufacturing, making it the third leading sector of employment”. 
Puerto Ricans were also disproportionately concentrated in service occupations compared to the 
general New York City population. In 1990, 20.99% of the Puerto Rican labor force was 
employed in the service sector, whereas 16.12% of all New Yorkers held such positions (Cruz, 
2004, p. 62). Likewise, although Puerto Ricans had made gains in the managerial and 
professional sector of the economy, compared to the 28.8% of all local workers employed in 
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these positions, only 14.73% of employed Puerto Ricans held such jobs. The one area in which 
Puerto Rican and general local laborers converged is the technical, sales and administrative 
support. In 1990, 34.85% of New York City workers were located in these support fields, 
compared to the 36.54% of Puerto Rican workers (Cruz, 2004, p. 62). Throughout the 1990s 
there would be vast changes in local Hispanic residential patterns, but much about Puerto Rican 
living in New York City would stay the same. 
The decline in Puerto Rican media coverage came at a time when Puerto Ricans were 
making waves in politics and non-profits. Puerto Rican successes were hidden behind the guise 
of Hispanidad, and little to no effort was made to document the events. It is also possible that 
Puerto Rican politicians sought to expand their appeal, fostering a Hispanic identity. As well, 
Puerto Ricans’ depressed economic standing was quite newsworthy, albeit in a negative sense, 
and yet these statistics failed to make it in the news. I find it very difficult to believe that 
Spanish language journalists were unaware that the politicians were Puerto Rican, and so this 
failure to include ethnicity seems to be a targeted effort to enforce Hispanic reporting. 
Furthermore, I find it difficult to believe that there were not newsworthy events taking place in 
poor Puerto Rican neighborhoods, as is evident in the unemployment statistics, and so again, it 
seems to be a concerted effort to move away from Puerto Rican reporting. 
 
 




Paradoxically, despite the decline in population and media presence, local Puerto Rican 
representation persisted with the turn of the century, and even increased for Boricua women. By 
2000, Puerto Rico-born Margarita Lopez had been serving on the New York City Council 
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representing the Lower East Side for two years (Edozien, 2004), taking over the role from her 
Puerto Rican predecessor Antonio Pagan. The same year, Maria Baez was positioning herself to 
seize her district’s city council seat from the male dominated ballot in the Bronx in 2001. And 
both Puerto Rico-born Sara Gonzalez and Annabel Palma were laying the grassroots groundwork 
for their future battles for city council seats in Brooklyn and the Bronx, respectively, against 
male Puerto Rican rivals, ex-con Angel Rodriguez, and the subsequently convicted Pedro G. 
Espada, then the youngest person elected to the New York City Council at 23. 
Combined with this upswing in new female politicians were veteran political women as 
well. The first Puerto Rican woman elected to the New York Senate, Puerto Rico-born Olga 
Mendez, would remain in office for another 4 years.  The first Puerto Rican or Hispanic woman 
to serve on the New York City Council in 1983, also the first Puerto Rican elected to Congress in 
1993, Puerto Rico-born Nydia Velazquez, now served the newly named 7th Congressional 
District containing parts of Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan. And Puerto Rico-born Carmen 
Arroyo, the first Puerto Rican or Hispanic woman elected to the New York State Assembly in 
1994, retained her position representing the South Bronx. 
There was growth in Puerto Rican representation at this time for males as well, some of 
which can be attributed to familial succession. Jose M. Serrano, 28, son of long-term 
Congressman Jose E. Serrano (PR born) would soon take a seat on the New York City Council 
serving the Bronx in 2001. And at 22, Joel Rivera, would take a leave from college to fill his 
father’s place (Puerto Rico-born Jose Rivera) on the New York City Council serving the 15th 
District in the Bronx- the youngest person ever to hold a New York City Council seat. Pedro G. 
Espada was not just a successor to his politico father, Puerto Rico-born Pedro Espada, Jr., but in 
1996 had become one half of the first father and son duo to concurrently serve on the New York 
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State Legislature for two different districts in the Bronx. At age 22, he was the youngest person 
to be elected to the New York State Assembly. And in a reversal of trends, Ruben Diaz, Jr. was 
elected prior to his father, taking post on the New York State Assembly in 1997, five years 
before his father, Rev. Ruben Diaz, Sr. (PR born), at the ripe old age of 26. Also in 1997, 
Federico Perez would be elected to the New York City Council serving Mott Haven, Crotona, 
and Hunts Point in the Bronx. And in 1998, Adolfo Carrion, Jr. would start his service 
representing University Heights, Morris Heights, Kingsbridge, and Fordham in the Bronx on the 
New York City Council. 
In terms of the male veterans of the time, by 2000 Fernando Ferrer, had been serving as 
Bronx Borough President for 13 years- the second Puerto Rican to hold the post- and was 
gearing up for a mayoral run in 2001- for what would be the closest a Puerto Rican or Hispanic 
has come to becoming mayor. 
This period represents the fastest rate of growth for Puerto Rican politicians in New York 
City. Between 1990 and 2000, the number of Puerto Rican representatives grew from 16 to 26 
public servants. In comparison to earlier decades, this group included many more mainland-born 
politicians, reflective of changes in the local population. Over time, the percentage of mainland 
Puerto Ricans born on the island has decreased, as the children of migrants come of age and have 
children of their own. Additionally, the rate of migration was comparatively slower than in the 
height of the great migration, meaning that growth in the mainland-born population was 
outpacing growth in the number of island-born residents. With respect to political growth, the 
number of representatives increased at every level: New York City Council, NYS Assembly, 
NYS Senate, and Congress. Additionally, there was continued growth in the number of Puerto 
Rican politicians serving Brooklyn. 
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Puerto Ricans were not the only group to experience political growth in 2000. By this 
time Dominicans had achieved representation by way of a local elected official with the political 
“coming of age” of this population in New York City. Born in the Dominican Republic, 
Guillermo Linares, the first Dominican elected to New York City Council, and tied for first as 
the first Dominican elected official in the U.S., was in his 9th year of service. As well, in 1996, 
Adriano Espaillat, also born in the Dominican Republic, was elected to the New York State 
Assembly. Interestingly, these Dominican political newcomers followed the Puerto Rican trend 
in which im/migrants were those to be the first to enter the political scene. 
Like Puerto Ricans, Dominicans have had extremely high rates of return to their home 
island. In her work The Transnational Villagers, Peggy Levitt (2001) describes the ease of travel 
and even relocation between the Dominican Republic and the mainland, much like the case of 
Puerto Rico, despite the relevance of immigration law to Dominicans. However, even with the 
relevance of such laws, Dominicans have had some of the highest per capita rates obtaining the 
needed visas from the U.S., in the 1980s having the highest rate in the world (Grasmuck and 
Pessar, 1991). 
By 2000, as was the case in the previous decade, it seemed that at least half of the Puerto 
Rican officials elected to represent New York City at the city, state, and federal level were in fact 
born in Puerto Rico (Table 7). This train of thought leads to other fields in which Puerto Ricans 
have made waves in New York City, including academia. When considering the experts on 
Puerto Ricans in the United States, more often than not, these scholars hail from Puerto Rico. 
Arlene Davila, Juan Flores, Angelo Falcon- all born in Puerto Rico. Is there an issue of migrant 
selectivity taking place, wherein those that migrate have some attribute that has led to success in 
various fields, while those born on the mainland generally lack access to these positions?  Or are 
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Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rican truly representative of Puerto Ricans born on the mainland? 
Are we culturally assimilated or not? In essence, even the question of who represents the 
“Puerto Rican” voice needs to be asked, not just who represents the “Hispanic” voice. 
 
 




This question of mainland Puerto Rican identity is of the utmost importance to the matter 
of ethnic invisibility, as there are only two possible conclusions to be made: either Puerto Ricans 
have assimilated to become American and thus less visible as an “other”, or Puerto Ricans 
continue to maintain distinct attributes and have paradoxically become invisible. There are two 
basic questions: is there a difference between mainland born Puerto Ricans and other 
Americans?  And is there a difference between being Puerto Rican on the island and being 
Puerto Rican in New York City? 
The differences between mainland born Puerto Ricans and other Americans remain 
significant. Using IPUMS sample data (ACS) for residents in the New York-Northeastern New 
Jersey Metropolitan Region (Code- 560) from 2010, I performed tests to examine the difference 
poverty status and education (Ruggles, et al, 2015). I first recoded the data into “Puerto Rico- 
Born Puerto Ricans”, “Mainland-Born Puerto Ricans”, and “All Other Residents”, (N=158,876). 
The result show that mainland-born Puerto Ricans are about 15% more likely than all other 
residents to live at or below the poverty line, while all other residents (not Puerto Rican) in the 
area are 19% more likely to have incomes that are 300-500% higher than the poverty line. A 
Chi-Square test and an analysis of variance (ANOVA) show that these differences are 
statistically significant (p=0.000) (Figure 23).  Additionally, mainland-born Puerto Ricans are 
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21% more likely to have a high school education or less, while other residents (not Puerto Rican) 
are 19% more likely to have to have at least some college. Again, a Chi-Square test and an 
ANOVA show that these differences are statistically significant (p=0.000) (Figure 24). 
Figure 23. Differences in Education Between Mainland PR and Other Residents. 
 





Figure 24.  Difference in Poverty Between Mainland PR and Other Residents. 
 





The differences between mainland Puerto Ricans and island Puerto Ricans are also 
significant.  As can be seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 above, Puerto Ricans born in Puerto Rico 
are more likely than mainland-born Puerto Ricans to have a high school education or less, and 
more likely to live at or below the poverty line. But there are other ways that Puerto Rico-born 
Puerto Ricans and mainland-born Puerto Ricans differ as well. As Jorge Duany found (2002), 
Puerto Ricans’ racial identities are markedly different depending on whether one lives on the 
island or on the mainland. In Puerto Rico, residents overwhelmingly characterized themselves as 
being racially “white” on U.S. Census forms in 2000, whereas on the mainland, Puerto Ricans in 
large part characterized themselves as a racial “other”, neither black nor white. From 1899 on, 
over 60% of Puerto Ricans on the island have characterized themselves as white, and the 
percentage has been increasing over time. In 2000, the percentage of island-based Puerto Ricans 
deeming themselves “white” was 80%. 
This is in stark contrast to the experience on the mainland, where the percentage of 
Puerto Ricans characterizing themselves as white has continually decreased since 1960, in part 
due to changing categories provided on the Census forms. In his argument, Duany sees this 
difference as being related to the relatively fluid understanding of race in Puerto Rico, where a 
person can be any of some 19 commonly used descriptive terms for phenotypical appearance, 
and the more dichotomous black/white color line in the United States. In Puerto Rico, a mixed 
person that was not definitively white or black, but somewhere in between, could in some 
instances pass for white, but the same could not be true in the American context. As well, in 
Puerto Rico, the higher a person’s economic rank, the “whiter” a person was perceived to be. 
However, in both the island and mainland context, to be black is to be at the lower end of the 
social stratum- a fate that many Puerto Ricans have distanced themselves from. 
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Despite the overall distancing from “blackness” in the mainland context, there are 
exceptions to this rule. Puerto Ricans have had a somewhat different experience in Chicago. In 
this setting, wherein a significant number of African Americans have found economic success, 
Ana Y. Ramos-Zayas found that for many Puerto Ricans to marry an African American is to in 
fact, “marry up” (Ramos-Zayas, 2003, p. 231). Thus there are differences in experience not just 
between island and mainland Puerto Ricans, but amongst mainland Puerto Ricans depending on 
where one lives. 
Even in Puerto Rico, where it is assumed that one born there would be a true Puerto 
Rican, there have been questions about what it means to be Puerto Rican, confusing the issue of 
identity both on the island and on the mainland. In her book Sponsored Identities, Arlene Davila 
found that the Puerto Rican government played a critical role in articulating what is means to be 
culturally Puerto Rican. For example, the Puerto Rican government, in conjunction with 
corporate sponsors, promoted the symbol of the jibaro, a Puerto Rican peasant- meant to 
represent the three purportedly equal ancestral sources- the Spaniard, the African, and the Taino 
(Davila, 1997, p. 71). However, the jibaro is never portrayed as being African, but as a 
combination of Spaniard and Taino- but mostly Spaniard. Thus, like Puerto Ricans on the 
mainland, even Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico are subject to questions of cultural identity. 
 
 




Making history, in 2009 native New Yorker Sonia Sotomayor would become the third 
female and the first Puerto Rican Supreme Court Justice in the United States.  Although she was 
in service to the nation, and not New York City, she was born in the Bronx and served New York 
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City during her ascent in the U.S. legal system. With regard to political developments 
specifically in New York City, the trends in place in 2000 would not falter, and between 2000 
and 2010 a number of Puerto Rican politicians had stepped on the New York City scene. Maria 
Baez was elected to serve Fordham, Kingsbridge, and Morris Heights in the Bronx on the 14th 
New York City Council District in 2002, a post she would hold until 2009 when half Puerto 
Rican and half Dominican Fernando Cabrera would take the post. Rev. Ruben Diaz was elected 
to serve the 32nd New York State Senate District representing the South Bronx in 2002. Martin 
Malave Dilan was also elected to serve on the New York State Senate in 2002, representing the 
18th District containing Williamsburg, East New York, and Brownsville in Brooklyn. Melissa 
Mark Viverito, now City Council Speaker, would be elected to serve the 8th District containing 
East Harlem in Manhattan, and Port Morris and Mott Haven in the Bronx on the New York City 
Council in 2006. Maria Del Carmen Arroyo was elected in 2005 to serve District 17 in the 
Bronx and Annabel Palma was elected in 2003 to serve the 18th District in the Bronx. Rosie 
Mendez was elected to serve the 2nd New York City Council District containing the Lower East 
Side, the East Village, Union Square, Gramercy, Kips Bay, and Murray Hill in 2006. Erik 
Martin Dilan was elected to serve District 37 in Brooklyn in 2002.  Marcos Crespo was elected 
to office in 2009, serving Sound View, Clason Point, Longwood, and Hunts Point in the South 
Bronx and Rikers Island on the 85th New York State Assembly District.  Robert J. Rodriguez 
was elected to serve District 68 on the New York State Assembly in 2010, which straddles East 
Harlem and the Bronx. And Gustavo Rivera was elected to serve East Tremont in the Bronx on 
the New York State Senate in 2010. 
These newly minted politicians added to the number of longer standing Puerto Rican 
public servants.  Felix Ortiz continued to serve as New York State Assemblyman in Brooklyn, 
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and Jose Rivera and Carmen E. Arroyo continued to serve on the New York State Assembly in 
the Bronx. 
By 2010 many New York City Puerto Rican politicians had achieved promotions as well. 
 
Margarita Lopez would become a NYCHA board member in 2006. Adolfo Carrion, Jr. would 
complete 7 years of service as Bronx Borough President, when in 2009 Ruben Diaz Jr. would 
take the post. And Jose M. Serrano would become a New York State Senator, taking Olga 
Mendez seat in 2004 on the 28th District serving Spanish Harlem, Roosevelt Island, and parts of 
the Bronx and the Upper West Side. 
In addition to incoming Puerto Rican politicians, there was a new cohort of Dominican 
politicians as well. Brooklyn-born Diana Reyna was elected to serve the 34th District containing 
Williamsburg and Bushwick in Brooklyn and parts of Queens on the New York City Council in 
2001. After serving the 21st District containing Corona, Elmhurst, East Elmhurst, and Jackson 
Heights in Queens on the New York City Council for 6 years, Hiram Monserrate would be 
elected to the New York State Senate’s 13th District seat in 2008, until he was removed from the 
post for an assault charge in 2010. Jose Peralta was elected in 2002 to the New York State 
Assembly serving Roosevelt Ave, and in 2010 would be begin his service on the New York State 
Senate.  And long-time Assemblyman Adriano Espaillat would now serve Washington Heights 
on the New York State Senate. 
By this time, there were other Hispanic politicians on the New York City scene as well. 
 
Ecuadorian Francisco Moya was elected to serve Corona in Queens on the New York State 
Assembly in 2010. And Half Cuban Nicole Malliostakis was elected to serve Staten Island on 
the New York State Assembly in 2010. 
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There were Puerto Ricans serving other regions in New York State as well. Pete Lopez 
was elected to serve District 102 on the NYS Assembly, which includes parts of Albany County, 
Greene County, Delaware County, Ostego County, and Schoharie County in 2006. By 2010 Phil 
Ramos and Ricardo Montano were serving Suffolk County, and Mark Bonilla was serving 
Hempstead in Nassau County on Long Island. 
 
 




Another factor contributing to Puerto Rican invisibility in New York City is the spread of 
Puerto Rican people and representation in less visible cities and towns throughout the region. 
New York City was the origin and epicenter of Puerto Rican political activity, but other smaller 
locales such as Paterson and Perth Amboy would later develop political representation as well as 
the Puerto Rican population grew. While Puerto Rican representation in New York City dates 
back to the 1960s, in Northern New Jersey Puerto Rican representation started to develop in the 
late 1980s (Table 7). This timing corresponds with the dispersion of Puerto Ricans throughout 
the broader metropolitan region. 
In 1990 there were 16 Puerto Rican politicians representing New York City (Table 7). 
The majority of them were born in Puerto Rico (11), and all but two were men. Additionally, 
most represented the Bronx (9), while the rest represented Brooklyn, East Harlem, Harlem, and 
Lower Manhattan. This representation corresponded to the residential concentration of Puerto 
Ricans in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Manhattan. It also represented an increase in representation 
from the previous decade, in which only 12 Puerto Ricans politicians were serving New York 
City. 
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As Puerto Rican political representation was expanding in New York City, it was 
spreading to Northern New Jersey. By 1990, there were two Puerto Rican politicians 
representing the Garden State, in locations that also housed an increasing number of Puerto 
Ricans (Table 7). In Paterson, Jose Torres, a mainland-born Puerto Rican was serving the City 
Council and in Perth Amboy, half-Puerto Rican (half Portuguese – mainland born) Joseph Vas 
was serving as mayor. 1990 was also a key year in terms of non-Puerto Rican Latino 
representation. Bob Menendez would be the first Cuban (and first non-Puerto Rican) elected to 
serve the region. In 1990, he was serving Hudson County on the NJ State Senate. Hudson 
County is home to cities such as West New York and Union City, both of which have a large 
number of Cuban residents. At the time, Cubans represented the majority of the local Latino 
population. 
In 1990, in both New York City and New Jersey, Puerto Rican representation was located 
and expanding in places where Puerto Ricans were not faring particularly well, given the 
lackluster ability of Puerto Ricans to regain the socioeconomic ground lost in the 1960s and 
1970s (Table 1- Passaic County; Table 7). Both Paterson and Perth Amboy would suffer the 
effects of the flight of industry from the region.  This combined with the flight of the middle 
class would lead to a similar (albeit on a smaller scale) experience of urban blight (James, 1989; 
Cheslow, 2001). 
The trend of increased Puerto Rican and Latino representation would continue into 2000, 
and accelerate. In New York City, the number of Puerto Rican representatives would increase 
from 16 to 25, and the number of other Latino politicians would rise as well (Table 7). By 2000, 
New York City would have its first Dominican elected official serving Upper Manhattan on the 
New York City Council, and its second Dominican elected official serving Upper Manhattan on 
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the NY State Assembly. Dominicans were also making waves outside of New York City. In 
2000, Vivan Viloria-Fisher (born in the Dominican Republic) was serving as County Legislator 
in the Town of Brookhaven (District 5). She would not be the only Latino to serve Long Island, 
as Anthony Jimenez (unidentified origin) of Glen Cove would serve on the City Council. The 
case of Brookhaven is interesting, as the proportion of Latinos there was, and is, quite small 
(about 6% of the Town’s population). Glen Cove, however, was much more Latino. In 2000, 
Latinos made up about 20% of the population. In this case, the presence of a Latino elected 
official is much more clearly linked to growth in the local Latino population. 
Latinos were making waves in New Jersey as well. The number of Puerto Rican 
representatives serving the Garden State would double (Table 7). In 2000, in addition to Jose 
Torres and Joseph Vas, Puerto Rico-born Samuel Rivera and Luis Quintana would join their 
ranks. Samuel Rivera was serving Passaic as Mayor and Luis Quintana was serving on the City 
Council in Newark. Cubans were making gains as well. Bob Menendez would make the jump 
from NJ State Senate to U.S. Congress, Albio Sires would be elected as Mayor of West New 
York, and Silverio Vega and Rudy Garcia would serve Hudson County on the New Jersey 
General Assembly. Interestingly, all but Bob Menendez were born in Cuba. Additionally, while 
Cubans remained a significant presence in West New York and Union City, their share of the 
local Latino population was quickly shrinking as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and Mexicans 
moved in. In this case, the proliferation of Cuban elected officials coincided with a decrease in 
the local Cuban population. Generally, Cubans tend to fare better than other Latino populations 
with respect to socioeconomic status. Furthermore, higher socioeconomic status is associated 
with greater political participation. In this case, perhaps the increased Cuban representation is a 
function of their high socioeconomic status. 
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Other Latinos would appear on the NJ political scene in 2000 as well. Al Santos, born in 
Venezuela, would be elected Mayor of Kearney. Another Latino, Anthony Suarez (unidentified 
origin) would be elected to serve Ridgefield in Bergen County on the City Council (Table 7). 
What is interesting about Kearney is that while the local Latino population was indeed 
increasing, the Venezuelan population was incredibly small. By 2010, the Census counted only 
104 Venezuelans living in Kearney. In this case, a Latino representative is indicative of growth 
in the Latino population, but not of Mayor Santos’ own ethnicity. In Ridgefield, Councilman 
Suarez’ 2000 election was also indicative of growth in the local Latino population - but because 
of his ambiguous ethnic identity it is unclear if his election is due to the higher socioeconomic 
status of local Cubans, or the influx of other Latinos such as Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and 
Mexicans. 
By 2010, Latino representation throughout the region would become much more diverse. 
In New York City, the number of Puerto Rican representatives would remain pretty much stable, 
while the number of other Latino politicians grew rapidly. In 2010 there were 25 Puerto Rican 
representatives, continuing to serve neighborhoods that maintained a concentration of Puerto 
Rican residents (namely in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and East Harlem/Lower Manhattan) (Table 7). 
The stability of Puerto Rican representation makes sense in that the local Puerto Rican 
population was not expanding, but rather retracting. In contrast, by that time, the number of 
Dominican representatives had quadrupled.  In 2010 there were 8 Dominicans serving on the 
New York City Council, the NY State Assembly, and the NY State Senate. While much smaller 
in number than the Puerto Rican representatives, interestingly, Dominican politicians served a 
larger number of boroughs than Puerto Ricans – all but Staten Island.  The districts they served 
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all experienced growth in the local Dominican population, and thus the increased representation 
is indicative of demographic growth. 
Other Latino representatives would come to join their ranks in New York City in 2010 as 
well. Francisco Moya, the first Ecuadorian elected official in the U.S., would serve Corona, 
Queens on the New York City Council. Additionally, half-Cuban Nicole Malliostakis (half- 
Greek) would be the first Latino elected to serve Staten Island on the NY State Assembly. 
Outside of New York City, the number of Latino representatives would almost triple 
between 2000 and 2010.  The number of Puerto Rican elected officials in New Jersey grew from 
4 to 10 representatives, and by 2010 there were three Puerto Rican representatives serving Long 
Island (Table 7).  These representatives served on the NY State Assembly, the NJ State 
Assembly, the NJ General Assembly, as NJ Freeholder, as NY Town Clerk, as NY County 
Legislator, on NJ City Councils, and as NJ Mayors. The locations they served throughout Essex, 
Hudson, Union and Middlesex Counties in New Jersey were indicative of growth in the local 
Puerto Rican population, as well as the local Latino population.  The same applies to Long 
Island, where the increase in the number of Puerto Rican residents is associated with an increase 
in political representation. 
By 2010 the number of Cuban politicians outside of New York City had grown as well. 
 
In New Jersey the number of Cuban representatives had doubled from 4 to 8 civil servants, 
predominantly serving Hudson and Bergen Counties (Table 7). This trend towards expanded 
Cuban representation remains interesting given the continued decrease in the number of local 
Cuban residents, and the fact that Cubans represented a decreasing proportion of the local Latino 
population. Again, it seems as though Cubans’ increased political representation seems to be a 
function of their higher socioeconomic status, and thus greater civic participation.  It could also 
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be a function of the timing of Cuban migration to the region, in that Cubans have a much longer 
history in Hudson County, in particular. By 2010 Cubans were also representing parts of Long 
Island. Cuban-born Jorge Martinez would represent Freeport as Town Trustee, and David 
Mejias would represent the 14th District in Nassau County as County Legislature. 
The number of Dominican representatives outside of New York City would rise as well. 
In 2010 there were five Dominicans serving New Jersey and Long Island. As in New York City, 
Dominican politicians served at a variety of levels, however in New Jersey, a Dominican official 
was elected Mayor (Table 7). Alex Blanco, born in the Dominican Republic, was serving as the 
Mayor of Passaic in 2010. Other Dominican representatives served as NJ Freeholder, on NJ City 
Council, on a Village Board of Trustees, and as County Legislator. The expansion of Dominican 
political representation outside of New York City, just as in the case of Puerto Ricans, is 
connected to demographic growth. 
The growth of other Latino populations, such as Mexicans, would be slower to produce 
political representation. In 2010 there were no elected Mexican representatives in New York 
City, where most of the local population was concentrated. Interestingly, a Mexican woman, 
Maria-Christina Poons (born in Mexico), would be elected to serve on the Town Council in 
North Hempstead in Long Island (Table 7). In 2010, Hispanics made up 12% of the total 
population and Mexicans made up 9% of the local Hispanic population (1% of the total 
population). So, in this case, the appearance of a Mexican representative in this location is a bit 
of an enigma. As for the lack of Mexican representation in places with a large number of 
Mexican residents, such as Queens and the Bronx, this is likely due to issues of documentation 
and residency (Bergad, 2011). Mexicans are more likely to be undocumented when compared to 
other Latino populations, and more likely not to regulate their status (when compared to say, 
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Dominicans). In 2010 Laird Bergad found that 51% of Mexicans in New York City were not 
citizens (Bergad, 2011). In the case of lacking citizenship, voting would be an impossibility, 
making representation more difficult to attain. 
The distinctiveness of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Dominicans in relation to U.S. 
citizenship is important. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens by birth, which lends itself to a certain 
privilege with respect to electoral politics. But Cubans also maintain a certain privilege as 
refugees. All immigrants that are recognized as refugees by the federal government can become 
naturalized after living in the U.S. for five years.  Thus, there is only a slight delay with respect 
to gaining entrance to the realm of politics. Cubans are also the most highly educated Hispanic 
subgroup, which also lends itself to political privilege. Dominicans, while they do not maintain 
either of the above privileges, U.S. policies aimed at relieving political tensions in the 
Dominican Republic contributed to Dominicans receiving the highest number of visas per capita 
in the world in the 1980s. While there may be a number of undocumented Dominicans, 
Grasmuck and Pessar observed that this to be a temporary issue in New York City, in that many 
Dominicans have little trouble in regulating their status (1991). In this sense the path to 
citizenship, and thus electoral politics, is much more linear for local Dominicans, when 
compared to say, local Mexicans. 
 
 




The spread of Latino representation throughout New York City and the surrounding 
regions is incredibly important to the matter of Puerto Rican invisibility. By 2010, Latino 
representatives would be equally spread throughout New York City and the surrounding region. 
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There were 35 Latino representatives serving New York City and 35 Latino representatives 
serving suburban NY and NJ. In New York City, Latino representatives remain concentrated in 
regions where Latinos experience socioeconomic disadvantage. However, in the surrounding 
regions of New York and New Jersey, the representation is more split between areas where 
Latinos do fairly well, and where they do not. In both cases, these cities and towns outside of 
New York City are much smaller in size and thus have much lower public profiles than places 
like the Bronx and Brooklyn. This lower profile thus means nearly nonexistent public visibility. 
For one thing, news reports on Latino representatives outside of New York City are extremely 
difficult to locate. This then means that there is a lacking documentation of the history of Latino 
representatives in the region. If there are no reports on local Latino representatives, how would 
anyone outside of a given town know they exist? 
In addition to the inherently lower profile of the smaller towns and cities outside of New 
York City, the decreasing share of Puerto Rican representatives also contributes to Puerto Rican 
invisibility. In New York City, the number and share of Puerto Rican politicians decreased from 
26/28 in 2000, to 25/35 in 2010. Outside of New York City, the number of Puerto Rican 
politicians grew substantially, however, their share decreased from 2/3 in 2000, to 13/35 in 2010. 
The dispersion of Puerto Rican politicians amongst others also serves to obscure the public 
presence of Puerto Ricans. Not only do the politicians themselves increasingly ascribe to 
Hispanic political ideology, but with the changing political landscape local political reporters are 
also increasingly utilizing panethnic terminology as the representatives become more diverse. 
While representation is, of course, important for other Latino populations as the fabric of greater 
New York City changes, this does not change the fact that Puerto Ricans in New York City – 
where they have the largest number of representatives and the most concentrated representation – 
171	 
generally remain the poorest performing Latino subgroup in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and 
Manhattan. Thus both demographic and political dispersion are contributing to their decreasing 
visibility.  Even with the largest proportion of the local Latino population - even with the 
increase in the number of representatives throughout the region - Puerto Ricans have become the 
invisible poor in New York City. 
 
 




Along with influx of other Hispanic subgroups, Puerto Rican politicians were 
encountering another form of change in New York City- gentrification. Previously racially and 
ethnically segregated, historically Puerto Rican and black neighborhoods were now considered a 
desirable residential location for what Puerto Ricans have termed “yuppies”- a relatively wealthy 
cohort of young people seeking to make their homes in close proximity to a considerably poorer 
population. One example is the gentrification of the Lower East Side, wherein the ownership of 
the local community gardens was contested (Martinez, 2010).  Before the influx of a largely 
white and affluent population, in the 1970s the Lower East Side was considered to be a site of 
urban decay, inhabited in large part by Puerto Ricans and African Americans. In an effort to 
revitalize the neighborhood, local Puerto Ricans took a number of measures including the 
creation of community gardens. However, despite the battles that local Puerto Ricans took on to 
create and maintain these spaces, even when achieving the support of the white gentrifying class, 
they ended up losing control of them. As Martinez describes, “Their experience of attempting to 
share gardens with whites had taught them that improving a garden was, perforce, to whiten it” 
(Martinez, 2010, p. 106). 
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While race plays a role in the gentrification of some neighborhoods, there are instances 
where race is not a factor. In Harlem, for example, historically an African American community, 
many of the affluent newcomers were also African American (Taylor, 2002).  Like the Lower 
East Side, in earlier decades Harlem was considered a site of urban decay. Dilapidated and 
abandoned, the African American gentry had fled the neighborhood, although the cultural 
significance of Harlem remained. This rich cultural history was a draw for a new cohort of 
upwardly mobile African Americans, a phenomenon that many of the lifelong residents had 
hoped for. However, despite the similarity in race, the class-based differences, and thus the 
cultural capital differences between the poorer lengthy community and the incoming middle 
class proved to be quite divisive. As Taylor describes, “The absolute authority they exercise as 
private home owners gives way to a series of negotiations with others in the public spaces they 
share.  In the outdoors, different battles and new forms of resistance emerge” (Taylor, 2002, p. 
120). 
 
The manifestation of gentrification in Spanish Harlem has been similar. As documented 
in Ed Morales’ film “Whose Barrio”, a Hispanic gentrifier living in a newly developed condo 
building complains about the goings-on outside of his building. However, there is another side 
to this gentrification. Not only should these wealthier residents be considered agents of 
neighborhood change, but also the less financially stable cohort of students and teachers. This 
educated class of young people occupy a different although similar position. A 23 year old 
Mexican-American from Chicago, “Jaime” joined Teach for America and moved to New York 
City. She was assigned to teach at a school in the Bronx, and made her home with three 
roommates in Spanish Harlem, or as she called it “SpaHa”. Although by no means upper, or 
even really middle class, she still represented another form of “outsider”, one with a taste for 
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oysters that she picked up in college. Her tastes, or her cultural capital, most definitely set her 
apart from the local resident population. Thus, there is economic diversity even within what is 
considered to be the gentrifying class, however cultural capital often ties them together. 
Not to be ignored is the role of city government in the increasingly gentrified New York 
City. Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) have sprung up in both Harlem and the Lower East 
Side, among other neighborhoods, meant to enhance the neighborhood by way of enhancing 
businesses in the area. The effects of these districts varies, however the assumption is that the 
neighborhood businesses are in need of improvement, and it is the city government and those on 
the boards of these organizations that determine what “improvement” means (New York City 
Small Business Services, 2016). While the spaces that BIDs oversee are public, they are 
essentially privately managed by commercial property managers (Zukin, 2009). Oftentimes, 
what BIDs do is clean up the “unsavory” elements of a neighborhood to make neighborhoods 
appealing to customers and residents of means. In order to make these neighborhoods a 
destination, the homeless people must be relocated, crime must go down, and graffiti and litter 
must be cleaned up.  These changes are generally well received by people who use the spaces, 
but what does it mean for the local Puerto Rican population when the Lower East Side BID has 
no Puerto Rican representation (Lower East Side Partnership, 2017)? Here is where the 
complicated nature of public spaces with private management becomes a problem. 
 
 




In addition to the political changes and broader demographic changes, the Puerto Rican 
population in the New York City metropolitan region was changing.  Upwardly mobile Puerto 
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Ricans were moving outside of New York City to nearby wealthier counties such as Bergen 
County in New Jersey, Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island, and Westchester County, 
right next to the Bronx. Each of these counties experienced a net gain in Puerto Ricans residents 
between 1980 and 2010, and the lowest median income for Puerto Ricans in any of these four 
counties was $43,600 (Table 4). Although this figure is less than the median Puerto Rican 
income found in Staten Island, it is much larger than any found in the other boroughs with the 
exception of Queens. 
Also notable at this time, was the quickly accelerated movement from the island to the 
mainland. Between 2000 and 2010 more than 300,000 Puerto Ricans fled the island’s suffering 
economy- a rate of migration not seen since the Great Migration between 1950 and 1960, 
wherein 470,000 Puerto Ricans left Puerto Rico in large part for New York City (Rivera-Batiz, 
2004, p. 109; Cohn et al, 2014). But in 2000 and 2010, other cities have emerged as being 
heavily Puerto Rican. In 2000 Hartford, Connecticut had the largest per capita Puerto Rican 
population outside of Puerto Rico, whereas in 2010, Holyoke Massachusetts was the site of 
concentrated mainland Puerto Rican-ness. No longer the divided nation, there are one million 
more Puerto Ricans living on the mainland than on Puerto Rico, and concentrating in smaller 
U.S. municipalities. 
 
The story of mainland Puerto Ricans is no longer a New York City tale.  Also, the story 
of mainland Puerto Ricans is increasingly diverse. There is a small but growing population of 
Puerto Ricans who have “made it”, socioeconomically speaking. This dispersion and mobility 
have inherently helped to remove the Puerto Rican population from policy discussions, as once 
Puerto Ricans were said to be leaving New York City, New York City media and politics further 
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abandoned the Puerto Rican population. In this sense, recent demographic shifts in connection 







Local media, changes in Hispanic demography, gentrification, and changes in the local 
political terrain have all served to remove Puerto Ricans from public view. The media’s failure 
to report the ethnicity of Puerto Rican politicians has all but removed Puerto Rican issues and 
Puerto Rican actors from the mind of New Yorkers. The influx of new Spanish-speaking 
immigrants means that Puerto Rican districts are increasingly becoming immigrant (please 
remember Puerto Ricans are not immigrants, and thus do not face immigrant issues) districts. 
And the influx of hipsters into Puerto Rican neighborhoods means that Puerto Rican districts are 
also increasingly becoming hipster districts, where food to feed your family becomes 
unaffordable cuisine. The confluence of these trends means that flourishing Puerto Rican 
politicians and Puerto Rican political history are muted, and issues and concerns important to the 
Puerto Rican community are not on the table. 
The increasing lack of ethnic reporting beginning in the 1980s has served to scrub Puerto 
Rican politics from New York City history.  The number of Puerto Rican politicians in New 
York City more than doubled between 1980 (12) and 2000 (26), and yet there is currently no 
other existing documentation of this growth aside from this dissertation (Table 7). Additionally, 
there is no other existing documentation of the growth of Puerto Rican and other Hispanic 
politicians in the counties surrounding New York City.  As a consequence, scholarly literature, 
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historical records, and journalism offer no trace of the path that Puerto Rican politicians have 
paved in the New York City metropolitan region. 
Changes in local Hispanic demography have also helped to remove Puerto Ricans from 
public view.  The rapid influx of Dominicans and Mexicans to New York City combined with 
the flight of Puerto Ricans to surrounding counties means that Puerto Ricans make up a much 
smaller share of the local Hispanic population. Not only do Puerto Ricans make up a smaller 
share of the Hispanic population, but with the influx of hipsters, Puerto Ricans make up a smaller 
share of the residential population in historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods – the same 
neighborhoods that Puerto Rican politicians serve. As such, Puerto Ricans are just one of many 
different constituent groups that Puerto Rican politicians must cater to. Puerto Rican politicians 
no longer serve exclusively Puerto Rican districts, and so do not focus on Puerto Rican issues. 
In addition to demographic changes, Puerto Rican politicians must grapple with a 
changing political terrain. Coalition building a primary tool in the political process, as evidenced 
by the many coalition groups within the New York City Council, the New York State Assembly, 
and the New York Senate. While this may be an effective form of leverage, coalitions operate at 
the panethnic/panracial level as opposed to an ethnic level, and so inherently serve to minimize 
ethnic distinctiveness. This tool, much like Hispanic reporting, helps to render Puerto Ricans 
invisible in local politics. 
The rise of Puerto Rican politicians was ignored by New York City media. The omission 
(I wanted to say whitewashing – more on this in the next chapter ) of Puerto Rican political 
history is just one way that Puerto Ricans have been made invisible. The media’s focus on the 
panethnic conglomerate, demographic shifts, and changes in local politics, have all contributed 
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to Puerto Rican invisibility in New York City. The next chapter will discuss how the actions of 
individual Puerto Rican politician shaped Puerto Rican invisibility. 
178	 
Chapter 5. Politics II: Puerto Rican Politicians with Hispanic Voices in 2013 
 
 
The rapid ascent of Puerto Rican politicians at the turn of the 21st century was not 
documented, and thus remains an ignored aspect of New York City politics. While the bulk of 
Puerto Rican migration to New York City took place between 1940 and 1960, Puerto Ricans 
would not make significant gains in local politics until about 40 years later. The early Puerto 
Rican politicians laid the groundwork starting in the 1960s and 1970s, but with the onset of 
“Hispanic” politics, later Puerto Rican politicians evolved their platforms and public identities to 
cater to an ever-changing constituent base. These newer Puerto Rican politicians could not rely 
on machine politics as their Irish predecessors could (Erie, 1990). Instead, the new wave of 
Puerto Rican politicians have entered public service in a much more bureaucratic, and 
substantially less ethnic, political field. 
Notwithstanding the altered political terrain, the Puerto Rican politicians of 2013 have 
played a key role in the public invisibility of Puerto Ricans. It would seem as though Puerto 
Rican politicians, just by their existence, would equate with a visible Puerto Rican presence. 
However, when their platforms prioritize issues that are of little concern to Puerto Ricans (such 
as immigration), and their public identities are Hispanic, they, too, contribute to Puerto Rican 
invisibility. This is important, because the public sector is one of the main avenues through 
which Puerto Ricans have attained socioeconomic mobility (Logan, Alba, and Stultz, 2003), and 
politics is one of the main ways through which Puerto Ricans obtained a public identity. By 
minimizing their Puerto Rican identities and promoting their Hispanic identities, Puerto Rican 
politicians, as public figures, are contributing to Puerto Rican invisibility. 
Most Hispanic elected officials that serve New York City today are Puerto Rican (70%) 
(Table 7).  These politicians serve at an array of levels, from Community Boards to Congress. 
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For the most part, in the press and public domain, they are identified as Hispanic.  They are 
intent on promoting the linkages between Hispanic ethnic groups, and hesitate to acknowledge 
conflict. Between December 2012 and September 2013, I wrote and called local political offices 
with the hope of speaking with local politicians about the decreasing public attention paid to 
Puerto Ricans.  I made clear that my purpose was to include any information in my dissertation. 
I managed to speak with one elected politician directly, and a number of Community Board 
members, however, for the rest of the political offices, I spoke with Deputy Chiefs of Staff, 
Assistant Directors of Communications, among other staffers. While I cannot confirm this, it is 
my belief that all of these conversations with staff members were endorsed by the politicians 
themselves, otherwise, I would not have gained access at all. 
On an ethical note, I took great pains to ensure that I did not misinterpret or erroneously 
record any information. I took copious notes for all conversations, and subsequently submitted 
my notes to each respondent. I asked each respondent to review my notes, and to submit any 
requested changes, as it was my intention to portray their words and perspectives accurately in 
my work. I made all changes requested by the respondents, however, there were not many 
changes to make. In a further effort to protect my respondents, no identifying information is 
provided. 
Through my interactions with local political offices I learned of several important trends. 
First, the number of Puerto Rican voters is paltry. Second, gentrification plays a significant role 
in historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods. Third, there is little agreement amongst the various 
political offices about the main issues facing such neighborhoods. And finally, Puerto Rican 
politicians do not seem to be terribly interested in their Puerto Rican constituents anymore. 
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Are They Puerto Rican? 
In 2013, although some of the Hispanic City Council members were term-limited, and 
thus had a clear expiration date, the majority of these politicians were at least part Puerto Rican 
(Falcon, 2012). However, to the public, they were all Hispanic. In fact, identifying the specific 
ethnic background of many of the newer local representatives became quite difficult as their 
government websites list them as being Hispanic as opposed to including any specific ethnic 
information. For example, New York State Assemblyman Luis Sepulveda’s ethnic information 
is not included on his website, or even in most of the articles found when searching for “Luis 
Sepulveda” and “Puerto Rican”- the hits provided reference his membership in the Black, 
Hispanic, and Asian Caucus. Ironically, the New York Times, whose coverage of Puerto Ricans 
had drastically declined, included Mr. Sepulveda’s ethnicity in reference to his race against a 
fellow Puerto Rican, Peter Rivera in the Bronx (Dolnick, August 18, 2010). 
This trend is not an isolated event. In fact, for most local Puerto Rican politicians, there 
is no reference to ethnicity within their government website biographies. Instead, references are 
made to their identity as New York City residents, their experiences with poverty and 
disadvantage, and their grassroots community organizing efforts. If it were advantageous to list 
their ethnicity, it is likely they would.  However, they don’t. 
For those few that do list their Puerto Rican identity, it is framed from an immigrant 
perspective. In fact, in one bio, there is reference to “1st generation Puerto Rican immigrant” 
parents. While there are a lot of similarities between the Puerto Rican migrant experience and 
the immigrant experience, there is one small catch: Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens by birth. 
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To be Puerto Rican seems to only be politically advantageous if one can link this 
experience with the broader immigrant experience. To be a mainland born Puerto Rican is not 
something to brag about, at least not politically. As such, most Puerto Rican politicians are not 
including this information in their public profiles, and thus minimizing their public Puerto Rican 
identity. In doing so, however, they are not just minimizing their own ethnic identity, but also 
that of the broader Puerto Rican population. Up until the 1990s and early 2000s, Puerto Rican 
politicians were loudly and proudly Puerto Rican. While this did not necessarily equate with 
Puerto Rican political power, this did equate with a public Puerto Rican presence. Ironically, at 
this phase an increase in Puerto Rican politicians is now associated with a decrease in the 
visibility of Puerto Rican New Yorkers. 
 
 
Mainland Puerto Ricans Don’t Vote 
 
 
Puerto Ricans on the mainland have considerably lower voter turnout than Puerto Ricans 
in Puerto Rico. This conundrum was investigated in the 1980s by political scientist Angelo 
Falcon and, despite the continued trend, has been abandoned as a source of public concern. As a 
local politician recounted, less than 10% of constituents in the low-income communities of East 
Harlem voted in the primaries. This assertion was echoed by other local politicos.  In 
Washington Heights, a City Council member was voted in with only 17,000 votes.  Similar, if 
not more severe, statistics can be found in the Bronx as well, and the trend is not a new one. 
In 2004, only 5,167 of 53,521 registered Democrats voted in the Democratic primary for 
the 76th Assembly District in the Bronx. This particular district contains historically Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods such as East Tremont.  Even in 2010, with the influx of newcomers to the 
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area, such as Bangladeshis, Puerto Ricans represent about 30% of this particular district’s 
population.  When looking at the City Council district races, the same pattern emerges.  The 
2013 races throughout the Bronx City Council districts were won with an average of 12,700 
votes (NYT 2013 Election Results). The Bronx also happens to be the most Puerto Rican 
borough in New York City (percentage-wise). While voting data do not include specific ethnic 
origin, it would be logical to surmise that Puerto Rican voter turnout is lackluster to say the least. 
The lack of Puerto Rican voter turnout is one potential motivation for Puerto Rican politicians to 
embrace a broader panethnic identity in place of their Puerto Rican identity. 
Despite the ongoing difficulty in engaging voters in low-income districts that contain 
Puerto Ricans, Puerto Rican politicians have managed to maintain a seat at the political table. In 
fact, low-income neighborhoods are not alone when it comes to poor voter turnout. The highest 
voter turnout in the 2013 City Council races took place on the Upper West Side in District 6, 
wherein the winner took 28,137 votes, however, this event was the exception to the rule (NYT 
2013 Election Results). Voting patterns in most of the other districts mirror those in the Bronx. 
The stakes just happen to be higher in low-income neighborhoods, where the arm of public 
policy has a much greater reach.  For example, cutbacks within government-funded programs 
can cause considerable harm to low-income households. However, the nature of low-income 
neighborhoods in New York City is undergoing significant change. 
 
 




In earlier decades, spatial segregation (along with racial segregation) was one of the 
primary markers of the low-income neighborhood in New York City.  The quality of apartment 
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buildings, schools, and homes were poor, and thus were not desirable locations for middle or 
upper class residents. However, with ever-rising rents throughout New York City, a decrease in 
violent crime, the changing immigrant population, and the advent of the hipster, places like East 
Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant are becoming increasingly gentrified. In fact, most of the 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods are gentrifying, with the exception of East Tremont. 
Even the South Bronx is gentrifying to some extent (Small, 2016). 
 
Some of the more easily identifiable gentrified neighborhoods include Williamsburg, 
Brooklyn, and the Lower East Side of Manhattan – both of which happen to be historically 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods. The Lower East Side (LES), in particular, has been the subject of 
controversy, given the fast pace of gentrification and the subsequent effects on long-term 
residents. As one local politician’s office noted, local public schools are actually too good. This 
unusual problem has created a situation wherein out–of-district parents are managing to enroll 
their children in LES schools, leaving local children without seats. Additionally, long-time 
residents are being pushed out by skyrocketing rents, a dire situation for all, but especially for the 
senior population. 
There is, however, one population that is not subject to the ever-rising rental prices: the 
residents of local housing projects. While rent-controlled and rent-stabilized units are dispersed 
throughout the city’s rental units, housing projects create a scenario where there is low-income 
resident density and stability. This has created a unique situation on the LES wherein low- 
income residents live side by side with high-income residents, and the low-income residents 
cannot be pushed out. This does not mean that there are not negative consequences for low- 
income residents of the projects.  Rather, it means being able to afford an apartment, but little 
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else in the neighborhood. Food banks and churches offer some reprieve, but many local 
residents cannot afford to eat in the LES. 
While local politicians have pointed to the ways in which gentrification poses a threat to 
vulnerable constituents, the politicians represent both the vulnerable and the affluent; and there is 
a level of resignation about the economic and social forces at play. One local politician’s office 
addressed how Mayor Bloomberg’s policies accelerated gentrification and were to blame for 
increasing luxury development in the area, however, once in place, it is difficult to replace luxury 
housing. Furthermore, there are complications in how the issue of gentrification is posed. The 
historical process of demographic change on the Lower East Side is complex, however, the way 
that issues are posed promote a very simplified framing of the problem of gentrification. 
Gentrification is largely framed as a threat to “long-time” and “middle class” residents on 
 
the LES.  There is an entire book on the topic: Priced Out: Stuyvesant Town and the Loss of 
 
Middle-Class Neighborhoods (Woldoff, Morrison, and Glass, 2016).  The LES, however, has 
 
historically been home not just to low-income residents but also slums.  Jacob Riis’ seminal 
 
work, How The Other Half Lives (1890), details the dangerous conditions within the slums of 
 
the Lower East Side of New York City in the late 1800s. At that time the region was home to 
predominantly Jewish, Chinese, Irish, Italian, German and Czech immigrants. There are efforts 
to preserve this past by way of institutions such as the Tenement Museum, however, these 
historical efforts bypass the preservation of a later wave of poverty and social neglect.  The 
1970s brought a more modern form of economic turmoil, and with it, a new age of urban blight. 
However, this newer poverty was not the immigrant poverty of previous generations, but the 
poverty of second and third generation New Yorkers.  Furthermore, government social programs 
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were available in this post-Depression era, programs that were increasingly associated with 
blacks and Puerto Ricans on the LES. 
Blacks and Puerto Ricans on the Lower East Side had one benefit that their tenement 
antecedents did not: government housing. Originally meant for middle class whites, both blacks 
and Puerto Ricans have reaped the benefits of housing stability, albeit with the perils of poverty 
(Rothstein, 2012; Caro, 2014). In fact, this stability means that many of the inhabitants from the 
1970s and 1980s remain in local government housing to this day (interviews conducted in 2013). 
Somehow, however, the Puerto Rican past, as well as the Puerto Rican present, have been 
obscured. While the Nuyorican Poets’ Café still stands, those within are no longer Puerto Rican, 
they are African American (interview with General Manager). Additionally, the Rafael 
Hernandez public housing buildings on Allen Street pay homage to the famous Puerto Rican 
composer and yet this name (and the building’s inhabitants) is largely ignored by newcomers to 
the area (interviews conducted in 2013). 
Not only do Puerto Ricans remain on the LES, but Puerto Ricans remain poor on the 
Lower East Side. In the Census tracts that contain public housing projects on the LES, the 
median income of Puerto Ricans is quite low. In one such Census tract, Puerto Ricans’ median 
income was just $11,995. While housing remains affordable through the New York City 
Housing Authority (NYCHA), other amenities in the area do not. When speaking with a local 
resident, the cost of food was brought to the forefront. Low-income residents who have 
government housing benefits likely also have Supplementary Nutrition Assistant Program 
(SNAP) benefits, and being able to make those benefits last through the month on the LES is 
pretty much impossible.  As such, churches and food banks must fill the gap. 
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One would think that Puerto Rican political representation in historically Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods would mean increased attention paid to Puerto Ricans, but it doesn’t. Instead, 
Puerto Rican politicians largely frame issues so as to valorize the middle and working classes, 
and to avoid those entrenched in long-term poverty. For example, a recent news report about a 
local politician detailed her concern for her working class constituents in East Harlem in the face 
of potential new housing developments (Jorgensen, 2016).  East Harlem is one of the most 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods in the region (percentage-wise, and with respect to the continued 
presence of a small Puerto Rican commercial base), and yet the article makes absolutely no 
mention of Puerto Rican residents (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census, Summary File 1). The 
article also makes no mention of long-term poverty, which many of her Puerto Rican 
constituents face.  Rather the issue is framed exclusively as a “working class” worry, and it just 
so happens that many Puerto Ricans are not working class. Labor force participation is lower for 
Puerto Ricans than for Blacks/African Americans, Dominicans, Mexicans, and Hispanics overall, 
hovering at about 50% (Table 13).  This particular politician is not alone, as nearly each and 
every respondent framed constituent issues in terms of “working” people, “middle-class” people, 
and the like (Interviews conducted in 2013).  One Bronx-based politician’s office did reference 
the working class history of Puerto Ricans, but did not address the present economic status of 
Puerto Rican constituents. 
Valorizing the presence of middle and working class residents itself is not such a bad 
idea – in theory. For years, sociologists have lamented the continued segregation of the whites 
from non-whites, a phenomenon related to class – and the unsuccessful efforts towards 
integration. Well, the Lower East Side is technically integrated. It includes blacks, whites, 
Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, South Americans, Chinese, among others.  It also includes the very 
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wealthy, and the very poor. Luxury high rises are located right next door to the projects, and yet 
it is not true integration. There is an invisible barrier between affluent spaces and poor spaces in 
the neighborhood, and an understanding that the spaces are separate and unequal. Even in the 
few efforts that have been specifically made to create community spaces have resulted in a 
fracture between whites and Puerto Ricans in the neighborhood (Martinez, 2010). 
Much like the long Puerto Rican resident history, the LES also has a long history of 
Puerto Rican political representation. The first Puerto Rican to represent the neighborhood was 
City Councilman Antonio Pagan, who took office in 1992. Pagan was succeeded by another 
Puerto Rican, Margarita Lopez who would later become a board member for the New York City 
Housing Authority. Ms. Lopez was then succeeded by yet another Puerto Rican, Rosie Mendez, 
who continues to hold the office today.  That means that for the past 24 years, Puerto Ricans 
have been representing the Lower East Side in the New York City Council. Puerto Ricans have 
also been representing the Lower East Side for the past 24 years in the House of Representatives. 
In 1992, Puerto Rico-born Nydia Velazquez was elected to the post. This history of ethnic 
representation is much like that in other historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods. However, the 
same trend towards ignoring the Puerto Rican population is similar as well. Williamsburg, 
Brooklyn represents a site of similar Puerto Rican history, Puerto Rican representation, and 
gentrification. And even other neighborhoods that have experienced more moderate 
gentrification display a similarly blind eye towards their Puerto Rican residents. The only 
reference that any of the political respondents made to Puerto Ricans (without prompting) was in 
reference to the Puerto Rican past. Instead the focus was largely placed on newcomers such as 
Mexicans, Dominicans, Nigerians, Chinese and other newer immigrant residents in historically 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods.  Perhaps the avoidance of Puerto Rican poverty is a means of self- 
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preservation, in that admitting that the problem persists despite the politicians’ presence would 
be damaging to their political career. 
Puerto Rican Politicians Rarely Agree 
On top of politicians’ wariness surrounding the Puerto Rican communities throughout 
New York City, they rarely agree on the top issues facing their constituents. When asking each 
of the different political levels representing each historically Puerto Rican neighborhood 
(Community District, City Council, Borough President, State Assembly/Senate, U.S. Congress), 
there was no agreement with respect to the top issues facing historically Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods. While there are undoubtedly different responsibilities at the varying levels of 
government, it seems odd that there would be absolutely no agreement about the most important 
issues facing a given community. 
East Tremont in the Bronx offers one example of disagreement between the various 
levels of political representation. One political office indicated that gangs were a tremendous 
problem, and that an influx of international gang ties had contributed to such a dire situation that 
New York City had labeled the area an “Impact Zone”. Such “Impact Zones” are areas in which 
the police must provide extra support to combat the problem. In contrast, another political office 
pointed to the improvements made all around in terms of the creation of jobs, the reduction in 
food desert conditions, and the gain in working and middle class residents. 
Spanish Harlem in Manhattan also provides an example of political disagreement. In one 
political office, it was argued that crime was down, and that affordable housing was the most 
pressing issue.  However, another office indicated that turf wars were an issue amongst young 
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residents in the housing projects. For this reason, in a new participatory budgeting program - 
wherein local residents get to vote on how public funds are spent - residents chose to purchase 
security cameras for the neighborhood. In this sense, the local residents also believe crime to 
remain a significant problem. 
Crime offers the starkest example of disagreement between local political entities, 
however, other issues were matters of contention as well. Some other matters of debate include 
the availability of affordable housing, the state of the local public school system, and the 
availability of affordable local amenities. It was as if each of the different offices were 
describing different neighborhoods, despite the fact that they shared the same constituents. 
These kinds of discrepancies are particularly worrisome for local low-income residents who 
depend on their political representatives to be keenly aware of the problems faced in their 
neighborhoods. If crime is the most pressing matter of the day, and politicos are instead focused 
on housing, this does not bode well for the allocation of public resources to combat crime. 
The dissonance between the various levels of governance for each of the historically 
Puerto Rican neighborhoods in New York City points is indicative not only of a disconnect 
between government entities and the communities they serve, but also indicative of a disconnect 
between the various government entities. I would have expected that all elected or appointed 
officials for a given neighborhood would be abreast of the latest trends and in regular contact 
with one another – but I am not sure this is the case. It is likely that the community board would 
be in closest contact with constituents, given that it would provide the most immediate services 
to residents (required permits, etc.), and that the community board meetings are open to all 
community members. However, I wonder how many Latinos are participating in Community 
Board 1 meetings on the Lower East Side, given the scarcity of Spanish surnames on the board. 
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With respect to the disconnect between local political offices and their constituents, most 
of the local resident respondents with whom I spoke did not support the notion of a cohesive 
Latino community, nor did they feel the support of their local politicians. Most were quite 
critical of the role of local politicians in perpetuating the economic and social problems in their 
communities. Additionally, many of the problems noted by local residents were not 
acknowledged by local government. One such example is the exorbitant cost of food on the 
Lower East Side – a problem not noted by the local City Council office. This disconnect has 
tremendous consequences for how (and if) government entities respond to the needs of their 
constituents. 
One area where all political respondents did agree was with respect to the “Hispanic” 
community. In each and every historically Puerto Rican neighborhood, political offices 
discussed how a meaningful Hispanic community exists in their districts. Some politicos 
addressed brief past tensions, such as between Dominicans and Puerto Ricans, but this was 
mostly in an effort to illustrate the solidarity now existing between the various Hispanic 
subgroups. Some politicos used the term Latino interchangeably with the term Hispanic, but 
Hispanic was the more predominant descriptor for their constituents of “Spanish” descent. 
 
 
A Focus on “Newcomers” 
 
 
Yet another point of similarity in the discourse of local political representatives is the 
focus on immigrant newcomers to historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods. In one such 
neighborhood, staff for the representative in Congress spoke of the rapid influx of African 
immigrants from places such as Nigeria.  In another such neighborhood, Dominicans were a 
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group of particular interest due to their rising numbers. And in almost every historically Puerto 
Rican neighborhood the increasing number of Mexican residents was reported to be of 
significant importance. Much like the presence of economic and racial diversity on the Lower 
East Side, the focus on newcomers itself is a good thing. I, too, would want my political 
representatives to be aware of such demographic changes. However, the focus on newcomers 
should not overshadow the presence of long-term residents, such as Puerto Ricans – especially 
since Puerto Ricans continue to outnumber other Hispanic residents in neighborhoods such as 
Williamsburg, Brooklyn. 
The adoption of Hispanicity as a political platform is not new, however, it has deleterious 
consequences for Puerto Ricans.  In one sense, Puerto Ricans are assumed to be the benefactors 
of Puerto Rican representation. The rhetoric of Puerto Rican politicians, however, excludes 
Puerto Ricans instead focusing on the broader Hispanic population. This trend is associated with 
poor Puerto Rican voter turnout, the flight of Puerto Ricans from New York City, and the influx 
of other Spanish speaking constituents. In another sense, Puerto Ricans are assumed to have the 
“benefit” of citizenship, and yet, when comparing median incomes, poverty rates, and labor force 
participation, Puerto Ricans tend to fare worse than populations considered to be “immigrant” 
(Table 10, Table 11, and Table 13). The assumption of political ascent and the denial of 
continued socioeconomic adversity serve to further disenfranchise an already vulnerable 
population. 
The assumption of ascent is also linked to an assumption of assimilation.  The 
assumption is that New York City’s Puerto Ricans have assimilated, mostly in the cultural sense, 
but also in the socioeconomic sense. The election and appointment of Puerto Rican politicians is 
a sign of upward mobility and assimilation into the institutional fabric of New York City. These 
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politicians are college educated, often in Ivy League schools, and they display the requisite 
cultural capital needed to be political players. In the United States, a college education is viewed 
as one of the primary tenets of “success”. However, everyday Puerto Ricans throughout New 
York City have lackluster bachelor degree attainment. In fact Puerto Rican degree attainment is 
lower than Dominicans’ in the Bronx and Brooklyn, and lower than Mexicans’ in Manhattan 
(Table 12).  These statistics, along with median income, poverty, and labor force participation, 
do not paint a picture of socioeconomic assimilation (Table 4, Table 5, Table 13). 
With respect to cultural assimilation, this is problematic even for the politicians 
themselves. The majority of current Puerto Rican politicians in New York City are island-born, 
and furthermore, adult migrants. Seven of the thirteen Puerto Rican politicians that were born in 
Puerto Rico came to New York City as adults. Some came searching for better economic 
opportunities, such as Carmen E. Arroyo, while most others came to pursue higher education. Is 
it possible to migrate as an adult and experience wholesale cultural assimilation? Current 
research would say probably not. So, the Puerto Rican politicians actually indicate that cultural 
assimilation in the Puerto Rican population is far from complete. Rather than harness this 
knowledge and migrant expertise to evaluate the Puerto Rican population, however, current 
Puerto Rican politicians seek to avoid Puerto Ricans topics in favor of “immigrant” issues. If 
Puerto Rican politicians are at all interested in Puerto Rican issues, it is not being addressed 
publicly. 
The common lore is that Puerto Ricans have moved on from New York City. Time and 
time again, local politicians discussed how Puerto Ricans, like other immigrant populations, 
matured and then moved on to the suburbs. Granted, some Puerto Ricans did indeed move on to 
various suburbs throughout the nation, in places like Orlando, FL and Bergen County, NJ. But 
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this is just one part of a fairly complex story. At its height in the 1990s, the Puerto Rican 
population surpassed 1 million residents in New York City. In 2010, the population hovered 
around 800,000. These figures do not represent the wholesale loss of Puerto Ricans from the 
city. Furthermore, if one takes into account the larger region, most of the population loss from 
New York City proper is offset by gains in the surrounding counties of New Jersey and New 
York State. 
There is an added layer of complexity in that there is a continual flow of Puerto Ricans in 
and out of New York City.  In recent years, given the severe economic crisis on the island, 
Puerto Ricans have been leaving the island in droves (Krogstad, 2016). Some of these migrants 
have moved to New York City, and some have moved to places like Florida. Additionally 
complicating matters is the issue of socioeconomic diversity. In the early waves of en masse 
immigration to the region, most Puerto Ricans were working class. However, today there are a 
growing number of Puerto Rican professionals who are seeking economic opportunities on the 
mainland as well (Acosta-Belen and Santiago, 2006). Through my ethnographic research, I 
encountered several Puerto Rican migrants who fit the “young professional” profile, often 
working in the non-profit sector. There are thus not only temporal layers to the local Puerto 
Rican community, but socioeconomic layers as well. 
With respect to assimilation theory, the continual replenishment of Puerto Rican ethnicity 
to New York City from the island serves to further challenge the assertion that Puerto Ricans are 
culturally assimilated (Flores, 2009). Ironically, however, in recent years it is the island-born 
migrants who are the most economically assimilated (El Nasser, 2012).  Also ironic is the fact 
that being mainland-born, and thus more culturally assimilated, is not associated with 
significantly better economic prospects.  For example, in the case of Puerto Ricans in the New 
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York City-Northeastern New Jersey metropolitan region (Code-560), when comparing island- 
born Puerto Ricans to mainland-born Puerto Ricans, there was very little difference between 
them with respect to the percentage located at or below the poverty line (Figure 24; Ruggles et 
al, 2015). For those located moderately above the poverty line, island-born Puerto Ricans appear 
to maintain a slight advantage when compared to mainland-born Puerto Ricans. For those well 
above the poverty line, however, mainland Puerto Ricans maintain an advantage. Irrespective of 
the differences between island-born and mainland-born Puerto Ricans, all other residents 
maintain a much clearer advantage when compared to either group.  Those with means well 
above the poverty line are much more likely to not be Puerto Rican, but a local resident from 
some other racial/ethnic group. 
The case of educational assimilation is a bit more complicated. Overall, Puerto Ricans 
born on the mainland generally achieve higher levels of education (Figure 25), however, when 
examining differences by race, there are several caveats to this finding (Figure 26). For those 
Puerto Ricans that identify as white, mainland Puerto Ricans follow the assumed pattern. 
However, for those Puerto Ricans who identify as black, those with 1-3 years of college are 
much more likely to be migrants. And for those Puerto Ricans who identify as some other race, 
those with 4+ years of college are more likely to have migrated in the past ten years. 
Furthermore, differences amongst Puerto Ricans aside, there is still a much greater difference in 
educational attainment between Puerto Ricans and other residents in the area (Figure 27). Other 
residents are about 20% more likely than Puerto Ricans (either migrant or mainland-born) to 
have achieved 4+ years of education. 
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Figure 25. Puerto Rican Education by Timing of Migration 
 






Figure 26. Puerto Rican Education by Timing of Migration and Race 
 





Figure 27.  Education by Local Resident Group 
 




The cultural assimilation that Puerto Ricans make in American schools does not equate 
with ascent to the middle class. In fact, certain Puerto Rican migrants seem to maintain 
advantages with respect to higher education. These trends, however, are not part of the discourse 
of local politicians, and thus are outside of New York City’s consciousness.  Instead, Puerto 
Rican politicians have focused their lens and efforts on catering to the newcomers in Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods. 
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Also important to note is the complexities within the Puerto Rican political class as well. 
Some have been active in politics since the 1970s, while others were elected in 2014. There are 
differences in generation as well. Some were born on the island, while others were born on the 
mainland. And then, there is the matter of age. There is an increasing tendency for younger 
Puerto Ricans – often from political families – to join the politico ranks (Morales, 2013). In this 
sense, even Puerto Rican politicians are not a homogenous group. This heterogeneity is 
indicative of the heterogeneity within the broader Puerto Rican population, and speaks to the 
perils of relying on an ethnic typology let alone a panethnic typology. 
Despite the pitfalls of panethnicity, the newer generation of Puerto Rican politician is 
much less apt to focus on ethnic specificity, and more likely to focus on the broader panethnic 
population. They were born and bred in New York City, and their political paradigm has been 
shaped both by their political families as well as the new demographic reality, which has brought 
with it the shift to a Hispanic identity. While Puerto Rican politics was a viable strategy in the 
1990s, this began to change in 2000. With an influx of Dominicans and Mexicans to Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods, Puerto Rican politics became a less viable maneuver, and politicians took 
note. This did not necessarily lessen the presence of Puerto Rican politicians themselves, but 
rather lessened their public Puerto Rican-ness. Instead, they too shifted to a more Hispanic 
identity, presenting themselves as coalition builders and representative of all Hispanic interests. 
Fractures between ethnicities are minimized, and examples of intergroup harmony are promoted 
(Interviews with NYC politicians and offices, 2013). As one politician’s office described, “there 
have not been any large-scale fractures within the Latino population in East Harlem” and that 
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“Puerto Ricans can certainly understand the immigrant experience”. Even those born in Puerto 
Rico would develop this strategy. 
Not only are the newer Puerto Rican politicians more likely to embrace panethnicity, but 
they are also much more polished. The newer generation are is not made up of street politicians, 
but professional bureaucrats. The more recent cohort attended Yale and Columbia and have a 
much different kind of cultural capital than their predecessors. To illustrate the difference, the 
older cohort includes a former gypsy cab driver and a single mother who used to receive public 
assistance. In this regard the newer Puerto Rican politicians seem to be much more elite when 
compared to the local Puerto Rican population, revealing a disconnect between the political class 
and the constituents they serve. Rather than being representative of Puerto Rican, or even 
Hispanic residents, the new generation of Puerto Rican politicians are more representative of the 
upper middle class. 
 
 




In addition to the adoption of a Latino identity and platform, Puerto Rican politicians are 
also keenly focused on coalition building. Aside from the naming of streets after Puerto Rican 
figures, many Puerto Rican politicians are now focused on non-ethnic matters, and non-Puerto 
Rican matters such as immigration.  In fact their Latino public identities may possibly be an 
effort to create coalitions with other populations. This coalition building can be seen in the array 
of committees and caucuses in city, state, and federal government. Several Puerto Rican City 
Council members serve on a number of committees, including the Black, Latino/a, and Asian 
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Caucus, and most Puerto Rican NY State Assemblypersons serve the Black, Puerto Rican, 
Hispanic, and Asian Legislative Caucus. 
In addition to active coalition building, every office and politician supported the notion of 
a Latino community, and its existence in their own neighborhoods. The glossing over of inter- 
group difference (a reality for local resident respondents), the relegating of Puerto Ricans to the 
realm of public housing, and the focus on the influx of newcomers to New York City 
neighborhoods has served to remove Puerto Ricans from current political discussions.  In the 
case of gentrification, because Puerto Ricans reside in public housing, they are deemed to be less 
at risk than other populations.  In the realm of immigration, Puerto Ricans are not relevant.  In 
the examples of housing, jobs, and education, all Latinos are addressed as a group. In all of these 
instances, there is no need to assess the particularities of the Puerto Rican experience, and so it is 
not done. Census data points to Puerto Rican distinctiveness, and yet the various political offices 
are more interested in the influx of newcomers than the consistently impoverished. 
Puerto Rican politicians, through promoting an immigrant identity are by default 
minimizing their racial identity. When they promote themselves as being an “immigrant” and 
“Hispanic” – at this stage these are linked identities – they are avoiding their own racial identity. 
But when they promote their “immigrant” and “Hispanic” constituents, they are avoiding their 
community’s experience of race. Some examples include the prominent and active support of 
sanctuary cities, DACA, the DREAM act, and bills meant to enable undocumented immigrants to 
vote (Oleaga, 2015; Morrison, 2016; Goldenberg, 2015; Velazquez and Mark-Viverito, 2015). 
All of these issues are framed around immigrant status as opposed to any specific issues faced by 
particular groups of immigrants. For example, an undocumented Mexican immigrant with 
apparent indigenous heritage not only faces the consequences of being undocumented, but the 
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consequences of being a person of color. However the issue of race is rarely broached by local 
politicians, and they instead hone in on immigration as a matter of statute. 
The debate about the Hispanic category, and its relationship to race, is not new. In the 
1960s there was a huge debate amongst New York City Puerto Rican politicos about whether 
“Hispanic” was a racial category or not (Lee, 2016). The more radical politicians, such as 
Gilberto Gerena Valentin, considered “Hispanic” a racial category, while the more moderate 
political figures viewed the “Hispanic” category as non-racial and more of a cultural distinction. 
With respect to that particular political battle, the moderates won, and Puerto Rican politicians 
and all levels of government treat “Hispanic” as an ethnic category as opposed to a racial 
category. The current use and meaning separates “Hispanics” and “African Americans”, or any 
other non-Hispanic black population, as mutually exclusive categories. In this sense, to be 
“Hispanic” is to disassociate with blackness, even though many New York City Hispanics have 
apparent African ancestry and identify as black (Navarro, 2003). 
In places like California, the “immigrant” narrative has been used as a means to evade 
the racial stigma associated with being black (Hintzen, 2002). In the New York City case, the 
Hispanic narrative – and its entanglement with immigrant identity – is used for a similar purpose. 
It has been broadly accepted in the political realm that to be “Hispanic” and to be “black” are 
two different things, meaning to be “Hispanic” is to not be black, and vice versa. There are 
several key politicians that fit this bill. Congressman Charles Rangel, for example, embraces his 
black identity in place of his Hispanic identity, while State Senator Ruben Diaz Sr. identifies as 
Hispanic in place of a black identity (Eligon, 2012; Brederman, 2016). In the way politicians 
describe themselves and their constituents, it seems you can’t be both black and Hispanic in 
politics. 
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New York City politicians can deny that Hispanic is a racial category, however, Hispanic 
people are often also people of color – especially in New York City.  Mexicans, for example, 
have strong indigenous ancestry, while Dominicans and Puerto Ricans have strong African 
ancestry. Despite the obvious non-white phenotypes of many local Hispanics, Puerto Rican 
politicians choose to ignore the obvious and focus on non-racial issues, despite the importance of 
race in each topic they address. Race, time and time again, has been shown to have significant 
effects with respect to all of the important issues local politicians reference: access to good 
schools, access to good jobs, access to good housing, access to quality- and affordable – 
amenities, and access to safe neighborhoods. Non-Hispanic whites maintain measureable 
advantages in each and every one of these areas when compared to Hispanics in part because 
many Hispanics are not white – they are racialized. However, local Puerto Rican politicians shy 
away from discussions of race and instead focus on the issues facing Hispanics as an immigrant 
group. 
Regardless of the reason, local government officials are not addressing Puerto Rican 
constituents in New York City, which further contributes to their public invisibility. Puerto 
Ricans, as an ethnic group, and in large part as a racialized people, are being ignored by their 
Puerto Rican representatives. And even the representatives themselves are shifting away from 
their own Puerto Rican identities. Puerto Rican politicians, under the guise of Hispanicity, are 
the silent majority (70%) of Hispanic politicians. As a group, politicians are some of the most 
visible people in New York City, and yet, instead of promote Puerto Rican visibility, Puerto 






Puerto Rican politicians in New York City have turned away from the local Puerto Rican 
community, and turned towards the “Hispanic” population.  Immigrants and the working class 
are of prime importance to Puerto Rican politicians, who seek to enhance their Hispanic 
identities and submerge their racial and Puerto Rican identities.  Demographic changes, 
combined with poor voter turnout on the part of Puerto Ricans, are compelling reasons for Puerto 
Rican politicians to abandon the Puerto Rican political ship. Despite making up the majority of 
Hispanic politicians in New York City, Puerto Rican politicians are ethnically invisible. Puerto 
Rican politicians, by ignoring race, entrenched poverty, and their Puerto Rican constituents, have 
actively made Puerto Ricans in New York City invisible. 
Too, the demography of Puerto Rican neighborhoods has changed drastically in the past 
several decades. Especially between 1990 and the present, the influx of Mexicans and 
Dominicans have altered what it means to be Hispanic in New York City, while the influx of 
hipsters have changed the nature of the Puerto Rican neighborhood.  Spanish Harlem, once the 
site of riots and civil unrest, is now home to yoga studios and gluten-free baked goods in an array 
of new cafes. As one Yelper put it: “I stumbled into this cute little coffee shop-you would have 
loved it. Who would have thought that I'd find this wonderful place in Harlem” (December 5, 
2016). These demographic changes mean that the constituent base in historically Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods is much less Puerto Rican in years past. This, combined with low Puerto Rican 
voter turnout, is likely motivation for Puerto Rican politicians to turn away from their Puerto 
Rican constituents. 
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The Mexicans and Dominicans that move to Puerto Rican neighborhoods are more likely 
than not to be working class. They are located in a different occupational space than Puerto 
Ricans, who experience much lower rates of labor participation. To be working class is viewed 
as an honorable characteristic in the United States.  As such, the working class is valorized, 
while the unemployed are viewed with at least a tinge of contempt. Puerto Rican politicians 
adhere to this in that they, too, valorize the working class, while ignoring those that experience 
long-term poverty, who in their districts are likely to be Puerto Ricans. 
As Puerto Rican neighborhoods change, and the political field changes, Puerto Rican 
politicians are increasingly less inclined to identify as Puerto Rican in the public sphere. Instead, 
they call themselves “Hispanic” or make reference to their “immigrant” experiences – both of 
which are tied together.  Not only do they identify themselves as being Hispanic, but they refer 
to their constituents this way as well. Puerto Rican politicians’ use of the Hispanic category, 
much like other government entities, denies the racial meaning of the term.  Instead “Hispanic” 
is used as an ethnic term, highly connected to immigration, which is considered completely 
separate from blackness.  In this way, the use of Hispanic identity also serves as a means to 
evade blackness, even if those that identify as Hispanic have apparently black features. Despite 
the continued disadvantages associated with being a person of color in the United States, Puerto 
Rican politicians avoid the conversation of race altogether. 
Demography has indeed changed, and Puerto Ricans have low voter turnout. These are 
facts. What is also fact, however, is the reality that Hispanics are racialized in New York City, 
and that Puerto Ricans seem to be at a significant disadvantage within this group. Puerto Ricans 
are not immigrants, and are in many cases not working class, but impoverished. Because Puerto 
Ricans do not match either of these characteristics, they are over-looked in most policy 
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discussions, even when those discussions are being held by Puerto Rican politicians. Puerto 
Rican politicians are the silent majority of Hispanic politicians in New York City, and by failing 
to advocate for their Puerto Rican constituents, they make Puerto Ricans invisible. 
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Chapter 6. Culture: The Rise and Fall of Nuyorican Culture 
 
 
The media and politics are not the only realms in which Puerto Ricans have receded from 
public view. In addition to the complete disregard for Nuyoricans in local media and politics, 
Puerto Ricans have also experienced declining visibility in the cultural world. Just like the other 
fields, the realm of culture has also been impacted by the shift towards Hispanicity.  But there 
are other shifts than have affected Puerto Rican culture as well. Salsa music, as the most visible 
Puerto Rican cultural object in the United States, has been relegated to the periphery of the music 
industry. A number of factors are responsible for this marginalization, including the shifting 
strategies of music marketers, lacking institutionalization, and denial of Puerto Rican ownership 
of the genre on the part of high profile musicians. Salsa music is important because it was one of 
the primary means for Puerto Rican social mobility, but it was also one of the primary ways that 
Puerto Ricans obtained and maintained a public and visible presence. The decline of salsa music 
is one of the primary means through which Puerto Ricans have become invisible. 
Salsa music was born in New York City in the 1960s. A largely Puerto Rican cohort of 
musicians adapted and merged various musical forms, including Cuban son montuno and 
mozambique, American jazz, and European brass, wind, and string instruments. The result was a 
genre that broke with all of the above traditions, instead making its mark as a distinctly New 
York City art form. The Fania record label was at the helm of salsa’s development, with co- 
founder Johnny Pacheco (a Dominican flautist) scouting talent on the streets of New York City. 
He did not want a schooled and polished set of musicians, he wanted musicians with raw talent 
and passion. At the time it was not hard to find, as many Puerto Ricans saw music as one of the 
only career paths available. Additionally, it was very common for salsa musicians to have their 
instruments with them at local jam sessions and parties.  In fact, at the time most parties were 
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jam sessions, and vice versa. Even when a better known band would play at a club or venue, it 
was commonplace for an audience member to hold up their instrument and request the chance to 
play – either playing with the band or taking a solo. 
Starting in the late 1980s and reaching an apex in the 1990s, music marketers swiftly 
began to shift their strategies, increasingly promoting pop versions of salsa music. Some artists 
that met this mold include Jerry Rivera, Victor Manuelle, and of course, Marc Anthony. Marc 
Anthony has experienced the most mainstream success, and this is likely due to his commitment 
to ballads and Latin Pop music, but also his crossover into English language lyrics. His style, 
while at times includes certain elements of salsa music, is much more pop and mainstream – 
even formulaic, traits that music marketers continue to promote across all genres. By promoting 
pop versions of salsa, music marketers marginalized the original version and the artists who 
created it. 
Another prominent factor in the marginalization of salsa music is the lack of 
institutionalization of the genre. Other genres, such as Rock n Roll and Jazz, have been 
documented, historicized, preserved, and housed in music schools to venerate them and continue 
their practice. Even hip hop, which developed at least 20 years after salsa, is being taught at 
prestigious music schools – but not salsa. There is no museum, or library, or text that captures 
the rich history and developments of the genre. Instead, this work is done by various fans or 
artists, who do what they can to preserve some small piece of Nuyorican culture – mostly on 
YouTube and various independent websites (Nader, 2016).  Some might argue that salsa has 
been documented through Latin Jazz, but this is not true. There is overlap between artists that 
dabble in both realms, but Latin Jazz is an entirely separate genre from salsa. The lacking 
institutionalization of salsa music serves to further push salsa music to the periphery. 
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The final nail in the salsa coffin ironically comes from the most prominent Puerto Rican 
musicians. Highly influential salseros such as Eddie Palmieri and Ray Barretto have publically 
stated that salsa music is Cuban music, emphatically referencing Cuban musicians in the creation 
of the genre.  There is a certain political correctness in pronouncing salsa to exclusively be 
Cuban music, as Arsenio Rodriguez has been “officially” deemed the godfather of salsa – much 
like Afrika Bambaataa has been “officially” deemed the godfather of hip hop. However, 
significant enough innovations occurred that salsa music became distinct from Arsenio 
Rodriguez’ son conjunto style of music.  Part of the issue stems from the high level of 
investment on the part of the Cuban government to take ownership of (and to preserve) Cuban 
musical traditions.  Additionally, Cuban refugees and Cuban exiled musicians were exalted in 
the American imaginary, having fled the Communist regime.  In this sense, Cubans are given 
sole credit for the salsa genre in part because of the politics of music in Cuba, but also because of 
the political position of Cubans in the United States. Regardless of the reason, the insistence of 
prominent Puerto Rican salsa musicians to deny ownership of the genre is the most effective 
means of rendering the most visible Puerto Rican cultural form in the United States invisible. 
The marginalization of salsa music greatly contributes to Puerto Rican invisibility. As a 
significant American art form, salsa music is not respected or even acknowledged by most 
musical institutions in the United States. In addition, the lore that Puerto Ricans are merely 
conduits of Cuban music further strips Puerto Ricans of their cultural contributions. The decline 
of salsa music, as one of the main ways that Puerto Ricans achieved social mobility and public 
visibility, significantly helps remove Puerto Ricans from public view. 
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Culture as a Sociological Construct 
 
 
Traditionally, sociologists have defined culture as all beliefs, objects, traditions, and 
practices of a people (Tylor, 1871). Current approaches to culture, however, tend to focus “on 
symbols and on the behavior that derives from symbolically expressed ways of thinking and 
feeling” (Griswold, 1994, p. 10). A cultural group may be defined by national borders, by 
religious identity, or by ethnic identity. However, in the era of globalization, each of these 
defining points may overlap as national borders and religious identities shift and people move. 
Today, there are German Muslims, Indian Catholics, Turks living in Spain, Indians living in New 
Zealand, and an incredible number of cultural groups all living within the U.S.  Consequently, 
the boundaries between groups have become increasingly blurry over the past several decades. 
Furthermore, in the case of Puerto Rico and other Spanish speaking nations, a history of 
colonization muddies distinct cultural boundaries between people. 
Puerto Rican culture is broadly defined as the beliefs, objects, traditions, and practices – 
the symbols - of the people of Puerto Rico. The predominant view of Puerto Ricans is that their 
background is comprised of a mix of Spanish, Indigenous, and West African heritage. However, 
as anthropologists have noted, this mix is not an equal one, as the practices of the indigenous 
were purposefully shunned by the dominant Spanish colonizers, as were those of the West 
African slaves imported following the downfall of the indigenous population (Davila, 1997). 
The suppression of the oppressed culture is an integral part of the process of colonization. The 
historical repression of West African culture has survived centuries, as indigenous cultural 
practices are placed in a more favorable and desirable light by not only the government but also 
numerous activist groups on the island.  In this sense, Puerto Rican culture is not necessarily a 
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melting pot of the three cultures, but rather a pot of Spanish culture with a dash of Indigenous 
and West African culture – whatever traits were protected through the passing of time. 
There are several complicating factors to be noted. For one, other groups traveled to 
Puerto Rico to settle. There is a history of both Chinese and German immigration to Puerto 
Rico. And in recent years, well-to-do Americans have been settling on the island as a means to 
escape high mainland tax rates. Furthermore, both Cuba and the Dominican Republic share 
similar Spanish, Indigenous, and African roots. T make it difficult to completely differentiate 
one culture from the other. The main point to be made here is that it would be an onerous if not 
impossible task to define “Puerto Rican culture”, illustrating the broader context of what is 
considered to be Puerto Rican culture today. 
 
 




Following the U.S. acquisition of Puerto Rico in 1898 a steady stream of Puerto Ricans 
would move to the mainland, a stream that would quickly develop into a river as economic 
conditions on the island urbanized and deteriorated. These migrants brought their culture in the 
process. Puerto Rican culture in the mainland context would be viewed as a subculture within 
American society. That is, those who maintain Puerto Rican traditions and practices are seen as 
distinct from the dominant population. However, with the passing of generations, some Puerto 
Ricans have shed some of their Puerto Rican practices in favor of American ways. Furthermore, 
depending on the region of settlement, there may be variation in the adaptation of Puerto Ricans 
to the “American” lifestyle. For example, the Northeast has historically been the docking station 
for numerous immigrant groups, while the Southwest was formerly part of Mexico and would 
212	 
not undergo extensive American population until the mid-1800s. Percy Hintzen is particularly 
cognizant of the importance of the socio-historical region as a contributing factor to immigrant 
incorporation (Hintzen, 2002). As he found, West Indians in California had a markedly different 
cultural experience than those in New York, partially because of the very different economies, 
politics, social circumstances and cultures present in each region. In this respect, Puerto Ricans 
have been culturally incorporated in a different manner in Hawaii than in New York – because 






Salsa music is by far the most visible and accessible form of Puerto Rican culture in the 
United States. Ownership of the genre is rarely contested, identified as “Cuban” or “Latino” 
music, but never Puerto Rican. Salsa, composed and played by Puerto Rican artists, is played in 
an almost every venue, from television commercials to elevators. And yet, these artists are not 
given the respect of authorship and cultural genesis. Instead, the lore is that Puerto Ricans play 
Cuban music. The music is not their own, despite the fact that their hands made it. The irony of 
cultural ownership of the genre knows no bounds. In examining the highest selling salsa album, 
the most awarded artists, and the most beloved singers of the genre, Puerto Ricans take center 
stage.  Furthermore, the salsa scene was born and raised in New York City. 
For example, Siembra is the highest selling salsa album in history (PBS, 2017). Under 
the Fania record label, Willie Colon and Ruben Blades are the title artists, one half of this duo 
Puerto Rican and the other half Panamanian. Additionally, when examining the list of 
contributing artists on the array of instruments necessary to produce the most popular salsa 
sound- almost all of the artists are Puerto Rican.  The exception is an African American 
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drummer. Upon the implementation of the “Latin” Grammy category in 1976 and its successor, 
the “Tropical” category in 1984, into which the salsa genre fits, the awardees within these 
categories are in large part Puerto Rican (Wikipedia, 2017). In fact, a Puerto Rican was the first 
awardee in the category: Eddie Palmieri. Mr. Palmieri, Tito Puente, Ray Barretto, Spanish 
Harlem Orquestra, among others, have been some of the most awarded names in the category- 
and heavily Puerto Rican. And when considering the most popular and well-known singers and 
artists in the salsa game worldwide, Puerto Rican Hector Lavoe probably tops the list. 
Despite the obvious Puerto Rican role in the development of salsa music, there is little 
public argument that Puerto Ricans own any aspect of the development of the genre. In fact, the 
most successful Puerto Rican salsa artists themselves believe the music to be purely Cuban in 
nature (Ray Barretto, Eddie Palmieri, etc.). As Eddie Palmieri described in an interview, “I 
started out listening to those great Cuban orchestras and their followers in New York, the great 
mambo bands of Machito, Tito Puente, Tito Rodriguez” (Morales, 2012). From this description, 








There are several  the cultural ownership of salsa music.  To start, right when salsa egan 
to develop and take off in New York City, the U.S. was in a very tense and public dispute with 
Cuba (Levine, 2000). The result of which would be an economic embargo, which severely 
restricted, if not entirely prohibited, cultural exchange between the mainland and Cuba. Leading 
up to these events, Israel “Cachao” Lopez developed mambo in the 1930s and Arsenio 
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Rodriguez developed the son montuno in the 1940s and 1950s, both of which would gain 
immense popularity in New York City, and would serve as the foundation and inspiration for 
salsa (Garcia, 2010). However, following the inability of the U.S. to usurp control from Fidel 
Castro, Cuba would face an economic - and cultural - embargo. 
The vast majority of the first wave of Cuban refugees settled in Miami, a mere 90 miles 
from Cuba (Levine, 2000). It was likely thought that the move was a temporary one, and that a 
return migration would soon follow. Furthermore, the climate in Florida was nearly identical to 
that of Cuba, making it an ideal settlement location. This group of migrants were those that had 
the most to lose in Cuba’s newly instituted communist system – those with the most capital, both 
monetary and cultural. As race and class are closely linked in most Latin American countries, 
these migrants also happened to be whiter than the general Cuban population.  This group, just 
by nature of their class was much less likely to participate in musical production, as there was 
not a lot of prestige associated with genres such as mambo and son montuno which included 
African influences (Madrid and Moore, 2013). This lacking participation in the music scene and 
the fact that the Cuban refugee community centered around Miami, combined with the cultural 
Cuban embargo, meant that Cubans were not participating in the New York City music scene in 
large numbers. 
This spatial and cultural disconnect took place at a time when mambo, son, and cha-cha- 
cha had reached new heights of popularity in New York City. These three Cuban genres served 
as inspiration for the development of salsa music. Owned by a Jewish couple, Max and Helen 
Hyman, The Palladium Ballroom (a nightclub) was a particularly popular site for live music and 
dancing (Jazz on the Tube, 2017). In the early days, the venue maintained a racially restrictive 
policy, meaning that the various racial/ethnic populations were organized into separate 
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entertainment dates. When Latin music was instituted in 1948, Wednesday and Sunday 
afternoons were reserved for Hispanics. This trend would evolve over time, as Mambo became 
increasingly popular with other racial/ethnic populations. As Puerto Rican bandleader Ray 
Santos described, in the 1950s Wednesday nights became populated with “a hip Broadway 
crowd of actors, musicians and other celebrities combined with mostly Jewish and Italian girls 
from Brooklyn and Queens” (Myers, 2009). Friday nights would be predominantly Puerto 
Rican, including Boricuas from all around the city. In fact, many of the musicians were Puerto 
Rican, even if the music played, and the bandleader, was Cuban (Garcia, 2010). Even when 
considering the “Big Three” bands that headlined at the Palladium - Machito, Tito Puente, and 
Tito Rodriguez - two of the three were Puerto Rican. 
As the mambo craze spread beyond the Hispanic population, and beyond the Palladium, 
it became particularly popular within the Jewish population. In December of 1959, Tito Puente 
would play at Grossinger’s Catskill Resort Hotel to a packed house of about 1200 Jews on break 
from city-life (Schwartz and Kun, 2007). Soon after, a full-length album would be released 
documenting this very show. Furthermore, Wednesdays at the Palladium increasingly became 
Jewish night. As Norby Walters, famed sports agent and entertainment empressario, described, 
“The crowd was maybe 35% Puerto Rican. Some Blacks. Fifteen percent Italian and 50% 
Jewish. Wednesday night was when we all went. I have no idea who was there on a Friday or 
Saturday night, because I never went.” 
Ironically, as Mambo increased in popularity outside of the “Latin” population, its 
popularity declined within the Hispanic population (Garcia, 2010). As the Palladium’s 
popularity and competitiveness reached new heights with the feverish mambo tempo, Arsenio 
Rodriguez was working at a slower pace uptown and in the Bronx.  The Cuban composer’s son 
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montuno, a more relaxed style of music, became immensely popular amongst Puerto Ricans, 
Cubans, and other Hispanics in the city.  From 1950 on, Arsenio, his brother Raul, and an array 
of Puerto Rican recruits would play throughout the city, but largely in more peripheral clubs, not 
in elite, and more diverse, hotspots like the Palladium. 1957 would be a pivotal year, in which 
the mambo, and the Palladium, would lose some of its luster, and the crowds slowly but surely 
diminished. 
Aresenio Rodriguez’ music, described as tipico, or music that was more typical of Cuba 
and more related to the earlier danzon and bolero era, was deemed not only the musical 
preference amongst many Hispanics, but also served as the inspiration for the inevitable 
evolution of the music. Willie Colon, famed trombonist and composer, described Arsenio as his 
“principle teacher”, and indicated that the feeling of Arsenio’s music is what provided the 
foundation for what he would later create (Garcia, 2010). 
The timing of the shift in popularity from mambo to son montuno, and the more island- 
like style is important. By 1960, Puerto Ricans would make up 80% of the Hispanic population 
in New York City. The Cuban population grew as well, however, would not even reach 50,000 
at the start of the 1960s. Therefore, the vast majority of the Hispanic patrons of the Latin music 
scene at the time were Puerto Rican. The relationship between the audience and the band is 
pivotal, as the audiences were the breeding ground for future musicians, bandleaders, and 
developers of the son montuno genre. 
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The Fania All Stars are perhaps the most well-known set of salsa vocalists and musicians, 
and the Fania era – the later 1960s to 1970s - is often described as the height of the genre. While 
led by the Dominican flautist and composer Johnny Pacheco, the majority of the artists who 
participated were Puerto Rican. Conguero Ray Barretto, trombonist Willie Colon, percussionist 
Roberto Roena, cuatro player Yomo Toro, timbalero Nicky Marrero provide examples of Puerto 
Rican musicians. With respect to vocalists, Hector Lavoe, Cheo Feliciano, Ismael Miranda, 
Ismael Quintana, Santos Colon, Bobby Cruz, Pete “El Conde” Rodriguez, were/are all Puerto 
Rican. While the Fania line-up was largely Puerto Rican, the other influences were Cuban, 
Jewish, Panamanian, and Dominican. Celia Cruz, Justo Betancourt, and Mongo Santamaria 
were/are Cuban; Barry Rodgers, Ralphy Leavitt (half Puerto Rican), and Larry Harlow are/were 
Jewish; famed singer Ruben Blades is Panamanian, and Jose “El Canario” is Dominican. 
Part of the ability of salsa bands to fill their ranks with non-Puerto Rican members, is 
related to the decline of big bands, and so there were a number of big band musicians in need of 
work. At the same time, the unions were in decline. The manner in which rock n roll was 
produced re-structured the industry outside of the union offices (Roberts, 2014). For this reason, 
the method of hiring musicians changed substantially. Rather than dropping by the local union 
office to hire musicians for a gig, the hiring process became much more informal. A musician 
might ask a bandleader to play a solo one night, and end up playing for the band full-time. 
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Jerry Masucci, a lawyer from Brooklyn, would be one of the few Italians to participate in 
the cultural production of salsa music, however, his role was one of management as opposed to 
musical contributions.  In 1962 he would meet Johnny Pacheco through his work as a lawyer, 
and in 1964 the two would start Fania Records (Contreras, 2006). Rather than relying on the 
already popular musicians in circuit, Masucci and Pacheco actively recruited young and lesser- 
known artists on the streets of the Bronx and East Harlem to join their label. This method likely 
led to the quick evolution and experimental sound that would develop within Fania. 
Cuban Inspiration for Nuyorican Salsa 
The son montuno style, attributed to Arsenio Rodriguez, was undoubtedly influential on 
this younger set of New York City musicians – most of whom were Puerto Rican, specifically 
Nuyorican, at the time. However, these second generation Boricua innovators would add 
elements, experiment with others, and include various tempos and strains of music, both Cuban 
and American – and even Puerto Rican.  American genres such as jazz, soul, funk, and even 
disco would influence the New York City-based musicians, as would other closely related Cuban 
genres such as charanga, cha-cha-cha, mozambique, and guaguanco. Yomo Toro, the Puerto 
Rican cuatro (small Puerto Rican guitar) player, is a prime example of Puerto Rican influences 
on the music, given his use of a Puerto Rican instrument (Cubans use the tres) and expertise in 
bomba and plena, the two better-known Puerto Rican musical styles. Salsa then came to embody 
all of these influences, precluding ownership of any one cultural group – but also precluding the 
disenfranchisement of any group as well. If any entity maintains ownership of the closely-knit 
group of musical styles now known as salsa, it is New York City.  New York City, with its fast- 
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paced urban landscape, crashed head-on into the island-paced vibe of son montuno.  The result 
of which was a markedly more impatient, aggressive, and assertive sound – fitting for a city that 
never sleeps. 
An important, and highly decorated, artist, Eddie Palmieri, is a prime example of an 
innovator of Cuban and American musical styles, getting his start in the early 1960s. Following 
a performance at Carnegie Hall at age 11, Palmieri would go on to play for established bands 
such as that of Tito Rodriguez. In 1961, he put together the band Conjunto La Perfecta, and 
would periodically participate in Fania events, but is better known for his solo work (Rate Your 
Music, 2017). He and his older brother Charlie Palmieri, an organ player, were known for 
playing in the haranga format – son-based music with a flute and violins, and without bongos. 
The younger Palmieri would experiment with the charanga sound, removing the violins and 
adding in trombones. Specifically, he added trombonists Barry Rodgers (Jewish) and Jose 
Rodrigues (Brazilian). Two other key players in La Perfecta were timbalero Manny Oquendo 
and vocalist Ismael Quintana – both Puerto Ricans. Palmieri would continue to innovate his 
sound, adding hints of jazz and mozambique, a faster-paced rhythm with origins in Cuba. 
Palmieri is an interesting case, in that he made explicit attempts to connect himself to the 
dire situation facing many Puerto Ricans in New York City, and the ongoing social upheaval at 
play. In 1972, he would play with his band Harlem River Drive for prisoners at Sing Sing 
Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York located north of New York City along the Hudson 
River (Ballon, 2008). His set was followed by spoken word poet and Young Lord Felipe 
Luciano, who recited his work “Jibaro, My Pretty Nigger.” The lineup for Harlem River Drive 
was pivotal, in that a significant number of the included recording musicians were not from the 
salsa world, but rather the jazz, funk, blues, and rock world.  Hank Anderson played on bass, 
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Cornell Dupri and Harry Viggiano on guitar, Ronnie Cuber on sax, and Jimmy Norman, Alvin 
Taylor, and Lorene Hanchard supplied vocals.  This was important, in that the sound of the 
music was much changed from Palmieri’s haranga days. The sound very definitely included the 
jazz, funk, blues, and rock influences of the featured artists. 
This event, and the music Palmieri created with Harlem River Drive served as a pivotal 
moment in many ways, as he would later become increasingly involved in the jazz world, as 
opposed to the salsa world. In recent years, his accolades and Grammy nominations/awards have 
been located in the Latin Jazz category as opposed to Tropical. 
Ray Barretto, a contemporary of Eddie Palmieri, followed a strikingly similar trajectory 
to the esteemed pianist. Born a mere 7 years prior, Mr. Barretto came to music later in life, 
following a stint in the U.S. military. Upon his return to the mainland, he took up percussion, 
specifically the congas, and began playing at jam sessions throughout New York City. 
The two artists, Palmieri and Barretto, while making an indelible mark on salsa music, 
would in their wiser years go on to abandon the genre in their recordings and albums in favor of 
Latin Jazz. In some ways it makes sense, as both artists were heavily influenced by jazz and 
specific artists such as Miles Davis in their youth. In this regard, both artists seem to have come 
full circle – however, in doing so, the salsa genre has taken a huge, and perhaps deadly, hit. 
Without the vibrancy and restlessness of youth, their music really is different than in the past, 
with reason – both artists have done what all humans do – age (verb). Eddie Palmieri no longer 
yells with passion and sings along with his solos, and Ray Barretto, among other renowned 
artists such as Yomo Toro, have regrettably passed on (2007 and 2012). 
Salsa music belongs to Puerto Rican culture. Nuyorican artists took Cuban genres, 
melded them together with American jazz, and added Puerto Rican innovations.  However, salsa 
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music is not considered Puerto Rican. Hip-hop includes innovations to West African drumbeats 
and call and response, and yet hip-hop is accepted as having been birthed in the Bronx. Why is it 
that salsa remains firmly attributed to Cuba? It is partially due to the acceptance of high profile 
Puerto Rican bandleaders. Despite contributing substantial creative innovations, Eddie Palmieri 
continues to proclaim that he is a conduit of Cuban music, and so the genre has been documented 
as such. Another reason is the significant efforts made on the part of the Cuban government to 
document and promote Cuban culture (Rodriguez, 2003). One of the primary tenets of the 
revolution was to preserve Cuban culture, and to this end, there have been government policies 
specifically aimed at preserving musical heritage and developing professional musicians. In 
contrast, there have been no such efforts on behalf of Puerto Rican artists in New York City. 








The Fania era was an era in which Puerto Ricans were defining themselves through salsa 
music.  Willie Colon fancied himself a Nuyorican gangster, Hector Lavoe summoned the 
wildlife of El Yunque (a rainforest in Puerto Rico) in his testament to Santeria (Aguanile), and 
Eddie Palmieri used to wax poetic (and nostalgic) about the mountains of Puerto Rico.  The 
1970s through the 1980s represented a period of development for the Nuyorican identity through 
salsa music. Through this process, Nuyorican identity was crystalized for Nuyoricans, but it was 
also crystalized for non-group members as well. 
The Fania label was a monopoly of sorts, representing the primary means of making it in 
salsa music.  Fania gave artists from the street a chance, and in return, Fania gave them fame, 
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and to a lesser extent, fortune. At a minimum, the label offered socioeconomic mobility.  The 
bulk of artists represented by Fania were Puerto Rican, and so the label promoted Puerto Rican 
visibility by raising the profile of its artists to listeners around the globe. However, by the 1990s, 
Fania would lose its hold on the salsa market as music marketers became interested in less 
ethnic, and more pop, genres. 
 
 








By the 1990s, music marketers became increasingly interested in promoting a more pop 
version of salsa music, and the version that attained the most success was salsa romantica. This 
version was highly formulaic, and lacked any sort of improvisation. Even if there was staged 
improvisation, it is likely highly rehearsed. The focus of the music was the romantic tale being 
told in the lyrics. The musicians were minimized, in favor of the singer, who maintained a finely 
tuned public image. This image was more explicitly sexual, not that the salsa era musicians were 
not sexualized, but the salsa romantica artists were not political at all. 
There are numerous examples of singers who have built their careers on salsa romantica, 
including Gilberto Santa Rosa, Tito Nieves, and of course, Marc Anthony. Some examples of 
their hits include Que Manera De Quererte (What a way to love you), El Amor Mas Bonito (The 
Most Beautiful Love), and Contra La Corriente (Against the Tide – also about love).  Most of 
the salsa romantica artists, again, are Puerto Rican, however, their Puerto Rican identities are 
scrubbed from salsa romantica.  In place of their ethnic identity is a sexualized pop celebrity. 
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While the bands behind Puerto Rican salsa music may be suffering due to shifts in the 
economy of music, salsa dancing has taken off in recent decades. There is a whole industry 
explicitly dedicated to salsa dancing: studios, instructors, shoes, clothing, parties, congresses, 
schools, etc. With regard to studios, Piel Canela is one of the better known in New York City, 
but even Alvin Ailey has hopped on the bandwagon. Eddie Torres is probably the best known 
instructor in New York City, although there are so many now, it is difficult to say who is most 
prominent. 
While the dancing element of salsa has indeed taken off in recent years, it is not 
necessarily that it has been rekindled amongst Puerto Ricans, but rather that it has expanded 
beyond Latinos, and become popular in other markets – even internationally. Salsa music and 
dancing is huge in Japan, for instance (Sager, 2015). Due to the globalization of the genre, the 
popular haunts of the old-timers (those Puerto Ricans who were there when Tito Puente would 
play on the street in the Bronx) have now closed their doors. The Maganette and The Village 
Gate are just two examples. 
The promotion of salsa dancing but not salsa music has substantially decreased the 
profile of Puerto Rican musicians and decreased the visibility of Puerto Rican culture. Now, 
instead of hiring a band, where sound can be an issue, dance venues seem to prefer a DJ, where 
any track can be played – from mambo to reggaeton. Salsa dancing in its commercialized form, 
much like salsa romantica, represents an ethnically scrubbed art form, wherein certain versions 
of the dance are boxed and promoted overseas. Salsa dancing today, again, like salsa romantica, 
represents the pop version of dance – the ballroom form. In this sense, the salsa romantica and 
salsa dancing markets helps make Puerto Ricans invisible. 
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The arts and entertainment appear to be the one niche in which the melting pot construct 
appears applicable, although not perfectly.  Furthermore, this sector of the economy appears to 
be utilized more fervently by those who may experience greater discrimination in the broader 
employment opportunities available. Racial discrimination and anti-semitism have played a very 
real role in job competition (Royster, 2003; Weber, 1991). Mambo, Son Montuno, Boogaloo, 
Salsa, and Jazz provided a sort of niche economic opportunity structure for black, Jewish, and 
Puerto Rican young adults in the 1940s-1970s. The thriving nightclub culture would not take off 
until the post-war boom, however, by the 1980s, there would be a massive dip with the 
deleterious state of the economy. Even one of the co-creators of the Mambo, Israel “Cachao” 
Lopez, took to playing birthday parties as an everyday musician in Miami during these tough 
times. At the same time, the music industry was changing. Increasingly, the market for salsa 
music was developing in non-U.S. locales. In addition to Spanish speaking nations such as 
Colombia, salsa was becoming quite popular in places like Haiti and various European nations. 
There is footage of Ray Barretto’s band playing in Antibes-Juan-les-Pins, France in 1986 
(Esteban, 2008). Today, some of the biggest salsa events take place in similarly unexpected 
venues such as Vic Fezensac in France and Oslo in Norway – even Cape Town, South Africa. 
Bandleaders such as “Jorge Santos” have lamented salsa music’s shifting locus of 
popularity outside of the United States. While well-known clubs continue to employ live bands, 
there seems to be less interest in the genre. As Mr. Santos recounted an event from 2013, while 
waiting to go on stage for the second set of the band’s performance, the club manager promptly 
paid him and said that they would not need to play the second set.  Instead the club manager 
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proceeded to play recorded, and very loud, reggaeton. This must seem particularly absurd, given 
New York City, and its club scene, essentially gave birth to the genre. In the U.S., it seems as 
though younger generations of New Yorkers lack knowledge about the genre and in many 
instances prefer reggaeton. While musical families, such as the Condes, the Lebrones, or the 
Valdezes, may have passed on the genre to later generations, there does not seem to be 
succession on the part of the audience/dancers.  However, this may be due to the level of 
exposure that reggaeton is granted on the radio.  Mr. Santos, bandleader of a highly respected 
and award-winning band, indicated that he cannot get his music on the radio domestically. If 
young people are not exposed to salsa bands through local clubs and radio, how are they to know 
of it? 
In contrast, Mr. Santos continues to have immensely positive experiences while 
performing abroad. While playing a gig in Russia, Mr. Santos recounted details such as the 
comfortable volume of the music played, and the level of respect that staff had for the genre and 
musicians. Furthermore, international young people seemed to be particularly knowledgeable 
about salsa music when compared to domestic youth. This increased international interest in 
salsa has contributed to the development of salsa bands in places like Tokyo, Japan (Sager, 
2015). As salsa music gained popularity in Japan, initially Japanese bands would sing in 
Spanish, but did not understand the language (Waxer, 2002). Despite the linguistic barrier, such 
bands have gained international acclaim. 
In addition to a shift away from domestic venues, music profits have shifted away from 
record sales and into concerts (The Economist, 2007). In earlier decades, bands would go on 
tour to promote their records, but today, bands make records so that they can go on tour. While 
some record sales inevitably result from performances, it is not a guarantee, particularly in the 
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new internet-based music market. YouTube and Pandora, free internet services offer music 
consumers rampant opportunities to avoid costs, and more and more artists are releasing their 
music through individualized YouTube channels and in some cases gaining notoriety exclusively 
through this avenue. In fact, music sales are so uncertain that Grammy-award winning 
institutions such as U2 now give their music away for free. 
The shifting market for salsa music and the changes within the music industry have made 
it more difficult for Nuyorican bands to find domestic work. In the past the music industry was 
an economic haven for groups experiencing market discrimination.  However, the lack of 
cultural succession combined with the disinterest of local media has helped diminish the work of 







Perhaps to biggest blow to the domestic salsa music market is the fact that the genre was 
never formally institutionalized, like other related genres, specifically jazz. Schools of music, 
museums, historical societies, and the like have been erected to pay tribute and preserve jazz, 
while salsa music has been surreptitiously denied the same consideration given it is not 
considered to be a member of the jazz family. Juan Luis Guerra, clearly not a jazz musician, 
studied at the prestigious Berklee College of Music in Boston, earning a degree in jazz 
composition. The reason is that it is not possible to earn a degree in salsa music, or merengue, 
bachata, or other related genres for that matter. This lacking institutionalization has left salsa 
aficionados to informally document their historical knowledge on personal websites (Puerto 
Rican trumpeter Pete Nater, Mamboniks) and YouTube in an attempt at preservation. Today 
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there is an incredible amount of historical footage on YouTube in particular (albeit not 
consolidated), however, there is a both a lacking acknowledgement and formal preservation of 
the genre. 
Furthermore, salsa and other related genres never attained lasting official Grammy 
categories as have Jazz and Latin Jazz (Wikipedia, 2017). The fact that there are two categories 
for jazz is indicative of the prestige of this genre over less esteemed ethnic music. The category 
“Tropical” includes salsa, bachata, merengue, cumbia, Spanish language rock music, among 
many others deemed to be “tropical”. Recent winners include Carlos Vives, a Colombian pop- 
Latino singer. There do not appear to be any clear definitions of what “tropical” music is. For a 
brief stint, between 2000 and 2003, the tropical category was divided into two categories, Best 
Salsa Album and Best Merengue Album, however, the two categories were quickly consolidated 
in 2004 and then eliminated in 2007. While some may argue that the inception of the Latin 
Grammy Awards in 2000 was meant to combat the inadequacy of the Grammy Awards in 
addressing the universe of Latin music, even this specialized event, meant to break out the 
immense diversity of Latin music, does not include a category for salsa music. Ironically, the 
Latin Grammy category reserved for the genre is “tropical”. Thus, even in the Latin music 







Although salsa music might be the most visible Puerto Rican cultural product in the 
continental United States, in New York City, the bodega was arguably the most visible site of 
Puerto Rican culture in earlier decades.  In the densely populated urban context, bodegas 
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emerged both as a site where Puerto Ricans could locate cultural products, but also as an 
alternative to large grocery stores for all New Yorkers. Most bodegas sold culturally universal 
non-perishables such as paper products, gum, in addition to perishables such as milk, fruit, and 
hot coffee. These stores were sites of interpersonal exchange between Puerto Ricans and non- 
Puerto Ricans. By way of this exchange, the term “bodega” was widely incorporated into the 
New Yorker vocabulary. However, today, very few Puerto Rican bodegas remain (Falcon, 
2004). 
To a lesser degree, restaurants are also visible sites of Puerto Rican culture, however 
there is a greater degree of selectivity involved in this particular type of business. Given ethnic 
restaurants tend to serve exclusively ethnic food, and so serve less culturally universal items, the 
likelihood of cross-cultural exchange is decreased.  Additionally, Puerto Rican restaurants tend 
to be located in neighborhoods that continue to maintain a fairly dense Puerto Rican population 
(East Tremont, East Harlem, Lower East Side), which in the sense of foot-traffic, in some cases 
limits opportunities for non-Puerto Ricans to be aware of such a dining experience. There are 
exceptions to this, however, such exceptions tend to be upscale restaurants that serve fare that the 
average Puerto Rican, or average person, might not be able to afford. For example, Sazon is an 
upscale Puerto Rican restaurant in Tribeca (Sazon, 2017). While it serves Puerto Rican dishes 
such as mofongo, such dishes are the creation of an executive chef, who offers vegetarian 
options for each dish listed on the menu. The cost of a dinner entrée costs between $17 and $39, 
making it unaffordable for many in New York City.  Furthermore, there are decidedly non- 
Puerto Rican items included on the menu. For example, a quesadilla (Mexican) is listed as an 
appetizer, churrasco (said to be Argentinian) as a meat offering, and cheesecake (New Yorker) as 
a dessert. 
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A much more specialized small business, one-stops were also visible sites of Puerto 
Rican culture. One-stops sell an array of cultural items often specifically musical in nature, 
however, not necessarily. Available products might include domino tables, cuatros (small Puerto 
Rican guitars), and CD’s that would likely not be found in big music stores and would almost 
certainly be Spanish-language. However, the music may not be specifically Puerto Rican either, 
as other genres such as those in Mexico and the Dominican Republic increase in popularity. In 
New York City, these small businesses were historically linked to the salsa scene, providing 
specific musical products, selling the music of local musicians, and also acting as sites of cultural 
production. Renowned song-writer Rafael Hernandez opened a music store in East Harlem in 
order to support his song writing (National Park Service, 2001). Taino Mayor Studios, a 
recording studio on East Tremont, operates within a one-stop (Pinto, 2011).  And Rincon 
Musical, the largest chain of one-stops in New York City, sells everything from djembe drums to 







Puerto Ricans in New York City created and built salsa music. Puerto Rican bandleaders 
and singers remain the most successful and awarded salseros. However, their contributions were 
never formally documented or preserved.  Domestic institutions preserve American genres such 
as jazz and hip-hop, and Cuban institutions preserve Cuban genres such as son and cha-cha-cha, 
however, no institution has preserved or documented Puerto Rican contributions to salsa music. 
This combined with the swift ascent of salsa romantica and commercialized salsa dancing, and 
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the denial of Puerto Rican ownership of the genre, have rendered the most visible Puerto Rican 
cultural contribution invisible. 
The only documentation of the salsa era lies within the few documentaries on the subject, 
such as “Our Latin Thing”, a few independent websites, and various videos on YouTube (Gast, 
1972). There is no Salsa Hall of Fame. As such, the rich history or the genre, and the 
overwhelmingly Puerto Rican contributions to it, are muted. 
In addition to the lacking institutionalization, music marketers significantly shifted their 
goals in the 1990s towards a more commercialized and pop form of music. They took salsa and 
stripped it of its ethnicity, packaging it as a ballad with a catchy salsa-like background. At the 
same time, the market of salsa dancing began to develop, moving away from Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods and clubs, and into more commercialized and de-ethnicized venues, such as 
ballrooms and schools of dance. The dance was also scrubbed of its ethnicity, packaged into a 
glittery – and standardized – ballroom uniform. 
Lastly, prominent Puerto Rican artists denied their cultural contributions to salsa music, 
claiming it to be exclusively Cuban. The salsa heroes that made it to the 21st Century deny 
Puerto Rican cultural contributions to the genre – going so far to lump Tito Puente and Tito 
Rodriguez (Puerto Rican legends) into Cuban music. This attempt at providing “accurate” 
musical history and assuage any political criticism helps to erase the important role of Puerto 
Ricans in salsa music. 
Salsa music may only be one example of the erasure of Puerto Ricans from cultural 
contributions. Another such example would be hip hop. Raquel Z. Rivera found that Puerto 
Ricans were substantial contributors to early hip hop, and even more compelling, represented the 
largest resident population in hip hop’s birthplace: the South Bronx (Rivera, 2003). Despite 
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Puerto Ricans’ participation and contributions, hip hop is deemed to be exclusively an African 
American artifact. 
The combination of the lacking public acknowledgment of Puerto Rican contributions to 
the salsa genre, the lacking institutionalization and formal documentation of salsa music, and 
changes to the global music industry all contributed to the lacking public Puerto Rican presence 
in salsa music. The irony is that music was one of the few viable modes of attaining upward 
mobility for young Puerto Ricans in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. And yet despite these 
successes, their many contributions are muted. The submersion of Puerto Ricans in the 
development and maintenance of salsa music is yet another mean through which Puerto Ricans 
have become publicly invisible. 
232	
Conclusion: Puerto Ricans Have Disappeared 
Twenty years ago, Puerto Ricans played a prominent role in New York City life. Puerto 
Ricans could easily be found in ethnic enclaves and local media, and Puerto Rican leaders were 
visible in political and cultural activities throughout the city. Today, however, Puerto Ricans are 
difficult to locate in the public realm.  Public Puerto Rican identity has been scrubbed from 
public life, and in its place we find an ambiguous quasi-racial Hispanic identity. One might say 
that Puerto Ricans have become invisible in New York City. This invisibility is a paradox in that 
Puerto Ricans remain the largest Hispanic subgroup in the region, a group of approximately one 
million people.  Additionally, there is no compelling evidence to suggest that Puerto Ricans are 
no longer distinct from other local residents.  So, what happened?  When, how and why did 
Puerto Ricans become invisible? 
Some scholars might argue that Puerto Ricans are no longer visible because they have 
assimilated. For sociologists, assimilation generally refers to the shedding of one’s specific 
ethnic traits in exchange for socioeconomic mobility. By adopting American culture in place of 
ethnicity, it is thought that ethnic groups can make gains in education, income, and other 
measurable markers of acceptance into the mainstream. Assimilation theorists would argue that 
Puerto Ricans were either culturally assimilated or they mirrored other New Yorkers, and thus 
became ethnically invisible. Puerto Ricans, however, do not meet the requirements of 
assimilation. Puerto Ricans remain one of the poorest and least educated populations in New 
York City, and thus remain a distinct group when compared to the broader New York City 
population. Puerto Ricans did not culturally assimilate, rather, Puerto Ricans maintain cultural 
traits such as Spanish language use. Further, while their numbers decreased, Puerto Ricans 
remain the largest Hispanic subgroup in the region. 
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Scholarship has not well explained ethnic disappearance that fails to follow an 
assimilation trajectory.   Some theorists argue that if the children of immigrants were 
acculturated into American society too rapidly, they could experience downward assimilation 
into the native minority populations, such as African Americans (Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). In 
this vein, the authors might argue that Puerto Ricans, through a process of rapid acculturation, 
may have shed their ethnic markers too quickly and thus been assimilated not into the middle 
class, but the underclass. Either way, through the process of rapid acculturation, Puerto Ricans 
would have become culturally invisible, as they would be culturally indistinguishable from other 
Americans. The only problem with this theory, is that there is no compelling evidence to support 
the wholesale American acculturation of Puerto Ricans.  In fact, most Puerto Ricans in New 
York City continue to speak Spanish despite the passing of three or more generations (U.S. 
Census Bureau 2000 Summary File 4). Using existing evidence, Puerto Ricans remain culturally 
distinct from the American mainstream and yet they are both economically disadvantaged and 
publically invisible. 
Still other authors might argue that Puerto Ricans were merely subsumed into the 
Hispanic category (Mora, 2014; Davila, 2001).  The general consensus among the few 
sociologists that examine the development of Hispanic identity is that Hispanic identity 
developed in the 1980s and emerged in reaction to perceived discrimination or political struggles 
(Padilla, 1985). It is thus thought to be an emergent rather than preexisting, identity. However, 
my own findings suggest that a meaningful panethnic Hispanic identity was very much present in 
New York City well before the 1980s. I have shown, for example, that in 1963 the slogan of the 
largest Spanish language newspaper read: “Champion of the Hispanics.” This, in combination 
with the frequent use of the term throughout the text of each newspaper issue in January of 1970 
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(and analyzed here) suggest that not only was the term familiar to local residents, but was in 
frequent enough use that it was a standard term to refer to a fairly diverse group of Spanish 
speakers in New York City. In 1918, La Prensa (one half of the later merger El Diario La 
Prensa), promoted the slogan: “The Only Spanish and Hispanic-American Daily in the U.S.” 
This suggests a panethnic Hispanic identity was present over six decades before the 1980 mark 
noted by other scholars. Thus, the term emerged well before the disappearance of Puerto Ricans 
from the public discourse. 
Not only do these early newspaper slogans suggest that panethnic Hispanicity may be a 
preexisting identity in New York City, but they suggest that the development of Hispanic 
identity may be context-based. Perhaps in Chicago, where Felix Padilla (1985) performed his 
research, Hispanic identity was indeed emergent – but not every place has the same 
sociohistorical processes (Omi and Winant, 1994). These sociohistorical differences, then 
contribute to the formation of different kinds of identities – be it panethnic, ethnic, racial, or 
otherwise. In New York City, it seems that the development of Hispanic identity started at the 
community level, and was ascribed. 
Still other literature has addressed the matter of visibility by way of ethnic enclaves and 
therefore might explain Puerto Rican invisibility by the disappearance of their enclaves. Ethnic 
enclaves are defined as a spatially dense mix of ethnic residences and businesses (Wilson and 
Portes, 1980). This type of neighborhood can enhance a group’s visibility. Private residences 
alone are not generally visible, in that they may not stand out. However, ethnic businesses are 
inherently public in that they are meant for public consumption. To be sure, the primary 
business model for the Puerto Rican commercial sector had been the bodega. Once ubiquitous 
throughout New York City, the Puerto Rican bodega has now become the Dominican and Arab 
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(Yemini) bodega (Kates, 2006; Sury, 2013). This is likely partially due to succession, but also 
due to the failure of Puerto Rican bodega owners to thrive (Falcon, 2004; Wagenheim and 
Jimenez de Wagenheim, 2006; Hayasaki, 2008). Ethnic businesses are often located in spatially 
dense ethnic residential neighborhoods, and advertise themselves as cultural markers, so this mix 
contributes to the public visibility of a given ethnic group. Several clear examples of Puerto 
Rican enclaves in places like Spanish Harlem in Manhattan, Williamsburg in Brooklyn, and East 
Tremont in the Bronx had been visible in the past. In recent decades, however, the Puerto Rican 
commercial base in these neighborhoods has eroded and with the influx of newcomers to Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods came different kinds of businesses (both ethnic and not) to fill the void. 
Some examples include the bevy of Mexican street food vendors in Spanish Harlem, or the 
plentiful number of hipster bars in Williamsburg. In this sense, then, the decline of Puerto Rican 
businesses has indeed contributed to the decline in Puerto Rican visibility within Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods. 
This decline in commercial visibility does not necessarily mean that Puerto Ricans would 
become publicly invisible.  Many New Yorkers may not venture into Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods or bodegas, and thus would not be affected by the decline in Puerto Rican 
commercial density.  Puerto Ricans became invisible in New York City through other means. 
What is generally lacking in previous assessments of Hispanic identity is how American 
society treats Hispanic identity. Hispanic identity in its formal definition is not a racial category, 
and yet, in everyday life, Hispanic is used to describe a subset of the non-white population. 
Police reports describe suspects as being “Hispanic”, to mean that this is a visible and racial 
distinction. So, while the formal use of Hispanic identity is panethnic, the informal use of 
Hispanic identity references a murky kind of race.  Not every group can become ethnically 
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invisible; this varies by race. White ethnics, for example, seemingly can become fully 
assimilated into the white American mainstream. Ethnicity may be utilized in certain contexts, 
but those who are racially white are generally assumed to be a part of the broader white 
population and have unquestioned access to racial advantages (Waters, 1990). Non-white 
ethnics, however, cannot become racially white. Their specific ethnicity may be publically 
obscured, but non-whites are grouped into quasi-racial categories such as “Hispanic”. To this 
end, Puerto Ricans are no longer identified by their ethnicity, and instead have been racialized 
into the Hispanic category. Puerto Ricans became invisible through the nearly wholesale 
disappearance of Puerto Rican institutions, news reports, politicians, and popular culture. The 
process of invisibility began in earnest in the 1980s, and was nearly complete by 2010. The 
hallmark of invisibility, for the purpose of this dissertation, is that an ethnic group continues to 







While not a cause of invisibility, per se, demographic changes are associated with the 
declining visibility of Puerto Ricans.  Puerto Ricans have become dispersed – both throughout 
the New York City metropolitan region and amongst other Latinos. The Puerto Rican population 
has shifted away from the urban centers of New York City – their traditional location – and 
towards the surrounding suburbs. This shift is associated with the ascent of a subset of Puerto 
Ricans into more affluent suburbs such as Nassau County in Long Island and Bergen County in 
New Jersey. This more affluent group of Puerto Ricans can be considered the Puerto Rican 
pioneers into these well-to-do neighborhoods, as they generally make up a fairly small 
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percentage of the local population. These dynamics also mean that suburban-based Puerto 
Ricans are less visible than their more concentrated and less affluent urban counterparts. 
Less affluent Puerto Ricans are also increasingly dispersed amongst other Latinos in the 
urban centers where they remain. While Puerto Ricans made up the majority of the local Latino 
population up through 1990, they now make up an increasingly small share. Historically Puerto 
Rican neighborhoods, such as East Harlem in Manhattan and Williamsburg in Brooklyn, are now 
increasingly Mexican – while other neighborhoods in the Bronx are now increasingly 
Dominican. The shift of affluent Puerto Ricans out of the urban centers, and the shift of non- 
Puerto Rican Latinos into these areas, means that Puerto Ricans are much less concentrated in 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods – and less visible. 
The demographic analysis of Census data can tell us a lot about the suburban/urban 
divide, but it cannot tell us about the lived experience of Puerto Ricans in the region. My 
interview data help to fill in this gap. In my conversations with Puerto Ricans throughout the 
region, respondents’ most startling revelations included the inability of Puerto Ricans to put food 
on their family’s tables, the crime and violence that continues to plague Puerto Rican 
neighborhoods, and the palpable tension between Puerto Ricans and other Latino subgroups. 
These kinds of issues were present in the urban counties in New York City. By contrast, the 
experience of Puerto Ricans in the suburbs alluded to a wistfulness for a cohesive Puerto Rican 
community, and a willingness to sacrifice that longing in order to make a better life for one’s 
children in the suburbs. Somehow the divide between Puerto Ricans in the suburbs and Puerto 
Ricans in the urban centers has gone unnoticed by local news sources and policy makers. It is as 
if New York City proper is a world of its own, and any municipalities outside the five boroughs 
are irrelevant. 
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The research compiled in this dissertation suggests that there are three primary means 
through which Puerto Ricans become invisible: the media, politics, and culture. News reports 
about Puerto Ricans have dwindled in number in the past few decades.  Both the English 
language and Spanish language press have replaced Puerto Rican-based articles with reports on 
other ethnic populations such as Mexicans, as well as the panethnic Hispanic/Latino population. 
In addition, Puerto Rican politicians have shifted to a Hispanic identity. As the public face of the 
Puerto Rican community, the decision of politicians to remain ethnically ambiguous helps to 
remove Puerto Ricans from public view. Furthermore, Puerto Rican salsa has largely been 
relegated to soundtracks, jingles, and overseas tours. Those Puerto Rican musical artists that 
remain in public, such as Jennifer Lopez, have also developed Hispanic identities, and are only 
deemed acceptable because they generally adhere to the formulaic rules of pop music. The result 
is that public representations of Puerto Rican-ness are nearly nonexistent. 
Every year New York City is the site of what should be the most visible Puerto Rican 
event of the year. The Puerto Rican Day Parade takes place on the second Sunday of June, a 
tradition that spans over fifty years. Puerto Ricans from around the country come line 5th 
Avenue to celebrate their ethnic pride. And large television networks, such as ABC, dedicate 
airtime and programming to the event. While one would think that this kind of media coverage 
would translate into public visibility, interestingly, it doesn’t. Rather than portray New York 
City Puerto Ricans – Nuyoricans - local news coverage instead depicts Puerto Ricans from the 
island. Not only was coverage limited to island-based Puerto Ricans, but, specifically, racially 
white and upper class island-based Puerto Ricans.  Only about 30% of Puerto Ricans in New 
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York City were born in Puerto Rico, and most of them are not white. By ignoring local Puerto 
Ricans, media coverage of the annual parade aided in making Puerto Rican residents in New 
York City invisible on a day specifically meant to honor them. In the week surrounding the 
bigger Puerto Rican Day Parade on 5th Avenue, there a several smaller local festivals in 
historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods that offer a more authentic expression of local Puerto 
Rican-ness.  These festivals take place in neighborhoods like Spanish Harlem and the Lower 
East Side in Manhattan, and Williamsburg and Sunset Park in Brooklyn. Despite the more 
authentic presentation of what it is to be Puerto Rican in NYC, these festivals were not 
publicized in local media. Thus, even on the most Puerto Rican day of the year, everyday Puerto 







The media’s disinterest in everyday Puerto Ricans is not limited to the Puerto Rican Day 
Parade. Puerto Ricans have all but disappeared from local media reports. Despite remaining the 
largest Latino subgroup in the city, news coverage of local Puerto Ricans plummeted. As I have 
shown, the New York Times, the largest English language press in the region, and El Diario La 
Prensa, the largest Spanish language press in the area, helped to remove Puerto Ricans from 
public view. Both news houses have readily promoted Hispanic identity at the expense of Puerto 
Ricans. 
The New York Times rapidly decreased coverage of Puerto Ricans between 1970 and 
2010, while El Diario La Prensa rapidly cut the share of articles dedicated to Puerto Ricans 
while also shifting their lens away from the local Puerto Rican community and toward more 
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celebrity topics such as athletes and musical artists. In this way, both the New York Times and El 
Diario La Prensa have made Puerto Rican residents invisible in local media. 
The media’s choice to ignore Puerto Ricans helped to erase Puerto Ricans from public 
history. For example, Puerto Ricans made significant gains in New York City politics between 
1990 and 2000 when the number of Puerto Rican politicians grew from 16 politicians to 26. 
Not only did Puerto Ricans make political gains in New York City, but Puerto Rican politicians 
made waves in the surrounding counties as well. Between 1990 and 2010, the number of Puerto 
Rican representatives in suburban New York and New Jersey jumped from 2 to 13 politicians. 
But the New York City news media failed to report on this development. News coverage is the 
only publicly available way to trace the political history of a given location, and local media 
completely failed to capture most Puerto Rican political developments in the region. In this way, 








The political terrain of historically Puerto Rican neighborhoods has also contributed to 
Puerto Rican invisibility. With the influx of newcomers - largely Mexicans, Dominicans, and 
gentrifiers - the character of Puerto Rican political districts has changed significantly. Puerto 
Ricans now make up a much smaller share of the local district population, which means that 
Puerto Rican politicians’ priorities have shifted to cater to the changing demographic reality. 
One possible reaction to these demographic changes is that local Puerto Rican politicians - as 
one of the only publicly Puerto Rican groups - shifted to a more ambiguous Hispanic identity in 
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order to cater to broader constituent bases, perhaps in an effort to combat paltry Puerto Rican 
voting rates. In this sense, the rise in the number of Puerto Rican politicians was a lost 
opportunity to increase Puerto Rican visibility throughout the region, and instead actually 
contributed to Puerto Rican invisibility. 
In addition, the political field itself substantively changed in the past several decades. 
 
The machine politics of yore (that boosted Irish political clout in New York) are long gone, and 
in its place is a much more bureaucratic system (Erie, 1990). As such, Puerto Rican politicians 
have moved away from street politics, and at this point are a highly polished and elite group that 
publicly identifies as Hispanic. With a bevy of Ivy League credentials, Puerto Rican politicians 
today are generally not representative of the average Puerto Rican in the New York City 
metropolitan region and make few or no appeals to their Puerto Rican base. 
Furthermore, Puerto Rican politicians are also highly invested in topics that are not 
particularly relevant to Puerto Ricans. One such topic is immigration. Immigration legislation 
such as the DREAM Act, DACA, among others, are listed on nearly every Puerto Rican 
politician’s website, however, Puerto Ricans are not immigrants. Puerto Ricans are not subject 
to immigration law because Puerto Rico is a U.S. territory, and therefore Puerto Ricans are U.S. 
citizens by birth. 
In the 1960s there was a huge debate over whether Hispanic was a racial category in New 
York City – and the general outcome was that Hispanic was not considered a racial category. 
Instead, Puerto Rican politicians have sought to make Hispanic an immigrant category. In this 
sense, there is no need to address race, since the focus on the matter of immigration legislation is 
of greater concern to most Hispanics.  In a way, it is as if Puerto Rican politicians use 
Hispanicity and the issue of immigration as a way to avoid dealing with the prickly topic of race. 
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By avoiding Puerto Rican identity and matters of race, and promoting non-Puerto Rican issues, 







In addition to media and politics, changes in the cultural industry have also contributed to 
Puerto Rican invisibility. Here, I explored salsa music, perhaps the most visible Puerto Rican 
cultural object in the United States. The musical genre was born in Puerto Rican neighborhoods 
in New York City, and created largely by Puerto Rican musicians through the innovation and 
merging of Cuban mambo, son, and cha-cha-cha (three distinct Cuban rhythms). Salsa was born 
in the gritty, urban streets of New York City, and as such, has a very brash New York City feel. 
Salsa musicians were often self-taught, not schooled musicians, and so the sound is not polished, 
but perhaps it resonates with listeners for that very reason. For example, note how Grammy 
Award winner Eddie Palmieri, perhaps in an effort to combat his Carnegie Hall roots, can be 
heard on the track “Puerto Rico” yelling in the background as he takes his piano solo. He was 
very definitely in the moment, which made the track all the more powerful. Not only did salsa 
music come from the streets, but the subject matter of the music was often the streets as well. 
However, as with politics, Puerto Rican public history of the musical genre of salsa suffers, for it 
was never institutionalized in the way other ethnicized forms were. Furthermore, the bigger and 
better known Puerto Rican artists that participated in the development of salsa have turned 
towards more prestigious genres such as jazz. 
Puerto Rican artists are not solely to blame, as there was a significant shift in the music 
industry beginning in the 1990s.  Music marketers, in an attempt to create a broad consumer 
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base, decided that a more lucrative route would be to promote a more “pop” version of salsa, 
such as Salsa Romantica. Additionally, the salsa dance movement (On1 and On2) has pretty 
much eliminated the need for a band, as dancers are more than happy to dance to a DJ’s 
electronic sound. There is a whole industry (shoes, clothing, congresses) dedicated specifically 
to salsa dancing, which is particularly popular in places like Japan. For this reason, real salsa 
music has been generally been relegated to jingles, soundtracks, and overseas tours, and has 
generally been scrubbed of its New York City-rooted Puerto Rican ethnicity. This is important 
because salsa music was both one of the primary means of achieving social mobility, as well as 
one of the primary modes through which Puerto Ricans could become publicly visible. 
Even today’s most famous and public Puerto Rican of all, Jennifer Lopez, is a perfect 
example of the scrubbing of Puerto Rican ethnicity. In 2006 she told People en Espanol: “I’ve 
never tried to hide the fact that I’m Latina…I think that’s why Hispanics are like ‘She’s ours; 
she’s out there, but she belongs to us’ and that’s true. With the Latino community, I am theirs. I 
do belong to them- that’s who I am” (Perez-Feria, 2006). In this sense, even today’s most visible 
Puerto Rican – one who graces the covers of almost every major magazine, and was a judge on 
American Idol – who at 47 is reported to be dating 30 year old Drake, perhaps the most visible 
male vocalist of color today - is downplaying her Puerto Rican-ness in favor of Latinidad.  Thus, 
it is not only the media’s doing, or the politicos’ doing, but even the most prominent Puerto 
Ricans have embraced Hispanicity at the expense of lauding a Puerto Rican identity. 
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Local demographic shifts, the increasing media and political interest in panethnic 
populations, and changes in the culture industry have resulted in the perfect storm of invisibility 
for Puerto Ricans in New York City.  But ethnic invisibility could happen to other groups as 
well, although not in just any context. For example, I do not believe that Mexicans will become 
invisible in California, even if only because California used to be a part of Mexico and shares a 
border with her.  Unlike the melting pot culture of New York City, California socially constructs 
a space where “the immigrant is popularly imagined as a permanent foreigner with a legitimate 
claim of belonging”- in fact the immigrant is needed for the California economy to thrive 
(Hintzen, 2002). Thus, I argue that even the same ethnic group could have a different experience 
depending on which American coast they land on – that’s how much context matters. That said, 
in the context of New York City, with the rapid rise in the local Mexican population, and the 
movement of Dominicans outside of the city, I believe it is very possible that one day 
Dominicans could become publicly invisible themselves. 
I also wonder about the potential for ethnic invisibility amongst African Americans. 
Currently, there is a distinction between the “African American” ethnic category and other 
ethnicized experiences of racialized blackness. African American music, African American 
styles of dress, African American dialects, and African American cuisine all make for an 
ethnically distinct culture. And yet, cultural objects such as African American cuisine are being 
subsumed into the black category. “African American” - like “Puerto Rican” - is simultaneously 
a racial and an ethnic measure, however, when used solely as a racial measure, this is how 
African American ethnicity is obscured.  Marcus Samuelsson – an Ethiopian raised in Sweden – 
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opened the now famous Red Rooster soul food restaurant in Harlem without question because of 
his race, however, B. Smith’s eponymously named restaurant could not survive New York City 
rents (Ferst, 2015). By opening a soul food restaurant, Samuelsson helps make the case that 
African American culture is merely black culture – there is no African American distinctiveness. 
The slogan at the top of the Red Rooster website reads: “Celebrating the roots of American 
cuisine”, while the restaurant cookbook reads: “The story of food and hustle in Harlem” (Red 
Rooster, 2017). These two punchlines very clearly remove African American ethnicity from the 
cuisine served at this soul food restaurant. Samuelsson’s Harlem restaurant exemplifies the 
murkiness between race and ethnicity even within the black racial category. This is one example 
of how African American ethnicity could also become invisible, and perhaps is already on its 
way to becoming ghosts. 
 
 




What does ethnic invisibility mean for the one million Puerto Ricans throughout the New 
York City metropolitan region? Some might argue that invisibility is part and parcel of social 
mobility. But there is more evidence than not showing that everyday Puerto Ricans continue to 
identify as Puerto Ricans, rather than as Americans or an ambiguous Hispanic identity.  And 
even in those areas where Puerto Ricans have made economic gains, they continue to be 
socioeconomically distinct from the general population. Whether you are rich or poor, one’s 
ethnic identity remains important, especially when viewing the distinctions between Puerto 
Ricans and others throughout the poor and affluent counties in and around New York City. 
Puerto Ricans continued to be racialized as a group, and yet by rendering them ethnically 
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I think the role of Puerto Rican public servants here deserves special attention. While I 
understand the challenges associated with running for political office, I also understand the 
incredible pressure to ride the Hispanic wave that has enveloped not just New York City, but the 
nation. However, what I can’t understand is the widespread ignorance and denial of race and 
poverty in the Puerto Rican community once one’s office is won. No matter who elected Puerto 
Rican politicians, those politicians have a duty to serve all of their constituents, not just the 
immigrants and working class. In fact, elected officials should be most interested in serving the 
most vulnerable residents in their districts.  Instead, issues like Puerto Rican hunger on the 
Lower East Side, Puerto Rican heroin use in Williamsburg, and Puerto Rican gangs and poverty 
in Spanish Harlem and East Tremont, are muted or ignored altogether. I do not place the blame 
entirely on the political class, as they only way that they can thrive is if there is an existing 
system to support them. But, it is very difficult for me to reconcile the fact that Puerto Rican 
politicians have a (likely) unique opportunity to create meaningful and beneficial change in their 
community and appear not to be making good use of it. It appears as though we have already 
reached the pinnacle with respect to the number of Puerto Rican representatives – the highest 
number of Puerto Rican politicians to date was 26 in 2000; by 2010 that figure dipped to 25 
representatives. Instead of acknowledging and embracing this fleeting opportunity to bring 
attention to the Puerto Rican community, Puerto Rican politicians operate as if Puerto Ricans 
have long left New York City and immigration is the new black. 
I also take issue with the lack of attention to race among those in the Puerto Rican 
population at large.  Puerto Ricans have much more in common with African Americans than 
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they do with any other ethnic sub-population in New York City.  Puerto Ricans entered the 
region at a similar time, they participated in similar kinds of labor, they were impacted by 
broader economic shifts in similar ways, they occupy a similar niche in the public sector, and 
they both have prevalent African ancestry.  There is even cultural overlap through jazz, 
boogaloo, salsa, and hip hop. However, the ramifications of the 1960s Hispanic race debate are 
that the two groups are now considered mutually exclusive. Puerto Ricans are somehow not 
black (although they were spoken about as such in the 1970s). This arbitrary, and illogical, line 
extends to nearly every realm: scholarly work, politics, government, non-profits, the media, 
culture, etc. Even today, arguably, Puerto Ricans are racialized just as African Americans are, in 
fact, the socioeconomic consequences (from an aggregate level) appear to be more severe. In 
spite of the denial of the relevance of race to the Puerto Rican population, Puerto Ricans are 
suffering racial penalties. Today, then invisibility they can’t even be ethnic. In this sense, the 
racialization of a group may be most complete once a group is rendered ethnically invisible. 
There is no other option for Puerto Ricans but to be grouped into an ambiguous racial category 
such as “Hispanic” or “black”. Any a priori identity is denied in place of existing racial and 
panethnic aggregate labels. 
Recognition is the acknowledgement of the fundamental characteristics of an individual 
or group (Taylor, 1994). This idea of identity is formed through interaction – in the Hegelian 
sense – and is considered by some scholars to be a vital human need. Then, recognition must be 
the first step towards achieving social justice, and is in and of itself a political goal. For Puerto 
Ricans in New York City have been denied their public identity – instead they are rolled up into 
a Hispanic category that does not treat all subgroups equally. Puerto Ricans are 
disproportionately subsumed into the panethnic category.  Puerto Ricans are also 
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disproportionately disadvantaged when compared to other populations –on this count they need 
the most help, and yet there is little to no chance for social justice without recognition (Fraser, 
1997). Part of the problem is that through the general multicultural environment promoted by 
local politicians and government – as evidenced by the various caucuses and committees across 
city government – promotes the idea of “equal dignity”, whereas in all groups are worthy of 
equal attention (Taylor, 1994). This might not seem like a problem at first glance, however, in 
an unequal system, the dominant group gets to decide who is worthy of rights. Apparently 
Puerto Ricans are not deemed to be worthy. 
What would Puerto Rican visibility look like? Were Puerto Ricans visible, Puerto Rican 
poverty and lacking educational attainment would be a prominent feature of policy discussions; 
Puerto Rican contributions to local Hispanic politics, small businesses, and New York City 
culture would be documented and publically acknowledged; and prominent Puerto Rican figures 
would be known as such without the pressure to avoid their ethnic identity. More importantly, 
there would be efforts to create meaningful and beneficial change for a population that remains 
distinct in its socioeconomic disadvantage. Such efforts and attention should not come at the 
expense of other groups – of diversity – but given the current state of politics, when there are 
winners there are also losers. I do not begrudge groups that manage to maintain or achieve a 
semblance of recognition, I do take umbrage with those that play an active role in denying Puerto 
Rican recognition and justice. 
Ethnic invisibility is a most effective means of silencing a group of people.  Remove 
from public view their distinctiveness, their trials and tribulations, and their victories, and it is as 
if Puerto Ricans don’t exist. For those that have attained a modicum of success, ethnic 
invisibility may seem like a necessary evil, however, even Puerto Ricans in the suburbs are 
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racialized. Just because your ethnicity is invisible doesn’t mean your race is. Invisibility is not a 
phenomenon that begins and ends with Puerto Ricans. Depending on the demographic and 
political development of the African American and Dominican communities in the area, it is 
likely that these two groups – despite the immense size of their respective populations - will 
suffer similar consequences. 
The murkiness of race and ethnicity is only murky because our current paradigm denies 
that they are inherently linked.  Even though the U.S. Census and other institutions argue it is 
not, Hispanic is a racial term. Yes, it is also cultural, but in its common usage it is a racial term. 
Police departments formally treat Hispanic as a race in their descriptions of suspects, but police 
officers are not the only perpetrators making Hispanics racialized. Informally, Americans 
categorize all people along the racial lines we have been socialized to believe are real. A person 
unknown to us can only be White, black, Asian, Native American, or Hispanic (and maybe Arab) 
– all treated in this instance as racial categories. No one is allowed to be raceless (Treitler, 
2013). You cannot physically see ethnicity, but you can physically see our construct of race. 
Ethnicity only becomes visible when introduced and then recognized. To make matters even 
more complicated is the way in which these racial categories each are infused with ethnic 
meaning.  Black, Asian, Native American or Hispanic can all refer to a kind of ethnicity as well 
– these terms are all panethnic. However, society denies that Hispanicity is a racial construct. 
 
Race and ethnicity are inherently linked – but race continues to be the primary means for 
how we categorize non-Whites in the United States. These intertwined constructs of race and 
ethnicity, combined with the fierce denial that they overlap, muddies the definitions of both. 
Penalties for those who are identified as non-White. For Puerto Ricans, one penalty is that they 
are racialized, yet no one can tell because their Puerto Rican ethnicity has been rendered 
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invisible. Until we can all come to terms with the continued importance of race for all non- 
White populations, racialization in all its forms – including ethnic invisibility – will persist. 
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Appendix: Large Tables 
Appendix
Table 1. Puerto Rican Population 
 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
NYC 821700 860552 861122 789172 723621 
Bronx 308800 320098 336367 319240 298921 
New York 188100 166328 149464 119718 107774 
Kings 282600 279646 263424 213025 176528 
Queens 38800 83425 94395 108661 102881 
Richmond 3400 11055 17472 28528 37517 
Suburban 
NY 29000 67700 86397 109694 130350 
Nassau 9900 13,984 16668 23,540 29,965 
Suffolk 19100 35,935 42434 51,256 58,549 
Westchester 17,781 27295 34,898 41,836 
New Jersey 94300 155685 170371 192105 205196 
Bergen 3600 7080 11493 17290 25786 
Essex 24900 45,504 47117 53015 54005 
Hudson 36900 55,828 53721 58312 56436 
Passaic 24200 36,334 40459 41324 41827 
Union 4700 10,939 17581 22164 27142 
TOTAL 945000 1083937 1117890 1090971 1059167 
     Source: IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, www.ipums.org 
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Table 2. Puerto Ricans in Relation to Other Hispanics 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
NYC PR 821700 860552 861122 789172 723621 
oth Hisp 331300 552027 876805 1371382 1612455 
PR % 71.3 60.9 49.5 36.5 31.0 
Bronx PR 308800 320098 336367 319240 298921 
oth Hisp 48900 76,255 172,499 325,465 442,492 
PR % 86.3 80.8 66.1 49.5 40.3 
New York PR 188100 166328 149464 119718 107774 
oth Hisp 103600 169,919 231,233 298,098 295,803 
PR % 64.5 49.5 39.3 28.7 26.7 
Kings PR 282600 279646 263424 213025 176528 
oth Hisp 75300 112,472 184,181 274,853 319,757 
PR % 79.0 71.3 58.9 43.7 35.6 
Queens PR 38800 83425 94395 108661 102881 
oth Hisp 101000 178997 276931 447944 510869 
PR% 27.8 31.8 25.4 19.5 16.8 
Richmond PR 3400 11055 17472 28528 37517 
oth Hisp 2500 14384 11961 25022 43534 
 
PR % 57.6 43.5 59.4 53.3 46.3 
Suburban 
NY PR 29000 67700 86397 109694 130350 
oth Hisp 24500 79841 154897 317123 518276 
PR % 54.2 45.9 35.8 25.7 20.1 
Nassau PR 9900 13,984 16668 23,540 29,965 
oth Hisp 15300 29,302 56,212 109,742 165,390 
PR % 39.3 32.3 22.9 17.7 15.3 
Suffolk PR 19100 35,935 42434 51,256 58,549 
oth Hisp 9200 22,754 41,804 98,155 187,690 
PR % 67.5 61.2 50.4 34.3 23.8 
Westchester PR 
County Lines 
Redrawn 17,781 27295 34,898 41,836 
oth Hisp 
County Lines 
Redrawn 27,785 56,881 109,226 165,196 
PR % 
County Lines 
Redrawn 39.0 32.4 24.2 20.2 
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Table 2 (Part II). Puerto Ricans in Relation to Other 
Hispanics 
	
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
New 
Jersey PR 94300 155685 170371 192105 205196 
oth Hisp 101000 197455 316040 513245 699436 
PR % 48.3 44.1 35.0 27.2 22.7 
Bergen PR 3600 7080 11493 17290 25786 
oth Hisp 12400 21434 37419 74087 119495 
PR % 22.5 24.8 23.5 18.9 17.7 
Essex PR 24900 45,504 47117 53015 54005 
oth Hisp 17800 31,080 46,093 69,332 105,112 
PR % 58.3 59.4 50.5 43.3 33.9 
Hudson PR 36900 55,828 53721 58312 56436 
oth Hisp 49300 89,335 127,501 183,811 211,417 
PR % 42.8 38.5 29.6 24.1 21.1 
Passaic PR 24200 36,334 40459 41324 41827 
oth Hisp 7500 25,789 55,723 105,168 143,850 
PR % 76.3 58.5 42.1 28.2 22.5 
Union PR 4700 10,939 17581 22164 27142 
oth Hisp 14000 29817 49304 80847 119562 
PR % 25.1 26.8 26.3 21.5 18.5 
TOTAL PR 945000 1083937 1117890 1090971 1059167 
oth Hisp 456800 829323 1347742 2201750 2830167 
PR% 67.4 56.7 45.3 33.1 27.2 
  Total # Latinos 1401800 1913260 2465632 3292721 3889334 





Table 4. Median Family Income 
NYC 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Bronx PR 5450 8810 16800 22980 25000 
total 8,050 12,490 24,000 30,000 36,000 
PR 
% 67.7 70.5 70.0 76.6 69.4 
New York PR 5550 8357 17581 20100 29000 
total 8,050 14,005 30,000 43,000 59,600 
PR 
% 68.9 59.7 58.6 46.7 48.7 
Kings PR 5550 7805 16000 24100 32000 
total 8,450 13,790 29,396 35,000 44,200 
PR 
% 65.7 56.6 54.4 68.9 72.4 
Queens PR 8150 14210 34824 41000 48,600 
total 11,150 19,675 39,000 45,600 56,000 
PR% 73.1 72.2 89.3 89.9 86.8 
Richmond PR 10950 16310 37234 49300 69000 
total 12,350 24,005 50,000 61,000 81,000 
PR 
% 88.7 67.9 74.5 80.8 85.2 
Suburban 
NY 
Nassau PR 10050 23015 47600 68000 86300 
total 14,650 28,520 61776 83,000 112,200 
PR 
% 68.6 80.7 77.1 81.9 76.9 
Suffolk PR 9850 19130 44000 60200 74000 
total 12,350 24,860 54000 71,500 96,630 
PR 
% 79.8 77.0 81.5 84.2 76.6 
Westchester PR 10250 16020 32000 37800 43600 
total 13,950 27,070 57524 79,000 65,800 
PR 
% 73.5 59.2 55.6 47.8 66.3 
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Table 4 (Part II). Median Family Income 
  New 
Jersey 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Bergen PR 13950 25832 53000 56300 80000 
total 14,050 27,510 57,000 76,000 100,000 
PR % 99.3 93.9 93.0 74.1 80.0 
Essex PR 5050 7805 20000 29000 37000 
total 10,450 11,570 42,400 54,000 70,700 
PR % 48.3 67.5 47.2 53.7 52.3 
Hudson PR 6450 10005 23300 30200 42000 
total 9,550 15,620 33,430 41,600 56,600 
PR % 67.5 64.1 69.7 72.6 74.2 
Passaic PR 6550 10370 24000 36900 38000 
total 10,450 21,005 43,063 53,000 68,900 
PR % 62.7 49.4 55.7 69.6 55.2 
Union PR 6650 14010 24000 42000 45000 
total 12,750 18,010 47,100 62,240 80,000 
PR % 52.2 77.8 51.0 67.5 56.3 
    Source: IPUMS-USA, University of Minnesota, 
www.ipums.org 
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Table 5. Poverty Rates 
NYC 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Bronx PR 35.9 43.9 42.9 40.1 43.7 
total 19.5 27.6 28.7 30.7 29.3 
New York PR 31.9 43 40.6 41.3 36.8 
total 17.3 21.8 20.5 20 17.5 
Kings PR 35 47.6 43.3 36.5 35.8 
total 17.6 24 22.7 25.1 22.7 
Queens PR 14.9 25.4 18.3 19.1 24.9 
total 7.6 11.4 10.9 14.6 14.4 
Richmond PR 44.1 27.6 24.8 25.2 27.7 
total 6.1 8.2 7.8 10 11.3 
Suburban NY 
Nassau PR 20.2 17.5 9 10.9 17.6 
total 4.4 4.8 3.7 5.2 5.8 
Suffolk PR 13.6 18.6 13.9 14.3 10.6 
total 5.9 6.6 4.7 6 6.1 
Westchester PR 40.7 30.7 25.4 20.6 17 
total 6.2 7.1 6.8 8.8 9.3 
New Jersey 
Bergen PR 2.8 10.6 9 5.9 12.3 
total 4.1 4.1 3.9 5 6.6 
Essex PR 45.4 49.6 38 32.3 29.8 
total 13.1 17.9 14.3 15.6 16.1 
Hudson PR 20.3 38.9 30.6 25.8 25.8 
total 11.9 16.9 14.8 15.5 15.7 
Passaic PR 24 38.9 28.5 23.9 24.2 
total 9.3 12.8 10 12.3 15.8 
Union PR 29.8 30.5 27 20.1 22.4 
total 6.1 7.5 7.2 8.4 10.4 
















Puerto Rican Elected Officials Outside of New York City 
NJ City 
Council 
  Jose Torres No Paterson 
Mayor 
Joseph Vas No 
Perth 
Amboy 















City 1980 1990 
3 
264	









Lopez Yes LES 
Fernando 
Cabrera (1/2 




Viverito Yes 8th 
Pedro G. 
Espada No Bronx 
Maria Del 
Carmen 






Palma No 18th, Bronx 
Federico 
Perez Bronx Rosie Mendez No 2nd, LES 
Adolfo 
























Ferrer No Bronx 
Ruben Diaz, 
Jr. No Bronx 
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Crespo Yes 85th, Bronx 
Ruben 
Diaz, Jr. No Bronx 
Robert J. 
Rodriguez No 68th 




Arroyo Yes 74th, Bronx 





Denis No 68th 
Adam 
Clayton 










Rivera No 80th, Bronx 










Sr. Yes 32nd, Bronx 
Pedro 









Santiago No Brooklyn 
Gustavo 
Rivera Yes Bronx 
David 
Rosado Yes Bronx 
Pedro 











Serrano Yes 21st 
Jose E. 
Serrano Yes 21st 
Charles 
Rangel No 15th 
Charles 
Rangel No 15th 
Nydia 
Velazquez Yes 7th 
Nydia 
Velazquez Yes 7th 
Total 26 14 25 13 
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Peralta No 13th 
Adriano 
Espaillat Yes Manhattan 
Rafael Espinal, 
Jr. No Brooklyn 
Total 2 2 8 4 
Ecuadorian Elected Officials in NYC 
NYS 
















City 2000 2010 
28 35 17 
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Puerto Rican Elected Officials Outside of New York City 
NYS 
Assembly Phil Ramos No 
Suffolk 
County 




























Quintana Yes Newark 
Luis 
Quintana Yes Newark 
Anibal 
Ramos, Jr No Newark 
   
Carlos M. 
Gonzalez Yes Newark 
Jose Torres No Paterson 
Mayor 
Samuel 
Rivera Yes Passaic Jose Torres No Paterson 
Joseph Vas No 
Perth 














Total 4 2 14 4 
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Cuban Elected Officials Outside of New York City 
NJ City 
Council Javier Acosta No Ridgefield 
Hugo 
Jimenez No Ridgefield 
NJ 
























Mayor Albio Sires Yes 
West New 
York Silverio Vega Yes 
West New 
York 






Menendez No 13th Albio Sires Yes 13th 
U.S. Senate 
Bob 




Martinez Yes Freeport 
County 




Total 4 3 11 6 
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Tavarez Yes Paterson 
Mayor 
Alex 



















Total 1 1 5 5 


















1 1 1 1 










Total 1 1 
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Latino (Unidentified Origin) Elected Officials Outside of New York City 
Mayor 
Anthony 
Suarez ? Ridgefield 










Jimenez ? Glen Cove 
Anthony 
Jimenez ? Glen Cove 
Village 
Board of 














 Note: This table was pieced together through exhaustive internet searches, and sifting through 
archival New York Times and El Diario La Prensa issues.  Despite these efforts, there is still 
missing or potentially erroneous information.   
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1,421,101  92,513 
440,194  74,655 
(Non-
Hispanic) 468,699  32,941 
569,177 196,551 
2,899,171 396,660 
Dominicans 483,722 204,464 
 92,979  39,524 
107,662  70,818 
 78,777  57,078 
763,140 371,884 
Mexicans 207,774 189,955 
111,519 106,761 
 63,574  58,923 
 89,115  81,551 
471,982 437,190 





*Note: Dominican heritage was not an option on the 1980 Census form.  Figure is an
estimate obtained from Grasmuck and Pessar (1991).
Source: Social Explorer Tables(SE), Census 1980 and 1990, U.S. Census Bureau and 
Social Explorer;  U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 and 2010 Summary File 2. 
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Table 9. Number of Residents 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 Difference % Change 
Bronx Hispanic 644,705 741,413  96,708  15.0 
Black/African American 416,338 416,695     357   0.1 
Puerto Rican 319,240 298,921 - 20,319 - 6.4
Dominican 133,087 240,987 107,900  81.1 
Mexican  34,377  71,194  36,817 107.1 
Brooklyn Black/African American 848,583 799,066 - 49,517 - 5.8
Hispanic 487,878 496,285   8,407   1.7 
Puerto Rican 213,025 176,528 - 36,497 - 17.1
Mexican  58,825  94,585  35,760  60.8 
Dominican  65,694  86,764  21,070  32.1 
Manhattan Hispanic 417,816 403,557 - 14,259 - 3.4
Black/African American 234,698 205,340 - 29,358 - 12.5
Dominican 136,283 155,971  19,688  14.4 
Puerto Rican 119,718 107,774 - 11,944 - 10.0
Mexican  30,391  41,965  11,574  38.1 
Queens Hispanic 556,605 613,750  57,145  10.3 
Black/African American 422,831 395,881 - 26,950 - 6.4
Puerto Rican 108,661 102,881 - 5,780 - 5.3
Mexican  55,481  92,835  37,354  67.3 
Dominican  69,875  88,061  18,186  26.0 
Staten 
Island 
Hispanic 53,550  81,051  27,501  51.4 
Black/African American 39,704  44,313   4,609  11.6 
Puerto Rican  28,528  37,517   8,989  31.5 
Mexican   7,798  18,684  10,886 139.6 
Dominican   1,867   4,918   3,051 163.4 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 and 2010 Summary File 2. 
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Table 10. Median Household Income 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 Difference % Change 
Bronx Black/African American 29,282 36,900  7,618 26.0 
Mexican 25,762 32,505  6,743 26.2 
Hispanic 22,387  27,800  5,413  24.2 
Dominican 23,283 27,076  3,793 16.3 
Puerto Rican 20,723 25,425  4,702 22.7 
Brooklyn Black/African American 30,413 40,071  9,658 31.8 
Mexican 31,775 37,650  5,875 18.5 
Hispanic 25,628  33,906  8,278  32.3 
Dominican 24,408 30,054  5,646 23.1 
Puerto Rican 21,242 27,602  5,646 29.9 
Manhattan Mexican 38,996 45,004  6,008 15.4 
Black/African American 23,875 31,924  8,049 33.7 
Hispanic 24,766  30,269  5,503  22.2 
Dominican 24,520 26,712  2,192 8.9 
Puerto Rican 19,399 23,794  4,395 22.7 
Queens Black/African American 43,320 56,722 13,402 30.9 
Puerto Rican 40,513 52,841 12,328 30.4 
Hispanic 38,708  50,331  11,623  30.0 
Dominican 35,097 48,593 13,496 38.5 
Mexican 39,041 48,059 9,018 23.1 
Staten Island Puerto Rican 45,957 65,520 19,563 42.6 
Hispanic 44,314  57,890  13,576  30.6 
Dominican 37,683 57,143 19,460 51.6 
Black/African American 33,578 41,373 7,795 23.2 
Mexican 31,068 31,220 152 0.5 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4; U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 
American Community Survey. 
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Table 12. % Bachelor Degree or Higher (Age 25 or Over) 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 
Bronx Black/African American 14.60% 18.00% 
Dominican 9.40% 11.90% 
Hispanic 8.20% 11.40% 
Puerto Rican 7.70% 11.00% 
Mexican 4.30% 4.50% 
Brooklyn Black/African American 14.60% 19.50% 
Hispanic 8.50% 12.70% 
Dominican 6.90% 11.20% 
Puerto Rican 6.90% 10.40% 
Mexican 7.00% 9.50% 
Manhattan Mexican 21.50% 26.80% 
Black/African American 19.70% 26.50% 
Hispanic 14.00% 21.00% 
Puerto Rican 11.20% 15.50% 
Dominican 8.60% 14.70% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community Survey. 
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Table 13. Labor Force Participation 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 
Bronx Mexican 52.5% 70.0% 
Dominican 53.3% 65.0% 
Black/African American 55.5% 60.9% 
Hispanic 49.0% 59.2% 
Puerto Rican 47.0% 51.3% 
Brooklyn Mexican 60.1% 69.9% 
Black/African American 58.3% 62.5% 
Dominican 53.3% 60.2% 
Hispanic 52.7% 59.9% 
Puerto Rican 48.5% 51.2% 
Manhattan Mexican 64.8% 74.0% 
Dominican 52.5% 59.5% 
Hispanic 51.1% 58.8% 
Black/African American 53.0% 55.9% 
Puerto Rican 45.0% 48.3% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community 
Survey. 
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Table 14. Unemployment Rates 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 
Bronx African American 8.3% 8.3% 
Dominican 8.8% 8.0% 
Puerto Rican 7.9% 7.5% 
Hispanic 8.4% 7.4% 
Mexican 7.1% 4.8% 
Brooklyn African American 8.5% 6.9% 
Puerto Rican 7.7% 6.1% 
Dominican 7.4% 5.7% 
Hispanic 7.6% 5.4% 
Mexican 6.4% 3.9% 
Manhattan Dominican 8.4% 8.6% 
African American 9.6% 8.0% 
Puerto Rican 7.6% 7.9% 
Hispanic 7.8% 7.7% 
Mexican 6.2% 6.0% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community 
Survey. 
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Table 15. Percent Foreign Born 
Borough Racial/Ethnic Category 2000 2010 
Bronx Hispanic 30.4% 34.5% 
Black/African American 23.9% 28.5% 
Puerto Rican 37.7% 31.1% 
Dominican 69.5 61.2 
Mexican 65.2 60.4 
Brooklyn Black/African American 34.6% 37.0% 
Hispanic 36.1% 37.1% 
Puerto Rican 37.2% 30.6% 
Mexican 66.6 58.2 
Dominican 68.9 60.9 
Manhattan Hispanic 45.9% 43.4% 
Black/African American 12.5% 14.9% 
Dominican 69.3 62.9 
Puerto Rican 41.0% 33.5% 
Mexican 65.3 55.9 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 4; 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2006-2010 American Community 
Survey. 
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Table 16. Income Below Poverty Level in Last 12 Months in NYC 







Puerto Ricans 268,138 236,503 34 32.7 -31,635 -11.8
Dominicans 137,756 171,036 33.9 29.7 33,280 24.2 
Mexicans 57,721 92,119 30.9 28.9 34,398 59.6 
Hispanic 654,716 616,037 30.3 26.4 -38,679 -5.9
Black/African American 477,943 385,693 24.4 20.7 -92,250 -19.3
*Note: The percentage in 2000 and 2010 reflects the number of residents who reported
income below the poverty line, divided by the reported total number of residents.
Calculations were necessary, because there is no geographic variable available to encompass
similar data for all five brooughs.
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